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The concern of Chinese intellectuals with the "idea" 
of modern science from the West in the transition 
generation from 1895 to 1923 was fundamentally a concern 
about "national survival" and modernity. The value and 
2 
meaning that accrued to science as "method" -- as a 
"thinking technique" -- and to the evolutionary ideas of 
Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer as the "science of 
choice" among Chinese intellectuals of this period, was due 
to belief or disbelief in the power of these ideas to 
describe, explain, or solve the problematic of "modernity" 
in a Chinese context. 
Yan Fu's (1853-1921) translations of Thomas Huxley and 
Spencer and articles about ideas from the West, with their 
adherence to Confucian categories of description and 
assumed acceptance of aspects of Confucian-Taoist cosmology 
set the stage for much of the discussion for and against 
modern science, and evolutionary thought in particular, 
among social thinkers that was to follow. In the influence 
of Yan's notions of the meaning and role of modern science 
in China on the liberal Hu Shi (1891-1962) and the 
republican-turned-communist Chen Duxiu (1880-1942), a clear 
trend emerges. An examination of the essays of Hu and Chen 
written between 1915 and the journalistic polemic on 
"Science versus Metaphysics" in 1923 reveals that their 
views represent further development of strains in Yan's 
thought whose consequences had been insufficiently explored 
or about which he had been ambivalent. The trend of 
thought represented by Yan Fu, Hu Shi, and Chen Duxiu, with 
its belief in the transvaluative power of "scientific 
thinking" and increasing subsuming of a Chinese or Western 
3 
"essence" (ti) in the usefulness ( YQ.n.g) of a borrowed idea 
or technique, was not a clean break with the native Chinese 
philosophical tradition. Though they would come to promote 
radically divergent views, by relying on ideas from the 
science and philosophies of the West to solve China's 
problems, while casting their presentations of these ideas 
in traditional Chinese philosophical terms, these three 
figures all managed to "face both ways." 
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A NOTE ABOUT ROMANIZATION OF CHINESE NAMES AND TERMS 
This essay employs the pinyin system of romanization 
of Chinese names and terms in the text. This system was 
developed in the People's Republic of China and officially 
adopted in 1979. Although pinyin is becoming more 
universally used, the Wade-Giles (and sometimes the Harvard 
or Yale) system is found in older works and frequently in 
newer ones. Quotations and citations using one of these 
older systems have been left intact. The first time a 
Chinese name or terms appears in a chapter, the pinyin 
romanization will be immediately followed by the Wade-Giles 
rendition, in brackets [ J, to aid the non-specialist in 
moving from the text to the quotations and bibliographical 
references. 
A NOTE ABOUT TRANSLATIONS 
Translations of Chinese sources are mine only where 
indicated. Quotations from English language secondary 
sources are treated in the following manner: if I have seen 
the primary source, but used the translation of the author 
of the secondary source, the primary source is cited as 
"translated in ... "; if I only had access to the quotation 
translated in a secondary source, the primary source is 
cited as "quoted in .... " 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The period between the "100 Days of Reform" in 1898 
and the May Fourth Movement in 1919 is widely acknowledged 
as a "watershed" era in the intellectual history of modern 
China.1 A fundamental psychic tension had been building 
1 Charlotte Furth, "Intellectual Change: From the 
Reform Movement to the May Fourth Movement, 1895-1920," in 
The Cambridge History of China: Volume 12, Republican 
China, 1912-1949, Part I, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 322. The "100 Days of 
Reform" was a an attempt at a comprehensive remake of 
ineffective Chinese governmental and educational 
institutions during the summer of 1898. Based on proposals 
put forward by Kang Youwel [K'ang Yu-wei] and his follower 
Liang Qichao [Liang Ch'i-ch'aoJ, and supported by the 
Manchu emperor of China Guangxu [Kuang Hsu], it was 
intended to modernize the Confucian approach, not to 
overthrow it. It was ended by a reactionary "coup" in 
September 1898 that forced Liang and Kang to flee the 
country for Japan. The May Fourth Movement began on May 4, 
1919, in the intensely activist response of students at 
Beijing University to the acquiescence of the Nationalist 
government to the terms of the Versailles Peace 
Conference. In late April, 1919, the Chinese were informed 
that the Shandong [Shantung] peninsula, that Japan had 
seized from the Germans during World War I, would remain 
under Japanese control, instead of reverting to China, 
despite the fact that China considered Japan an enemy. The 
students began a demonstration and street fighting broke 
out. By forging ties with other, and older, intellectuals 
of the New Culture movement, their ideas spread throughout 
China's cities. The widespread critique of the old 
Confucian government and culture that ensued from this 
enlarged front helped to set new socio-political 
developments in motion. 
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since the 1840s, generated by the pressing need for "men 
of talent" to understand and utilize the "wealth and power" 
of the West. Many put their faith in a trickling-in of 
"Western studies" (Xixue) CHsi-hs~ehJ, believing it would 
enable China to politically and militarily expel the 
"Western barbarians" who were "carving-up China like a 
melon." China's military loss to the British in the Opium 
Wars of 1840-1842 and to the French in the Sino-French War 
of 1848, and the destabilizing political and economic 
consequences, convinced two generations of "self-
strengtheners" that China should take a lesson from the 
West and strengthen itself technologically and militarily -
- while maintaining a "true" Chinese identity. China's 
defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, by a country 
that the Chinese had considered a "puny little brother," 
was devastating to the morale of the those who were 
responsible for the day to day running of the government, 
as well as to the next generation of young leaders, then in 
their late teens and early twenties. 
In searching the horizon of the West for the secret of 
its strength and power in the world, the Chinese self-
strengtheners of the mid-nineteenth century had already 
pinpointed Western technology as a source of that strength. 
But they had based their assessment of the value of Western 
technology on a separation of its theoretical foundations 
from its utility in a given situation. This separation of 
"essence" (ti) Ct'iJ from "function" (YQQg_) [yy_ng) was to 
reappear, indeed to haunt, the thinking of intellectuals 
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involved in the process of modernizing China throughout the 
early twentieth century. In the 1990s it still occupies a 
not-so-hidden agenda in the continuing debate in China over 
the "correct" attitude of Chinese students to Western ideas 
when they are sent to European and North American 
universities to learn "techniques" to modernize China's 
economy, agriculture, industry, and medical care. 
The Chinese application of the t..i/Y.Q..!lg_ paradigm to 
contact with the West implies the belief that the practical 
techniques of one society can be absorbed by another 
without recourse to their theoretical underpinnings, and 
without regard to the cultural, social, and economic 
circumstances in which the ideas originated. The integrity 
of the borrowing culture would, ostensibly, be preserved by 
maintaining its "essence" (ti) and borrowing what is merely 
"utilitarian" (Y.Q..!lg_), an important consideration in the 
face of repeated military losses to Western nations. The 
most famous statement of this paradigm in the early modern 
period in China was that of Zhang Zhidong [Chang Chih-tungJ 
(1837-1909). His slogan of "Chinese learning for the 
essentials, Western learning for its utility" (Zhongxue wel 
•• •• ti, Xixue wei yong) [Chung-hsueh wei t'i, Hsi-hsueh wei 
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~1 was the real hope of many among the self-
strengtheners. It was important to strengthen the nation 
against the incursions of the West and Japan, but critical 
to preserve what was "essentially Chinese" while doing so. 
Self-strengtheners, who had been educated as members of a 
scholar-gentry class within the boundaries of a Neo-
Confucian intellectual tradition, still believed that what 
was "essentially Chinese" was a clear-cut entity. 
Chinese intellectuals in the late nineteenth century 
admired the West's modern sciences along with its 
technology. China had experienced, first hand, the power 
of the practical application of modern science in Europe's 
successful military, maritime, and industrial technologies. 
But the arrival of European science in China, beginning 
with the astronomy and physical science of the Jesuits who 
worked in China in the sixteenth century, had been hampered 
by piecemeal presentations. Few European books on 
scientific subjects were translated into Chinese until the 
late nineteenth century; many were only excerpts or 
incompletely translated.2 
The first attempts to present the modern sciences as 
whole systems of thought began only in the late nineteenth 
2 See Chapter Ill below, pp. 45-46, for a discussion 
of the status of Western science in China prior to the late 
nineteenth century. 
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century. This was made possible by improved translations, 
better facilities for the production of Chinese editions, 
and the support of the government authorities who 
controlled the import of European books and kept a close 
watch on the translating and printing of books within 
China. With increased instruction available in foreign 
languages, greater numbers of students were being sent 
every year to study industrial and military technology and 
medicine in Europe and the United States. While abroad 
they were exposed to the sciences in their "pure" forms, as 
systems of thought. They returned to China excited about 
the prospects of applying what they had learned in 
modernizing China. But their effectiveness was hampered by 
their low numbers in the population as a whole. 
In the late 1890s all of these factors -- improved 
translation and publication facilities, greater instruction 
in foreign languages, the exposure of students traveling to 
Europe and the United States for training in technological 
areas to "pure science" -- came together at the same time 
that China suffered her most humiliating loss, the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894-95. The first presentations of modern 
science as a whole system of thought, as an effective "way" 
of thinking, and as a key ingredient in the success of the 
modern West were made in the midst of these other factors, 
and when Chinese morale had reached a very low ebb. 
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one of the most systematic and satisfying 
presentations of science as a system in China in the 1890s 
was that of biological evolution. As the idea of Charles 
Darwin's theory of the evolution of species was absorbed 
into Chinese intellectual culture, its power of social 
explanation became immediately clear. Partially a social 
reading of Darwin's theory as a Spencerian/Malthusian 
"social Darwinism," it was being interpreted through the 
template of an already existing set of Chinese intellectual 
categories which helped to define and shape it. Elements 
of Darwin's theory of evolution had a "utility" {~) that 
filled a crying need among many of the younger generation 
of intellectuals who felt called to "save China." An 
"evolutionary cosmology" began to develop among social and 
political thinkers which represented a major stream of 
thought about "how science works" in China in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.3 
Chinese intellectuals were first exposed to Darwin's 
theory of the evolution of species in the articles and 
3 "Evolutionary cosmology," as used by Charlotte 
Furth (and others), is a "systematic conception of the 
universe, in which natural, spiritual, and social phenomena 
were perceived as manifestations of a single cosmic 
reality," which had its Chinese roots in Confucian-Taoist 
thought. The "external" sources for this new view were the 
Western notion of progress, a new knowledge of "world 
history," and the social implications of Charles Darwin's 
theory of the evolution of species. see Furth, 325. 
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translations of Yan Fu [Yen Fu) (1853-1921). His writings 
exerted a powerful influence on reform thinking in the 
generation between the "100 Days" and the May Fourth 
period. The range of those indebted to him for fundamental 
elements of their ideology includes constitutional 
monarchists, Confucian revivalists, nationalists, liberals, 
and'communists. Yan's work represents the first 
comprehensive attempt to present modern science from the 
West in more than its obviously technological aspects. It 
was science as a "way" of working with the world that was 
important to Yan. He still perceived the "way" of science 
as the way to save China, but in his thinking there is a 
shift toward the belief that the "nuts and bolts" of this 
"way" are in its method of operation rather than simply in 
its assemblage of "facts." 
By comprehensively presenting science in general, or a 
particular science, as a system of thought, Yan Fu 
succeeded in giving those whom he influenced not only a 
complete "scientific system," but right or wrong, a 
lasting impression of "how" science works as well. His 
translations of the work of Thomas Huxley and Herbert 
Spencer gave many reform-minded intellectuals a biological 
model of change that seemed to perfectly fit the social 
circumstances in China at the time. 
The understanding of the workings and uses of modern 
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science that Yan Fu developed was far from "seamless." In 
fact, certain ambivalences and contradictions in his work 
are the origin for elements of the thought of other 
important figures in the early twentieth century. Though 
detailed textual comparisons of Yan Fu's translations and 
miscellaneous writings with those of other intellectuals 
concerned with the issues of China's social survival have 
yet to be done, a critical part of his importance for the 
intellectual history of this period in China is due to his 
often subtle influence on other social thinkers. As a 
member of the class of bureaucrat-literati trained in the 
Neo-Confucian tradition, and therefore accustomed to its 
categories of description and explanation and its styles of 
presentation, he is an important bridge between the 
intellectual cultures of China and the West. In his 
unavoidably synthetic approach are the seeds of the thought 
of others who came after him. His use of Darwin, Huxley, 
and Spencer's biological explanations as analytical tools 
for the examination of social, political, and economic 
issues and the view of science implicit and explicit in his 
work was the starting point for many Chinese intellectuals' 
relationship with modern science. 
Two nearly opposing strains of thought in China which 
were borrowed from the West and born in the intellectual 
heat of the May Fourth Movement owe much to Yan Fu's 
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concept of science and his biological mode of social and 
political explanation. Chinese communism and Chinese 
liberalism were the two major viable alternatives to 
"national death" after the initial fervor of May Fourth 
died down. Though it was ultimately communism that won in 
the marketplace of Chinese ideas, they both express 
elements that are present in Yan's own work. Despite the 
marked difference in their conceptualizations of change and 
continuity, modernity and tradition, and "how science 
works," the Chinese variants of both Marxism-Leninism and 
liberalism are linked to the thought of Yan Fu through 
their "evolutionary cosmologies" and through their mutual 
belief in the transformative power of "scientific thinking" 
to secure China's survival in the modern world. 
The work of liberal Hu Shi [Hu Shih] (1891-19) and 
communist Chen Duxiu [Ch'en Tu-hsiu] (1880-1942) in the May 
Fourth era have frequently been linked to Yan Fu. Both of 
them were known to have read his works and openly admitted 
their debt to him for elements of their own thought. Part 
of their inheritance from Yan were certain 
conceptualizations of modern science, both in general and 
in the particularity of his application of modern biology 
to socio-political concerns. Though both liberalism and 
Marxism as they developed in the West have their own 
connections to evolutionary thought and to "scientific" 
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thinking, Hu and Chen were especially influenced by these 
ideas from the West as they had previously been interpreted 
by Yan Fu. 
By examining the work of Yan Fu, and that of Hu Shi 
and Chen Duxiu as two divergent strains of thought equally 
influenced by Yan's work, a picture begins to emerge of 
scientific understanding among Chinese intellectuals of the 
late imperial and early republican periods.4 That 
4 In this study the primary textual sources for the 
thought of Yan Fu were several influential essays published 
between 1895 and 1898, and Yan's Chinese translation of 
Thomas Huxley's Evolution and Ethics, published in 1898 as 
Tianyan Lun CT'ien-yen LunJ. The essays were unavailable 
in Chinese, necessitating a greater reliance on extensive 
quotations in English language secondary sources. Primary 
textual sources for Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu were articles 
that they wrote between 1915 and 1919 for the journal New 
Youth (Xin Qingnlan) CHsin Ch'ing-nlenJ, and their prefaces 
to the two volume collection of the polemic on "Science 
versus Metaphysics", published in 1923. This focus on 
published essays and journal articles, because their 
audiences were similar, helps to give some basis for 
comparing their ideas. 
Pertinent biographical information on all three 
figures was primarily obtained from English language 
biographies. Information on Hu Shi was particularly rich, 
as there were additionally an autobiography, Sishi zizhuan 
[Ss'u-shih tz'u-ch'uanJ (Autobiography at Forty) in 
Chinese, and a synopsis of the development of his personal 
"Credo," written in English in 1931. Chen Duxiu's 
"autobiographical fragments" of two chapters of an 
unfinished longer work were available in English 
translation. Certain aspects of their biographies are 
problematic and are discussed in the chapter devoted to 
each thinker. 
Finally, a large number of secondary sources were 
consulted, far too many to mention in an introduction. 
Where it was felt to be helpful, the original work of a 
European or American thinker whose influence on Yan, Hu, or 
Chen is the subject of discussion was consulted as well. 
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scientific understanding was carried into the following 
period of turmoil throughout the 1920's and 1930's and 
helped to form the revolutionary ideologies of those who 
eventually came to power in the 1949 communist revolution. 
This study will be confined to the single generation 
bounded by the publication of Yan Fu's earliest articles 
and translations, from 1895 to 1898, and the "Debates on 
Science and Metaphysics" in 1923. The period of the May 
Fourth Movement extended beyond the initial incident in 
Beijing, May 4, 1919 to include a number of important 
events that have their origins in the changing intellectual 
culture of urban China at that time. The "Debates," though 
occurring several years after the peak of activity 
surrounding the May Fourth Era, brought together all of the 
strains of thinking then current on the nature and role of 
modern science in China's immediate future. The earlier 
writings of Hu and Chen, from 1915 to 1919, were pivotal in 
generating the discourse among intellectuals concerning the 
meaning of science that eventually took the form of the 
"Debates," and their essays preface the published 
collection of the polemic. For these reasons the "Debates" 
provide a clear stopping place for periodizing this 
generation under consideration. The outcome of the 
"Debates" was a generalized acceptance of a "scientific 
view of life" as a necessity for achieving modernity among 
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many Chinese intellectuals. This set a certain tone for 
much of the political and social thought in China from that 
point on. 
Yan, Hu, and Chen share certain aspects of their 
background and educations that make them an ideal group for 
the study of a trend of thought over a single generation. 
They all came from families who were part of the class of 
Neo-Confucian trained scholar-officials, literati educated 
to serve the state, though they were exposed to different 
strains of Neo-Confucianism. They span the last generation 
of Chinese trained for the government sponsored examination 
system, and after its abolition in 1905, the first for whom 
it could not be the road to a valued career. 
But their responses to the transitional educational 
opportunities available were quite different. Though well-
prepared for the examination route from an early age, Yan 
Fu's financial circumstances (his father had died when Yan 
was quite young) probably kept him from pursuing the 
specialized tutoring in the Confucian canon needed to pass 
the exams. Instead, he opted for an education in "Western 
studies," studying naval science, while maintaining a deep 
interest in the Chinese classics. He eventually took and 
failed the exams four times before he ceased trying. Hu 
Shi also received thorough early training in the Confucian 
canon, but as a youth, attended a series of so-called "new-
13 
schools" that combined traditional Confucian studies and 
some "Western studies." Chen Duxiu is the only one of the 
three who took and passed the entry level prefectural 
examinations and received the xiucai [hsiu-ts'ail degree. 
He started but never finished taking the provincial 
examinations for the juren Cch~-jenJ degree.5 
All three men studied science or technology outside of 
China: Yan in England, Hu in the United States, and Chen in 
Japan. They shared the alienating experience of many 
"returned students" in China, frustrated in their attempts 
to use the technical skills they had learned. They all had 
command of at least one Western language, in addition to 
the scholar's acquaintance with terse and eloquent 
"academic" Chinese. Hu and Chen were also deeply involved 
in language and literary reform in the first quarter of the 
twentieth century. All three of them were deeply committed 
to education as the starting place to build a society, as 
Chinese scholars had been for centuries. The common 
elements in the backgrounds of these men help to point out 
more clearly the diverse directions that their thought 
eventually took. 
5 There was a third level, the metropolitan 
examination, held in Beijing. Success lead to the highest 
degree, the jinshi Cchin-shihl, which granted access to the 
most prestigious and powerful opportunities in the Chinese 
bureaucracy. 
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Though the thought of Yan Fu, Hu Shi, and Chen Duxlu 
certainly constitutes a Chinese strain of the world-wide 
phenomenon of "social Darwinism" -- defined by one 
historian as " .•. laissez-faire political economy rendered 
"scientific" by association with Darwin's theory of natural 
selection ...• "6 -- this essay ls concerned, above all with 
what did occur in the thought of Chinese intellectuals 
coming into contact with the ideas of Darwin, Huxley, and 
Spencer. The Chinese context is not simply an important 
element in the story. This essay is a study of how 
scientlf ic ideas from the West interacted with existing 
Chinese patterns of thought at the turn of the twentieth 
century. "Social Darwinism," while perhaps a useful 
analytical tool in the larger, world context, ls a Western 
term, describing Western responses to Western ideas. 
The same may be said of the label "scientism" --
defined by D.W.Y. Kwok as "··.that view which places all 
reality within a natural order and deems all aspects of 
this order, be they biological, social, physical, or 
psychological, to be knowable only by the methods of 
6 John c. Greene, "Science, Ideology, and World View," 
in Science, Ideology, and World View: Essays in the History 
of Evolutionary Ideas (Berkeley, CA: University of 
california Press, 1981), 3. 
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science."7 It, too, may be a useful tool in placing the 
thought of Hu Shi and Chen Duxlu into a larger, world 
context. Group studies of intellectuals in this period 
which included both Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu have been done 
which used "social Darwinism" or "scientism" as organizing 
themes and analytical tools.8 But in an "internal" study 
such as the present essay, "scientism," like "social 
Darwinism," as a rubric is loaded with the intellectual 
history of the West and may move attention from the Chinese 
context to that of the Western source. 
In an effort to explore the interaction of the ideas 
of modern science with the changing Chinese intellectual 
context in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, this study will try to show what actually 
occurred rather than to apply prefabricated labels of 
Western origin to these circumstances. The situation was 
considerably more complex than labels can express. Instead 
of simply imitating the ways of the West, Yan Fu, Hu Shi, 
7 D.W.Y. Kwok, Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900-
1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965; reprint, New 
York: Biblo and Tannen, 1971), 21 (page references are to 
reprint edition). The emphasis is mine. 
8 For a treatment of Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu in terms of 
"scientism" see Kwok. The most complete analysis of both 
men in terms of the "social Darwinism" of their thought is 
Lin Yu-sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical 
Anti-traditionalism in the May Fourth Era, with a Forward 
by Benjamin I. Schwartz (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1979). 
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and Chen Duxiu unavoidably worked at their understandings 
of the meaning of modern science within a conceptual 
framework that was essentially Chinese. In doing so, and 
in the intellectual resolutions each achieved, they "faced 
both ways." 
CHAPTER II 
YAN FU AND THE MODERN WEST 
When Yan Fu's [Yen Fu] (1853-1921) translation of 
Thomas Huxley's Evolution and Ethics (1893) was published 
in China in 1898 as Tianyan Lun CT'ien-yen LunJ (On 
Evolution), it started a revolution in thought. It 
appeared at a time when modern science and technology were 
increasingly acknowledged by Chinese intellectuals and 
government officials as crucial to China's survival.1 It 
also appeared on the heels of the Empress Dowager Cixi's 
[Tz'u-hsi] quashing of the "100 Days of Reform" in 1898, 
the first comprehensive, government sponsored reform that 
included modern science in the program. The failure to 
achieve the aims of the "100 Days of Reform" left many 
Chinese searching hard for the answer to why China seemed 
not to be able to save itself. 
Yan Fu was not a born iconoclast. Huch of his early 
background was not unusual for a man of the scholar-
official class. He was born in 1853, in the village of 
Yangqixiang CYang-ch'i-hsiangJ, Houguan (Hou Kuan) 
1 see Chapter III, pp. 57-60 below, for a discussion 
of the attitude of nineteenth-century Chinese "self-
strengtheners" to Western science and technology. 
prefecture, Fujian CFukienJ province. His father, Yan 
Chenxian (Yen Chen-hsienJ, was a practitioner of 
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traditional Chinese medicine of some local repute. Yan Fu 
was apparently a bright child (as are all famous scholars, 
in China as elsewhere!), and as the only surviving son in 
the family, was prepared from a very early age by his 
father for tutoring in the canon of Confucianism and study 
for the civil service examinations.2 
Yan Fu's father secured a suitable tutor for him, when 
he was ten years old. It is clear that the young scholar 
had a high regard for his first teacher, Huang Shaoyan 
(Huang Shao-yen], whose death when Yan Fu was fourteen was 
"grieved no end."3 Huang presented Yan with a "multi-
disciplinary" approach to learning the Confucian classics 
that were still the core of Chinese learning for the 
examinations. Rather than approaching study through only 
one or the other of the major intellectual trends in 
contemporary scholarship, Huang exposed Yan to both "Han 
•• learning" (Hanxue (Han-hsuehl and the older and more 
orthodox Nee-Confucian "Song learning" (Songxue) [Sung-
2 Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: 
Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge, HA: Harvard University 
Press, 1964), 22-23, 252 note 3. Yan Fu had two younger 
sisters and a brother, two years older than he was, who 
died as a child. 
3 Ibid., 23. 
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hsuehJ.4 Despite Yan Fu's eventual rejection of the 
empirical textual methodology (kaozhenq) Ck'ao-chengJ used 
by the practitioners of "Han learning,"5 this early 
synthetic approach to learning may have left its mark in 
his own work. Benjamin Schwartz has suggested that Yan's 
" ... combination of enthusiasm for the metaphysical sweep of 
the Spencerian cosmology and equal enthusiasm for [John 
Stuart) Mill's inductionist logic and empirical method 
reflects to some extent the efforts of his teacher to 
combine the values of 'Han and Sung'."6 A reverence for 
methodologies that purport to remove bias from an inquiry 
and ensure a balanced view was an important aspect of Yan's 
later admiration of Herbert Spencer, and his own synthetic 
approach to the problematic of "Chinese learning" versus 
"Western Learning." These aspects of Yan Fu's young adult 
thinking may be seen to have an affinity with his earliest 
formal schooling experience. 
When Yan was thirteen years old his father died. With 
the death of his beloved teacher the following year, Yan's 
4 There is a discussion of Han and Song "schools" of 
Neo-Confucianism in the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing [Ch'ingJ 
(1644-1912) dynasties, and their relationship to each 
other, in Chapter III, pp. 51-57, below. 
5 For a discussion of the empirical methods of Han 
studies and their relevance to acceptance of modern Western 
thought, see Chapter III, pp. 55-57, below. 
6 Schwartz, 24. 
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formal Confucian education came to an end. His father's 
death meant that strain on the family finances might have 
prevented him from getting adequate schooling to pass the 
examinations.? His own dedication to further educating 
himself after a brief three years under the guidance of a 
teacher is evident in his terse, elegant style of writing, 
even when translating a European text. It is a style that 
is deeply rooted in the tradition of scholarly writing on 
the Confucian classics. Even when criticizing or 
overhauling Chinese tradition, he is thoroughly indebted to 
it, and somewhat dependant on it for his metaphors, 
flavoring, and certainly the setting for his explorations 
of the West. 
Yan Fu pursued what was, for him, clearly a viable 
alternative to the traditional routes to a career. He 
chose to attend a school of "Western affairs" (yangwu) 
Cyang-wuJ at the Fuzhou CFoochowJ Shipyard School. The 
superintendent of the school, Shen Baochen [Shen Pao-chenJ, 
was from the same county as Yan's family and insured his 
admission to the school. His admission essay won him first 
place among those entering that term. Yan chose the School 
of Navigation where instruction was in English. English 
ideas would come to dominate his explorations of European 
7 Ibid., 25. 
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thought and his own intellectual development.a 
The Fuzhou Shipyard School (Chuancheng gu xuetang) 
•• (Ch'uan-cheng chu hsueh-t'angJ was founded in 1866 by Ze 
Congtang {Tso Tsung-t'ang] as the educational wing of a 
"self-strengthening" (zi qiang) Ctz'u-ch'iangJ institution. 
It was designed to train young men to staff, build, and 
repair the ships that were to become the backbone of 
China's modern navy. Though it maintained close ties with 
the more traditional academies in Fuzhou, at the time that 
Yan Fu attended it was the primary location in Fuzhou, and 
one of the more important in the country, to receive an 
education in "Western affairs" of any kind.9 
While Yan Fu was a student in Fuzhou, he was exposed 
to modern Western sciences for the first time, studying 
arithmetic, geometry algebra, trigonometry, physics, 
chemistry, geology, astronomy, and navigation, in addition .. 
to English and "Chinese studies" (Zhongxue) (Chung-hsuehJ. 
His first hand experience with basic sciences must have 
contributed to his "voice of authority" when he later began 
to write about modern science. After graduating with 
honors in 1871, he spent a number of years sailing the 
8 Ibid., 26-27. 
9 Suzanne Wilson Barnett, "Foochow's Academies: Public 
Ordering and Expanding Education in the Late Nineteenth 
Century," Journal of the Institute of Modern History 
(Academia Sinica) (1987): 513-514, 537. 
vessel Yang Wu (Western Affairs) and went on an "actual 
naval mission" to take soundings of various ports off the 
island of Formosa in preparation to defend China against 
attacks from Japan.10 
In 1877 Yan was sent to England to continue his 
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studies. Very little seems to be known about the two years 
that he spent in England.11 Benjamin Schwartz states that 
it was already clear to Yan by the time that he returned to 
China that the key to "wealth and power" in the West lay in 
Western thought and that he had "already become familiar 
with Darwinism in England and was also reading Spencer's 
other books at this time."12 But this is nearly all there 
is to go on. In the next decade after his return he was to 
become frustrated with his inability to use what he had 
learned about naval science to positive effect. After a 
series of false starts and dead-end jobs in various aspects 
of self-strengthening, he decided to make an attempt to 
pass the examination for the lowest of the civil service 
10 Schwartz, 27-28. 
11 The only monographic study of Yan Fu in English, 
Benjamin Schwartz's In Search of Wealth and Power, glosses 
over his years in England entirely, while stressing the 
importance of English ideas in his overall intellectual 
development. The only other work in English to treat Yan 
Fu in any depth, James Reeve Pusey's China and Charles 
Darwin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 
doesn't dwell on these years in England either. 
12 Schwartz, 33-34. 
degrees in 1885. He was to fail four times before he 
stopped trying.13 
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One aspect of English culture that Yan Fu certainly 
could not have missed observing while he was in England was 
"progress." At that time "Britannia" did rule the waves, 
and had proven its might as the major industrial and naval 
power in the world. It seemed that nothing could stand in 
Britain's way. England became the epitome of human 
progress for Yan, as the United States would for Hu Shi and 
France for Chen Duxlu. 
Yan Fu's first widely read essays appeared in 1895, 
the year of China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. A 
number of them, as a group, may be seen as a preface to his 
translations of Western thought that would have such a 
profound effect on reform and revolutionary thought in the 
next two generations. One of these essays, "On the Speed 
of World Change" ("Lun shibian zhi qi") C"Lun shih-pien 
chih chi"), was focused on the Western idea of progress, 
offering "the first definitive reform analysis of the idea 
of progress" in China.14 In the following passage about 
the relationship between the processes of change in the 
world, which he refers to as "destiny" (yunhui) Cyun-huiJ, 
13 Ibid., 32. 
14 Furth, 326. 
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and "the sages'" apprehension of these processes, Benjamin 
Schwartz has suggested that "destiny" can already be 
replaced in Yan Fu's thought with the notion of the 
"process of evolution."15 If the processes of the world 
are "destiny", and "destiny" in Yan Fu's thinking is the 
"process of evolution", then the relationship between the 
sage and his understanding of these cosmic processes is 
that of the scientific adept to those processes: 
Once the (process of) destiny had been fulfilled, 
the sages could not force it from its course, for 
after all, the sages were themselves a factor <i 
~) within the course of destiny. It is 
unreasonable to assert that they could change the 
course of destiny. The sages were men who knew 
the direction of the process and were able to 
anticipate its ultimate course ... They were then 
able to regulate it, complete it, to cooperate 
with it, and thus lead the world (t'ien hsia) to 
a state of peace. Later men, observing their 
success, came to believe that the sages were 
actually able to change the course of destlny.16 
Yan Fu's vision is certainly deterministic -- the 
plotting of the "ultimate course" of the universe. But the 
destiny of the universe in this vision is not simply an 
external force applied to humanity; sages are not simply 
those who have learned to "give in" to its power. Through 
application of the human will the sage "anticipates its 
ultimate course." This is a vision of the sage 
15 Schwartz, 44. 
16 Yen Fu, "Lun shih-pien chih chi" (On the Speed of 
World Change), quoted in ibid. The emphasis is mine. 
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participating in the universe, and being a part of it, to 
"complete it, to cooperate with it." This strain of 
voluntarism in Yan's thought, a belief in the power of 
human will to change not only physical reality but the 
character of humanity itself, would echo throughout modern 
Chinese intellectual history in such diverse individuals as 
Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu, Sun Yatsen [Sun Yat-senJ, and of 
course, Mao Zedong [Mao Tse-tung). 
Like Chen Duxiu's notion of science after 1921 as 
something that exists ~ priori, what Yan is intimating in 
the above passage is "natural law." These are the "laws" 
of the processes of the universe and tianxia Ct'ien-hsiaJ, 
that is "all under heaven", or the sphere of human society. 
For Yan Fu, to understand and participate in these 
processes through comprehension of their "laws" was 
"progress." Yan believed that it was the "Western sages'" 
grasp of a determined course of destiny/progress that was 
the key to the Western nations' success in the world: 
The greatest difference between the principles of 
West and East, that which is the most 
irreconcilable, is the fact that, while the 
Chinese love the ancient and ignore the modern, 
Westerners stress the new in order to overcome 
the old. The Chinese think of the process of 
nature (t'ien hsing) and of human affairs in 
terms of a cycle of order and disorder, 
prosperity and decay. The Westerners make their 
ultimate principle of learning and political 
action the idea that the possibilities of daily 
progress are inexhaustible, that prosperity once 
achieved will not decline, and that order will 
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not fall back on disorder.17 
For Yan Fu the Western way of thinking about the processes 
of the world was self-perpetuating, self-sustaining; once 
the idea of thinking this way was learned, it was set in 
motion, in a forward direction. And progress itself, which 
Western thinkers participate in through their understanding 
of its workings, is constantly renewing itself: "order will 
not fall back on disorder." 
In "On Strength" (Yuan Qiang) CYuan-ch'iangJ, also 
written in 1895, Yan Fu for the first time pointed to the 
Western sages who he believed had comprehended these 
processes of development and progress and described why the 
nations of the West were so strong. It was the 
evolutionary thought of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer 
that described for Yan how to understand the preeminence of 
Western nations in the world. The "rise of the West," of 
course, had begun centuries before. But it was Darwin's 
work in the evolutionary biology of species, followed 
closely by Spencer's evolutionary social theories that Yan 
Fu saw as the encapsulating explanation of all that the 
West had become: 
Since the publication of this book [The Origin of 
Species) vast changes have occurred in Western 
learning, government, and philosophy. Those who 
assert that the teachings of Mr. Darwin have done 
17 Ibid. 
more to renew the eyes and ears and to change 
men's thoughts than Newton's discovery of 
physical laws are perhaps not indulging in empty 
words.18 
For Yan Fu, as for European and American "social 
Darwinists," the key in the evolutionary processes that 
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Darwin had brought to light was "struggle", which tended to 
be seen in its most concrete form: 
Living things struggle among themselves in order 
to survive. Nature (lit. 'heaven') selects 
(among them] and preserves the superior species. 
In his (Darwin's) view that humans and living 
things are born within a given space and together 
feed on the environment (heaven and earth) and on 
the benefits of nature. They come into conflict 
with each other ... At first species struggle with 
species; then as [men} gradually progress, there 
is struggle between one social group and another. 
The weak invariably become the prey of the strong 
Cch'lang-jou), the stupid invariably become 
subservient to the clever.19 
As Benjamin Schwartz has pointed out, Yan Fu was not 
particularly wary of the consequences of an aggressive, 
competitive spirit -- he was exhilarated by them.20 He 
believed that the dynamic energy of the West was harnessed 
by its particular grasp of the "struggle for existence", 
and its exploitation of the energy released in this 
struggle. His deepest criticism of China, even in these 
18 Yen Fu, "Yuan-ch'iang" con Strength}, quoted in 
Schwartz, 45. 
19 Ibid., 45-46. 
20 Schwartz, 46. 
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earliest writings, was that its intellectual tradition did 
not allow for proper struggle, and hence did not have 
access to the social energies necessary for growth and 
progress. In the writings of Hu Shi, and in particular 
Chen Duxiu in the 1910s, this criticism would build to a 
refrain. 
Yan Fu's linking of Darwin's ideas to human society 
through the work of Herbert Spencer was already evident in 
the essays of 1895: 
Spencer is also a native of England, and a 
contemporary of Darwin. His books actually 
appeared before Origin of Species. He based 
himself on the theory of evolution to explain the 
origins of human relations and of civilization. 
I call this science the science of human groups 
[sociology], for, as Hsun-tzu states, man's 
superiority over the beasts lies in his ability 
to form social groups.21 
From its origins in the thought of Confucius himself, the 
focus of the Confucian tradition in China has always been 
on human relationships in society. Yan Fu's initial 
attraction to Spencer lies, perhaps, in the latter's 
treatment of the social group. In Spencer, it was the 
individual who was the key to the survival energy of the 
successful group. 
21 Yen Fu, "Yuan-ch'iang" (On Strength), quoted in 
ibid. Yan's term for Spencer's "sociology" ls gunxue 
Cch'un-hsuehJ -- "the study of human groups". The gun 
Cch'unJ, or group one belongs to, is the central element in 
Confucian social theory, not the individual, as in the 
"post-Enlightenment" West. 
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In China, the individual had traditionally been 
completely submerged in the needs and identity of the 
group. Yan Fu was acutely aware of this difference between 
Chinese and Western attitudes and identified this as the 
source of China's problems: 
Our Chinese sages were not unaware that the 
universe is an inexhaustible storehouse [of 
infinite possibilities] and that if the subtle 
powers of the human mind are given free vent, 
human ingenuity and intellectual capacity can 
attain unfathomable results. However, we simply 
turned aside [from the pursuit} and did not 
concern ourselves with it. In our philosophy 
(tao) of sustaining the people we aimed only at 
harmony and mutual sustenance ... 
The products of heaven and earth are limited 
but the lustful desires of men are limitless. 
The procreation of children increases constantly, 
the cultivation of the soil is ever more 
extended. In the end there is insufficiency of 
food. The insufficiency leads to struggle but 
struggle is [in their view] man's greatest 
calamity. Hence they preferred to preach 
contentment with one's lot (chih-tsu, lit. 
'knowing what suffices'). They saw to it that 
everyone was content with a rustic simplicity and 
a dull confined existence, that they cultivated 
the soil in the service of their superiors ... 
Alas, such was the consummate skill of the 
sages in constraining the world, in preventing 
struggles and putting an end to disorder, they 
were unable to foresee that people's knowledge 
would decline steadily and their energy would 
steadily deteriorate!22 
In, or just before, 1895, at the same time that these 
essays were beginning to be published, Yan Fu began to 
write his famous series of translation/commentaries of 
22 Yen Fu, "Lun shlh-pien chih chi" [On the Speed of 
World Change), quoted in Schwartz, 54-55. 
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Western liberal thinkers. The early essays of 1895 contain 
the framework of Yan Fu's understanding of the transforming 
and transvaluing power of ideas in shaping human society. 
Benjamin Schwartz has described the essays and letters 
(there were many more than mentioned above) of 1895-1989 as 
the "matrix in which the whole translation effort must be 
understood ... the ... translations provide an elaborate and 
imposing commentary on the basic notions elaborated in the 
essays."23 In this light, Yan's translation/commentaries 
of the works of Thomas Huxley and Herbert Spencer have 
their prologues in the essays "On Strength," "On the Speed 
of World Change," and others written in 1895. Yan's 
notions of how science works, in general, and how 
evolutionary biology works in human society, in particular, 
at first presented only partially in these essays, are 
presented more systematically in his 
translation/commentaries. 
Yan's immediate concern with the structuring power of 
an evolutionary cosmology shows clearly in his translation 
efforts. He began with Tianyan Lun [T'ien-yen LunJ (On 
Evolution), a paraphrase translation of and commentary on 
Thomas Huxley's Evolution and Ethics. In spite of Yan's 
own intentions that his books " ... were not designed to 
23 Schwartz, 92. 
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nourish schoolboys" and were " ... translated precisely for 
those Chinese who do read many ancient books,"24 Tianyan 
Lun had a profound effect on established scholars and 
schoolboys alike. Its self-conscious literary style was 
aimed at the scholar of the literati class, those who 
traditionally grappled with the affairs of thought and the 
state.25 Despite its difficult style, it was read for the 
beauty of its language as well as for the message it 
promoted.26 Both Kang Youwei CK'ang Yu-weiJ (1858-1927) 
and Liang Qichao [Liang Ch'i-ch'aoJ (1873-1929) apparently 
read the text of the book before it was finally printed in 
24 Yen Fu, Hsin-min ts'ung-pao [The New People's 
Miscellany) No. 7 (April 1, 1903), quoted in Schwartz, 
94. 
25 Yan once responded to the criticism that because 
his works employed a sinewy academic style of writing 
instead of a more journalistic, accessible style, they were 
too difficult to read to be of wide-spread interest, 
"Those who read my translations often find them impossible 
to understand readily and criticize their abstruseness. Do 
they know that the original works surpass this in 
difficulty? Principles of original subtlety certainly 
cannot be mixed together with language lacking in 
eloquence." Yan Fu, Ch'un-chi ch'uan-chieh lun con 
Liberty). Yen i minq-chu ts'unq-k'an, Volume 4. A 
translation of John Stuart Hill's on Liberty, quoted in 
Jerome B. Grieder, Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: 
Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution, 1917-1937 (Cambridge, 
HA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 84. 
26 Schwartz, 94. 
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1898 and were admirers of Yan's work.27 
Yan Fu was not interested in Darwin's biology, per se, 
but rather in how his ideas impacted the realm of human 
activity and the legitimating power of their standing as 
"science." Yan's reading of Darwin's ideas had been summed 
up in "Yuan Oiang" [On Strength), in two terse, classical 
Chinese phrases of his own invention: wu jing Cwu chingJ 
([living] things contend) and tian ze [t'ien tseJ (Heaven 
[or Nature) chooses): "'Things contend' means that things 
struggle to preserve themselves. 'Heaven chooses' means 
27 Hao Chang, "Intellectual Change and the Reform 
Movement, 1890-8," in The Cambridge History of China: 
Volume 11, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part 2, eds. John K. 
Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu (Cambridge: cambridge 
University Press, 1980), 297; Schwartz, 82-83. Liang 
Oichao is known to have read Yan's manuscript prior to 
publication and appears to have shown it to Kang Youwei. 
The extent of Yan's influence on Liang has not yet been 
worked out. Hao Chang accepts that Liang's early reading 
of Tianyan Lun influenced his well known turn toward 
"social Darwinism." See Hao Chang, Liang Ch'l-ch'ao and 
Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907 (Cambridge, 
HA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 64. Philip Huang has 
presented strong evidence for the alternative view that 
Liang's initial exposure to "social Darwinism" (not 
Darwin's theory of evolution) came from Liang's reading of 
the works of Japanese "social Darwinist" Kato Hiroyuki. 
See Philip C. Huang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Modern Chinese 
Liberalism (Seattle and London: University of Washington 
Press, 1972), 56-61 and 179-180, note 78. The issue as far 
as the present essay is concerned is Yan's influence on 
Liang, not whether Yan was the first evolutionary influence 
on Liang. They were in correspondence with each other, and 
their ideas were similar enough, that despite the fact that 
Yan was older than Liang, they could support each other's 
positions to a certain degree. 
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that only the fit races are preserved."28 "Things 
contend", but in Yan's scheme, not for the benefit of the 
individual. Spencer is brought in, on the wings of Xunzi .. 
CHsun-tzuJ, to reclaim the gun, the group. The energies of 
"things contending" are released so that the group 
benefits. Heaven/Nature selects the group that is the most 
fit for survival, the group whose energies have been 
properly released for survival among other groups. 
Remarkably, Yan Fu began writing Tianyan Lun within a 
year and a half of the initial publication of Huxley's 
Evolution and Ethics in England in 1893.29 He was clearly 
quite struck with Huxley's exposition in his hurry to get a 
translation of the new work out. He made it the first of 
his own major works. But like the essays, where Darwin's 
ideas are seen through Spencer's eyes, here Huxley's 
apologia of Darwin's ideas are seen through Spencer's eyes. 
Huxley's Evolution and Ethics is a parry to the 
"social Darwinism" of such social thinkers as Herbert 
Spencer. His aim was to remove the "stumbling block" of 
the 
... apparent paradox that ethical nature, while 
born of cosmic nature, is necessarily at enmity 
with its parent ... this seeming paradox is a 
28 Yen Fu, "Yuan-ch'iang" con strength), quoted in 
Pusey, 61. 
29 Schwartz, 98. 
truth, as great as it ls plain, the recognition 
of which is fundamental for the ethical 
philosopher ... We cannot do without our 
inheritance from the forefathers who were the 
puppets of the cosmic process; the society which 
renounces it must be destroyed from without. 
Still less can we do with too much of it; the 
society in which it dominates must be destroyed 
from within.JO 
34 
Yan Fu stepped directly into the paradox, while at the 
same time accepting the gains to be had from the 
meliorating influences of the balance implied in Huxley's 
passage above. His historically determinant cosmos is, 
paradoxically, to be grasped by the person whose 
progressing understanding can act on the world. After 
reading Huxley's clear-cut attempt to cut Darwin's theories 
free of the social accretions built upon them, he rehitched 
the horse of Darwin's theory to Spencer's wagon. It was 
Huxley's position that 
..• the science of ethics professes to furnish us 
with a reasoned rule of life; to tell us what is 
right and why it is so. Whatever differences of 
opinion may exist among experts there is a 
general consensus that the ape and tiger methods 
of the struggle for existence are not 
reconcilable with sound ethical principles.31 
Yan, on the other hand, believed in an utterly unified 
cosmos, and that human behavior, including presumably 
30 Thomas H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics and other 
Essays, author's edition (New York and London: D. Appleton 
and Company, 1894), viii. 
31 Thomas H. Huxley, "Evolution and Ethics," in 
ibid., 52-53. 
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ethics, is a reflection of the "way" (dao) Ct'aoJ of the 
cosmos. There doesn't seem to be room for the central 
element of Confucian ethics, ~ [jenJ, or 
"benevolence/humanklndness," in Yan's cosmos. On the 
morality of the cosmos, he quotes the Taoist philosopher 
Laozl [Lao-tzuJ: "Heaven and earth are not benevolent, they 
treat the ten thousand things as straw dogs."32 
It is in reference to Laozi and the cosmos where the 
meliorating influence of balance first appears in Yan's 
work; it will reappear in his comments about the 
"scientific method" of Spencer. As Yan has resorted before 
to Legalism (the work of Xunzi) for descriptive categories 
for this new, Western thought with which to rebuild the way 
that Chinese relate to the universe, he resorts here to 
Taoism: "The non-benevolence (pu jen) of which Lao-tzu 
speaks is not really non-benevolence. It is something 
which transcends the dichotomy of benevolence and non-
benevolence."33 It is a greater process, the "Tao of 
Evolution", if you will, that is the ultimate single 
principle of the cosmos -- for heaven and man. It is the 
sage's job to understand it. 
32 Yen Fu, T'ien-yen Lun [On Evolution], in Yen i 
minq-chu ts'unq-k'an, Volume 1, part 2 (Ya-tung Tushukuan), 
14, quoted in Schwartz, 107. 
33 Ibid. 
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This sense of the desirability of balance and order in 
society as a reflection of the cosmos and knowledge as the 
key to obtaining this balance has affinities with elements 
of Confucian thought as well. The following passage is 
from the Daxue CTa-hsuehl (The Great Learning),34 one of 
the Four Books of the Confucian canon and important to Zhu 
Xi [Chu Hsi) (1130-1200), co-founder of the "rationalist" 
strain of Song Neo-Confucianism, as well as to advocates of 
"practical studies" (shixue) Cshih-hsilehJ in the late Hing 
and Qing dynasties. In it the moral order is linked to the 
political and social order through "the investigation of 
things" (gewu) [ko-wul:35 
The men of old who wish to make bright virtue 
plain to the world first put their countries in 
order, for which they had first to regulate their 
families, and for that to improve themselves as 
individuals, and for that to correct their 
hearts, and for that to give integrity to their 
intentions, and for that to extend their 
knowledge. The extension of knowledge lies in 
the investigation of things (ke-wu).36 
34 The Daxue, or Great Learning, is a chapter from the 
Li Ji [Li Chi), or Record of Rites, a first century B.C. 
compilation of late Zhou [Chou) (B.C. 770-265) and early 
Han (B.C.206-A.D. 25) texts on ritual. 
35 The concept of gewu and its relationship to the 
acceptance of the Western notions of progress and modern 
science in China is discussed in Chapter III, below, pp. 
48-50. 
36 Willard J. Peterson, "Fang I-chih: Western Learning 
and the Investigation of Things", in The Unfolding of Neo-
Confucianism, ed. William Theodore de Bary (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1970), 376-377. The original 
37 
There is a correspondence being drawn between the 
possession of moral qualities and the "investigation of 
things" (read: "science"). The need for the sage to 
achieve a moral uprightness and balance, and to link the 
pursuit of "true knowledge" to this "centeredness," ls the 
dominant theme of the Doctrine of the Mean (another of the 
Four Books of the Confucian canon), as well. Balance and 
the elimination of disorder and chaos are fundamental 
themes throughout Chinese Confucian philosophy. Yan Fu was 
still interested in achieving order, which would be based 
on China's survival as a nation. But he seriously 
challenged the effectiveness of the old Confucian methods 
in preparing its leaders for a modern world. 
Yan Fu's interest in the work of Spencer as a 
scientist lay in his perception of Spencer's scientific 
methodology. Sociology, as Spencer presented it in The 
Study of Sociology, was the "Queen of sciences," "a 
science in which all other sciences are included." To Yan 
it must have seemed the very rectification of science 
itself. He stated that until he had read Spencer, he had 
Chinese may be read as paragraph four in The Great 
Learning, translation with exegetical notes by James Legge 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford University, 1893; 
reprinted in Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great 
Learning, and The Doctrine of the Mean (New York: Dover 
Press, 1971), 357-358 (page references are to the reprint 
edition). 
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believed that " ... life tends to lop-sided extremes (or to 
biases)."37 Spencer's scientific method, which Yan saw as 
eliminating biases, became for him the uprightness and 
moral rectitude described as the mark of the ancient sage. 
The change of mind and heart that China needed to engage in 
was to the "way" of science, as a method for thinking. 
In much the same way that the "laws" and theories of 
modern science are believed to be universally applicable to 
phenomena observed anywhere on the planet Earth, Yan had a 
strong belief in the universality of knowledge, which 
informed his attitude to "Western studies." Scientific 
method was a critical aspect of what Yan Fu believed 
"Western studies" had to offer China. In a letter to the 
editor of Waijiao Bao [Wai-chiao-paoJ (Journal of Western 
Studies) written in 1902, his plea for a general overhaul 
of thinking in China is clear: 
What are China's principle troubles? Are they 
not ignorance, poverty, and weakness? ..• Any 
method which can overcome this ignorance, cure 
this poverty, lift us out of this weakness, is 
desirable. The most urgent of all is the 
overcoming of ignorance, for our failure to cure 
poverty and weakness stems from our 
ignorance •.• We must exert our utmost efforts to 
seek out knowledge. We have no time to ask 
whether this knowledge is Chinese or Western, 
whether it is old or new. If one course leads to 
ignorance, and thus to poverty and weakness, even 
if it originates with our ancestors or ls based 
on the authority of our rulers and teachers •.• we 
37 Quoted in Schwartz, 34-36, passim. 
must cast it aside. If another course is 
effective in overcoming ignorance and thus leads 
to the cure of our poverty and weakness, we must 
imitate it, even if it proceeds from barbarians 
and wild beasts ... 38 
Yan exhibits, here, a clearly utilitarian streak in 
his thinking. He was able (or willing) to use 
correspondences between Western thought and Confucian and 
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Taoist thought to criticize the Chinese tradition. He was 
also prone to focus on the methodological elements of 
modern science, rather than on its data. It is his stress 
on Western "methods" that brings us back to a discussion of 
the ti/yong, or "principle" vs "utility" dualism in late 
Imperial and early modern Chinese thought. There is 
another paradox lurking here. Yan Fu's ability to see 
Western "thought", rather than Western "technique" as the 
foundation of the strength of European nations should have 
been a radical break with the tendencies of the "self-
strengtheners" of the mid-nineteenth century. But it 
resulted instead, in an odd twist, in subsuming t1_ (the 
essence or principle, in this instance "Western scientific 
thought") under YQ.llil (the usefulness of a thing). The 
value of the most theoretical aspects of Western 
scientific thought rests, then, in its usefulness. 
These scientific methodologies do not, however, 
38 Yen Fu, "Yu Wai-chiao-pao chu-jen lun chlao-yu 
shu," quoted in Schwartz, 49. The emphasis is mine. 
completely disappear inside their function. They are 
singled out, separated time and again, by Yan Fu. For 
example, volumes seven and eight in his series of 
•• translations are Hingxue gianshuo [Hin-hsueh ch'ien-shuoJ 
(Logic), a translation of William Stanley Jevons' Logic, 
and Mingxue CMing-hsuehJ (Logic), a translation of John 
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Stuart Mill's Logic. Science, as scientific method, and as 
theory, becomes a technology for changing society by re-
ordering the way people think -- an "intellectual 
technology." 
The idea of an intellectual technology is not new to 
China in this period. Robert Hartwell's description of 
"historical analogism" as the dominant methodology of 
governmental problem solving during the Song (960-1279) and 
subsequent dynasties amounts to an intellectual technology 
used in running the vast machine of the state 
bureaucracy.39 The orthodox interpretations of the 
39 Robert H. Hartwell, "Historical Analogism, Public 
Policy, and Social Science in the Eleventh and Twelfth-
Century China," American Historical Review 76 (1971): 690-
727. "Historical analog ism", as used by Hart we 11, refers 
to the technique of using discussions about, and solutions 
to, problems posed in the Confucian classics as a starting 
place for analysis of analogous current problems. Its 
centrality as an intellectual technology is reflected in 
the expectations of the Chinese examination system: the 
Palace Examination, a critical determiner of ultimate rank 
within the bureaucracy, was based on the concept of using 
historical analogism in solving governmental policy 
problems (703-704). Hartwell has further suggested that 
" ... in China the use of historical analogism was 
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Confucian canon that scholar-bureaucrats were trained in 
and the "eight-legged essay" format they used to write 
commentaries on this canon were intellectual technologies 
-- used to produce a predictable, obedient official for the 
government. Mathematics, in any culture, functions as an 
intellectual technology -- to keep track of number in time 
and space. 
Because the Chinese tradition had made use of a number 
of sweeping intellectual technologies in ordering human 
behavior and in problem-solving over the centuries, closely 
tied to the educational system, it was a short leap for Yan 
Fu to come to believe that education in science as a 
"useful" way of thinking was a necessity for the "new" 
sage. But Yan wanted only to "use" science as a technique. 
It was the key to wealth and power, and not yet an end in 
itself. 
On a practical level, Yan had more in common with the 
two generations of "self-strengtheners" who had come before 
him than he did with the more anti-traditional Hay Fourth 
generation that followed, building on many of the often 
incomplete understandings he had arrived at about the 
meaning of modern science for China's survival. He wasn't 
responsible for many steps in Cthel process of making the 
study of society a science. As a mode of investigation, 
however, it was inadequate to complete this transformation 
by itself." (718) 
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interested in "overthrowing" anything. He believed that 
through the application of the "useful" (~) "methods" 
that had made the West powerful, the Chinese would 
gradually evolve the modern institutions they needed to 
remain politically free and regain economic strength. But 
their fundamental Chinese identity (tj_), based on a 
Confucian value system, would remain intact. The ways of 
the modern West would be lifted up out of the post-
Renaissance socio-political circumstances that had created 
them, and added to Chinese ways. 
At the same time, Yan had presented science, for the 
first time, as more than a set of techniques for 
understanding and controlling the world. The dominance of 
Europe seemed to prove the "scientific" truth of Darwin's 
evolutionary theory. The "evidence" was overwhelming. The 
power of Darwin (through Huxley) and Spencer's ideas to 
explain China's weakness and point in the direction of the 
only way out, through struggle, to Yan and a growing number 
of intellectuals also lent credibility to the "idea" of 
science, because they were presented as "scientific." 
Thinkers such as Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu inherited more 
than simply general tendencies about the meaning of modern 
science from Yan Fu; they acquired many of his specifics as 
well. Among them, Yan's emphasis on science as "method," 
the voluntarism of the continuation of the moral 
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obligation for the educated (or skilled) person to 
"cultivate the self," and a deep faith in the ability of 
ideas to change social and political structures became 
important elements of Hu's and Chen's formulations of the 
meaning of modern science to China's survival. These 
concepts themselves would evolve in the 1910s and into the 
Hay Fourth period into new and powerful tools to chip away 
at the very foundation of Chinese culture itself. But Hu 
and Chen and others of the next generation would also 
inherit many of the Confucian (and Taoist and Legalist) 
categories into which Yan had set his ideas about science 
and Darwinian evolution. The following chapters will show 
that the strain of Chinese thought about the meaning of 
modern science that originates in Yan Fu and branches off 
into Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu is not just focused on the West, 
or on China, but "faces both ways." 
CHAPTER III 
PROGRESS, SCIENCE, AND THE LATE IMPERIAL 
CONFUCIAN DISCOURSE 
At the time that Yan Fu's essays and translations were 
being published in the late nineteenth century, the state 
of affairs in Chinese Confucian intellectual circles was a 
complex of competing strains, increasingly confronted in 
various ways with ideas from the West. Since the twelfth 
century Chinese Confucian scholarship had been dominated by 
strains of Nee-Confucianism influenced by Buddhist and 
Taoist cosmological and metaphysical presumptions that had 
become less and less effective in running the state. The 
political and fiscal failures of the government in the late 
Ming dynasty (1368-1644) generated an active internal 
critique of the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy that had 
legitimated the status guo. In addition, a number of 
powerful concepts from the West, including elements of 
Western science, were introduced to Chinese intellectuals, 
who were increasingly skeptical concerning inherited wisdom 
and demanded practical solutions to China's political and 
military problems. This only intensified the existing 
internal pressure on the "whole fabric" of Confucian 
thought. 
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Chinese acceptance of the ideas of Charles Darwin and 
Herbert Spencer, introduced largely through Yan Fu's 
translations, would be paved by the prior acceptance of two 
ideas from the West: "modern science" and "progress." The 
scientific traditions and recent innovations of the West 
had begun to trickle into China with Jesuit missionaries in 
the seventeenth century. The earliest ideas to arrive were 
those of astronomy and physical science, two fields of 
science with an immediate usefulness. Certain aspects of 
mechanics were applicable to construction and hydraulics 
systems. More accurate astronomy was essential to 
agriculture as well as the Chinese government, which 
depended on maintaining aspects of Imperial authority 
through judicious portents observed in the heavens. 
An entire system of Western astronomy was never 
presented to the Chinese by the Jesuits. Though Jesuit 
astronomers were aware of the new Copernican astronomy, 
they were forbidden by a 1616 decree of the Congregation of 
the Index of the Catholic church from discussing it with 
the Chinese. It wasn't until several years after 
Copernicus' De Revolutionibus was taken off the Index in 
1757 that it was introduced, and even then, it was 
presented without the appropriate new mathematical scheme 
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needed for its computations.! Until Yan Fu's translations 
in the late nineteenth century, science as it developed in 
the West was never presented to the Chinese as a "way" of 
thinking, or as systems of seeing and ordering the world, 
with their own logical integrity, languages of description, 
and regimes of practice. 
When Yan Fu was studying modern science in China and 
England in the 1870s, the attitude of the West toward 
modern science had already taken on much of its "modern" 
cast. The "descriptive" phase of natural philosophy had 
been left behind in nearly all fields in favor of a new 
materialism and quantification of phenomena, and a parallel 
emphasis on measurement. In many ways it was the 
development of biology -- a science in which the place of 
humanity can hardly be argued away -- that brought the 
concerns of mechanics, chemistry, and mathematics into the 
human sphere. By bringing chemistry into medicine, 
mechanics and physics into anatomy, and mathematics into 
human population studies, the gap between science as a 
study of "nature" and science as a study of humanity began 
to close. 
By the mid-nineteenth century Europeans and Americans 
1 Nathan Sivin, "Wang Hsi-shan," in Dictionary of 
Scientific Biography, Vol. 14, ed. Charles Coulston 
Gillispie (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), 160. 
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were caught up in the idea of progress, which was closely 
allied to notions of the value of modern science. The idea 
of progress was not new in the West at this time; versions 
of it have been part of intellectual history in the West 
since late eighth century B.C. Greece.2 But by the 
eighteenth century, in a recognizably modern form, progress 
had become the central element of the intellectual doctrine 
of educated elites in the West. It had become modernity 
itself. Lewis Mumford's comment concerning the concept of 
progress in relation to technology and culture brings out 
some of the nature of its intellectual power, especially in 
regard to its primary handmaiden -- Science: 
Value, in the doctrine of progress, was reduced 
to a time-calculation: value was in fact movement 
in time. To be old fashioned or to be "out of 
date" was to lack value. Progress was the 
equivalent in history of mechanical motion 
through space ... 3 
Progress was where the physical world and human 
capabilities met, and in a "science" sense, where human 
biology, society, and the laws of physical science met. 
Nowhere was this made more systematically clear than in the 
2 A good introductory essay on the idea of progress in 
the ancient Greek world is E. R. Dodds, "The Ancient 
Concept of Progress", in The Ancient Concept of Progress 
and other Essays on Greek Literature and Belief (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1973), 1-25. 
3 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1962 (19341), 183-184. 
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work of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. Spencer 
provided the framework, and for many, Darwin's theory of 
organismal evolution provided the mechanism of the 
"progress of human societies." What is commonly referred 
to as "social Darwinism" is the nearly immediate linking of 
Spencer's interpretation of the development of human 
society with Darwin's theory of the evolution of the human 
as an organism. "Social Darwinism," focused as it was on 
a simplistic interpretation of the concept of the "survival 
of the fittest," was descriptive to many Europeans 
enjoying a relatively high standard of living of the 
reality of the domination of the technologically more 
advanced cultures over those which were less well 
developed. And the key to technological advance was 
scientific advance. This was Progress. 
The idea of progress was not originally part of the 
native intellectual tradition of China. Progress is 
essentially a perspective on history, and the historical 
sensibilities of China were quite different from the notion 
of progress as it developed in the West. The Confucian 
sense of history places "truth" in the past, and it is 
there one must go to find answers to the present state of 
affairs. Progress is only nominally concerned with the 
present; it is always looking to the future. 
There were developments within Neo-Confucianism in 
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China in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that may 
have prepared the way for the epistemological shift that 
allowed for some acceptance of the idea of progress among 
scholars in nineteenth-century China. The two main issues 
have to do with shifting conceptualization of gewu [ko-wuJ, 
or "the investigation of things." The term is from The 
Great Learning (Daxue) [Ta Hsueh], one of the Four Books of 
the Confucian cannon. In this particular passage 
(discussed in Chapter II above) public service and morality 
are closely linked and the achievement of both ultimately 
r est s i n " the i n vest i g at i on o f th i n gs " ( g e wu ) [ k o - wu J • 4 
The kind of "thing" to be investigated, however, was a 
critical consideration, and shifted over time. 
By the Sung dynasty (960-1279) the interpretations of 
the Cheng [Ch'eng] brothers and Zhu Xi defined wu ("thing") 
not as "material", but as "activities". The proper focus 
of inquiry into wu was defined as ll.., that is the 
"principle" underlying the "thing/activity" rather than 
its partner gj_ [ch' i J, "matter or force." The tacit 
acceptance of the duality of 1.i and gj_ is fundamental to 
the later acceptance of the duality of ti [t'i] and Y9J19.. 
[.YY.!1.9.1. Ti as "pattern" is akin to li and is often 
translated as "principle", while YQ.!1.g_, "usefulness" is 
4 See Chapter II, above, pp. 36-38. 
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sometimes translated as "function" and as such implies the 
"matter and force" of g_t. The focus on "principle" moved 
Confucianism away from study of material concerns. Wang 
Yangming {Wang Yang-ming) (1472-1529) in the sixteenth 
century, building on the Cheng-Zhu CCh'eng-ChuJ 
interpretation, further moved the concept of gewu away from 
the external world of sense perception, internalizing the 
moral purpose of gewu in the mind.5 
In the late Hing (1368-1644) and early Qing [Ch'ingJ 
(1644-1912) dynasties there occurred what Benjamin Elman 
has called "a revolution in discourse".6 It began at 
roughly the point when a number of late-Hing scholars 
became critical of what they saw as the increasingly 
metaphysical and "vacuous" focus of orthodox Neo-
Confucianism, based closely on the interpretations of Zhu 
Xi and the Cheng brothers (often referred to as the "Cheng-
Zhu" school of Neo-Confucianism). They became convinced 
that official Imperial sanction of and reliance on this 
"impractical empty speculation" for guidance in governing 
was responsible for the current breakdown in Hing authority 
and organization. Government inefficacy was confirmed for 
5 Peterson, 376-378. 
6 Benjamin A. Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: 
Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial 
China (Cambridge, HA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 1. 
many of them by the fall of the Ming in 1644 to the 
"barbarian" Manchus. Many of these scholars became Ming 
loyalists, refusing service to the Manchu government. 
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The men who developed this "revolution in discourse" 
were concentrated in the Lower Yangtze River Basin, in a 
group of particularly rich and prosperous provinces known 
collectively as Kiangnan CCh'iang-nanJ (including parts of 
Jiangsu lKiangsuJ, Anhui CAnhweiJ, and Zhejiang 
[ChekiangJ). Since the late Tang [T'ang] dynasty (619-
907), this region, as both the southern end of the Grand 
Canal and the gateway from the Yangtze River (Zhang Jiang) 
east to the Yellow Sea (Huang Hai), had been a commercial 
and communications hub. A merging of merchant and literati 
interests through merchant sponsorship of schools, 
academies, and the arts, and strong growth in the printing 
and book trades in the area created a powerful support 
system for strengthening the growing community of 
scholars.7 
In the late Ming a type of small scholars' group known 
generically as wenshe Cwen-sheJ that met to discuss 
history, literature and philosophy in their various forms 
was at the height of its popularity. These types of groups 
had probably existed since the time of Confucius. But 
7 Ibid., 8-9. 
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population pressure on the civil service job market, 
congealing of the examinations around the highly technical 
(requiring specialized training) bagu Cpa-kuJ, or "eight-
legged" style of essay writing, and a more personal 
approach to enlightenment and attainment of the "Way of the 
Sages" helped to generate growth in the numbers of and 
membership in the wenshe.8 
After the success of the Manchus in wresting away the 
rule of China in the mid-seventeenth century many members 
of wenshe began to stress practical statecraft. In 
addition there was a trend away from the rarefied, 
metaphysical l!-centered philosophy of Song Neo-
Confucianism toward a philosophy of gj_, or "material 
force." Many scholars began to place a new stress on 
shixue Cshih-hsuehJ, or "practical learning" as they tried 
to figure out how they had lost the governing of China to 
the Manchus. This new emphasis was largely the result of a 
belief among many scholars that the overly-metaphysical li-
based Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy, on which the Ming political 
philosophy was based, was the cause of the failure to 
8 William S. Atwell, "From Education to Politics: The 
Fu She", in The Unfolding of Nee-Confucianism, ed. William 
de Bary, 333-337, passim. 
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retain rule.9 
Shixue was originally the term Sung Neo-Confucianists 
applied to their "real" or "practical" (shi) Cshihl 
critique of earlier Han and Tang style Confucianism based 
on textual exegesis and commentary and the "selfish 
negativism and quietism" of Buddhist and Taoist 
developments in the period just before the Sung. 
Practicality and "realness" were stressed as an antidote to 
the "heresy and heterodoxy" of "Buddhist emptiness" and 
"Taoist nothingness." By the late Ming in China, and the 
early Tokugawa period (1605-1868) in Japan, shixue and 
jitsugaku had shifted from a preoccupation with "self-
cultivation" as a "practical" aid to producing "good men" 
for the government, to a more materialistic concern with 
day to day statecraft. Mathematics, military technology, 
navigation, foreign languages, and eventually European 
technologies and sciences became increasingly the focus of 
both shixue and jitsugaku.10 
9 Peterson, 400; Elman, 43-44. Shixue, as both a 
trend within Neo-Confucianism and a critique of it, has 
been very little studied. There has been no monographic 
treatment of it. The most comprehensive look at shixue 
(though focused primarily on its Japanese variant, 
jitsugaku) is the series of essays edited by William 
Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, Principle and 
Practicality: Essays in Neo-Confucianism and Practical 
Learning (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). 
10 William Theodore de Bary, "Introduction", in de 
Bary and Bloom, 1-33. 
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Scholars such as Fang I-chih (1611-1671) began to 
reinterpret the concept of gewu in a more "material" or 
"practical" way. The Sung reading of the word~ ("thing") 
as "activity" -- having primarily a social meaning, 
directing the investigation of such a "thing" to the human 
sphere, the traditional domain of Confucian thought --
began to give way to an interpretation that was more 
experiential, more empirical, and hence more material. For 
Fang I-chih and an increasing number of anti-Manchu 
Confucian scholars in the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, 
Things (~) are that which fill the space between 
heaven and earth. Here is where human beings 
attain life. Life being contained in our bodies 
and our bodies being contained in the real world, 
all that we experience are events (shih). Events 
(or activities) are a class of things ... 
Particular physical objects (ch'i) certainly are 
things, and mind (hsin) is a thing as well. On a 
more profound level, the nature (hsing) and fate 
(ming) (associated with any particular being) 
together are a thing. Viewed comprehensively, 
heaven and earth together are a thing.11 
Fang and many other scholars renewing their interest 
in gj_-based philosophy were members of the Fu She (The 
Renewal Society), a wenshe that was viewed as a serious 
political threat in the mid-seventeenth century. Many of 
their number did well in the examinations, often placing 
11 Fang I-chih, Wu 11 hsiao chih, "Tzu hsu", la, 
quoted in Peterson, 378; also see 405, note 61. 
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first or second. Their interest in political power was 
linked directly to their interest in reforming decaying and 
ineffective institutions of education and government. Fang 
and others scholars of his generation are important as 
antecedents of the reform-minded scholars that would become 
the backbone of both the 1898 Reform movement and the May 
Fourth Movement ln 1919.12 
A new academic discipline of evidential scholarship, 
known as kaozheng Ck'ao-chengl began to develop in the 
Ming-Oing transition among members of the wenshe wishing to 
recover and evaluate techniques for ordering the world, 
gleaned from the Classics. Phonology and philology, and in 
due course, history, were revived and revitalized with a 
new purpose in the practical desires of scholars loyal to 
the Ming. These men were desperately trying to recover 
what the Sages of the Classics really meant about proper 
government and society, before the metaphysical accretions 
12 See Peterson, 376; Atwell, 339, 344-346; and the 
article on Fang in Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of 
the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912), Volume I (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1943), 232. Fang 
was also apparently familiar with most or all of the books 
on European natural philosophy that the Jesuits had brought 
into China prior to the fall of the Ming. His interests 
included astronomy, geography, mathematics, medicine, and 
music, as well as phonetics, history, philology, 
calligraphy, and painting. Willard Peterson has suggested 
that his contact with Western science through the Jesuits 
may have led him to his new interpretation of the 
previously mentioned passage in the Daxue. 
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of Sung Neo-Confucian "misunderstandings" (some said they 
were inspired by influences from Ch'an Buddhism) destroyed 
the "pure wisdom" of Confucius and his immediate followers. 
Evidential methodologies developed in their desire to 
retrieve original Han and earlier treatises, 
interpretations, word usages, and accounts of historical 
events in an attempt to get closer to the "truth."13 This 
trend of scholarship came to be called "Han studies" 
(Hanxue) CHan-hs~eh) to distinguish it from the focus of 
its critique, "Song studies" (Songxue) CSung-hsueh]. 
K'ao-zheng approaches to scholarship in statecraft-
centered astronomy and in phonological research in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries contributed to a shift 
in the conceptualization of the directionality of 
knowledge. Scholars such as Huang Zongxi (Huang Tsung-hsiJ 
(1610-1695), a member of the Fu She 14, and Mei Wending 
(Mei Wen-t'ing) (1633-1721) contributed to this new 
understanding. The approach scholars took was often quite 
synthetic. For example, Mei Wending, who attempted to 
rectify Chinese natural philosophy and mathematics, 
understood mathematics as an inductive process whereby the 
patterns of 11 underlying things (!!.Y,) in the universe could 
13 Elman, 51-53. 
14 For more information about the Fu She wenshe, see 
Atwell. 
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be fathomed by collecting data. Both Mei and Huang Zongxi 
had worked extensively with European astronomy available in 
China at the time and believed that there had been an 
accumulation of knowledge in this area, with the most 
recent techniques for calculation being the most precise. 
They had a profound influence on men such as Yan Ruochen 
(Yen Jo-ch'enl (1636-1704) who applied astronomy and 
chronography to the study of Confucian documents, believing 
that their increasing precision would lead to the discovery 
of forgeries in the various "official" versions.15 In the 
early Qing dynasty the accumulative nature of the data of 
kaozheng scholarship combined with an increasingly secure 
sense of the concreteness of things (wu) led scholars to a 
nearly unanimous and new understanding of knowledge as 
cumulative and moving forward in time.16 This 
understanding provided the epistemological shift necessary 
for the apprehension of the Western idea of progress. 
After the disastrous military defeats China suffered 
at the hands of Britain and France in the early and mid-
15 Elman, 133, 180-181, and 228-229. 
16 Ibid., 228. Elman feels that the overall 
progressive quality to kaozheng research was due to the 
tendency of practitioners to work in areas that lent 
themselves to cumulative results. The tendency is clearly 
there, but the causal relationship hasn't been cleared up 
yet. For a detailed discussion of cumulatlveness in 
phonology and other kaozheng scholarship, see ibid., 204~220. 
nineteenth century, there was another renewed interest in 
the "ways" of the West, in what was called "Western 
•• studies" (Xi xue} C Hs i-hsueh J . There was a new demand for 
"practical studies" (shixue}, infused with ideas borrowed 
from the West, in order to strengthen China against the 
West. This time it was justified as "self-strengthening" 
Czigiang} Ctz'u-ch'iangJ. Self-strengtheners like Li 
Hongzhang [Li Hung-changJ (1823-1901), Ceng Guofan [Tseng 
Kuo-fan] (1811-1872) in mid-century, and Zhang Zhidong 
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[Chang Chih-tungJ (1837-1909) in the 1890s, understood that 
the West had somehow "progressed" beyond China. The West 
was "modern" and China was not. They came increasingly to 
value some change, though not the fundamental change in the 
very underpinnings of the culture that would mark the 
China's call to "progress" in the May Fourth period. The 
"self-strengtheners" wanted China to "catch up", a notion 
that was embedded in the modern notion of progress as 
"movement in time." 
Progressive scholars who were concerned with China's 
survival were not, however, ready to accept Western values 
- in fact, they were not ready to accept the West as an 
equal. Even men such as Tan Sitong CT'an Ssu-t'ungJ (1865-
1898), who was often a strong advocate of "Western 
learning," were guarded in their appraisal of the 
possibilities it offered China: 
If China counts ten years, how will "Western 
affairs" (yangwu) taste? A scholar-official can 
make progress with control! It is not possible 
to make progress with "Western affairs" at the 
present time. There is a whole thing called 
"Western affairs", but what we see of it is 
steamships, that's all; electric 
wires ..• trains ..• firearms, mines ... iron-smelting 
to make various machines, that's all ... we should 
be well prepared, not always watching 
dreams ... These "Western affairs" are minor 
details, not the fundamentals."17 
Despite the move in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries toward a more g..!_- or material-based Confucian 
philosophy -- one that would have more "practical" 
application and had aided in the acceptance of the notion 
"progress" -- the duality of "principle" and "material" 
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remained in the application of the ti/yong paradigm to the 
promotion of "Western studies" in the late nineteenth 
century. In Zhang Zhidong's formula of "Chinese learning 
for the essentials, Western learning for its usefulness" 
(Zhongxue wei ti, Xixue wei yong) CChung-hsueh wei t'i, 
Hsi-hsueh wei yungJ, the West's material and techniques 
could be borrowed for their usefulness (Y.Q.D.9.) without 
effecting the "essence" (ti) of Chinese culture. Chinese 
thinkers in this period did not assume that what was useful 
from the West would be carrying the tl, or essence of 
17 Tan Sitong, quoted in Li Kan, "Wushu weixin yu 
Zhongguo jindai sixlang wenhua shi" CThe Reform Movement 
of 1898 and the History of Modern China's Ideology and 
Culture] Lish! Yanjiu (Historical Studies] No. 5 (1983): 
59. The translation and emphasis are mine. 
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Western cosmological assumptions or the philosophical 
underpinnings of the science and technology that were to be 
borrowed. As the concept of "self-strengthening" stretched 
after the failure of the 1898 Reform Movement, and the 
power of Western thought to create Western science and 
technology was increasingly recognized by figures such as 
Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, ii and YQDS began to come together. And some 
began to wonder if it wasn't the West's essence -- what lay 
at the foundation of the wealth and power of Western 
nations -- that would be the most useful to China in 
embracing the challenge of survival. 
CHAPTER IV 
HU SHI BEFORE 1917 
Hu Shi [Hu Shih] (1891-1962), China's leading advocate 
of Western liberalism in the early twentieth century, 
exemplifies the synthetic response of many Chinese 
intellectuals when exposed to the "idea" of modern science: 
they often relied on certain traditional Chinese patterns 
of thought while simultaneously accepting and advocating 
the power of modern scientific method.1 Strongly 
influenced by the reformers of the 1890s, especially Yan 
Fu [Yen Fu] and Liang Qichao [Liang Ch'i-ch'ao], Hu's 
writings are notable for their clarity and modern-ness of 
expression. Unlike the previous generation of reformers 
and "self-strengtheners" who still directed their work to 
Confucian educated elites in a very academic style of 
Chinese, his early use of a vernacular style of Chinese 
made his writings more widely accessible. His ideas are, 
1 This chapter will examine the development of Hu 
Shi's thought concerning his understanding of science and 
its role in social change up to 1917 only. In that year Hu 
returned to China from graduate school in the United 
States, with most of his ideas concerning science already 
formulated. It was after 1917 that he had his greatest 
impact on young scholars and intellectuals of the May 
Fourth generation. Also see Chapter VI below, p. 137, note 
1. 
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nonetheless, complex and full of nuances. As a widely-read 
author and professor, dean, and ultimately president of 
Beijing University, one of this century's most productive 
and volatile centers of intellectual activity, his 
influence in twentieth-century China has been profound. 
The synthetic character of his thought provides a window 
into some of the thornier dilemmas of the Confucian-trained 
Chinese intellectual grappling with the epistemology of 
modern Western science at the opening of the twentieth 
century. 
Hu Shi was born Hu Hongxing [Hu Hung-hsing], near 
Shanghai, December 17, 1891, in the village of Jiqi (Chi-
ch'i].2 At the time that Hu was born, his father, Hu Quan 
[Hu Ch'uan1, was a minor official, a collector of transit 
2 Hu changed his name while he was a middle-school 
student in Shanghai. His version of the story is a famous 
instance of the popularity of the rhetoric of Darwinism in 
China during his youth: "In the course of a few years many 
of the evolutionary terms and phrases became proverbial 
expressions in the journalistic writings of the time. 
Numerous persons adopted them in naming themselves and 
their children, thereby reminding themselves of the perils 
of elimination in the struggle for existence, national as 
well as individual ... Even my own name bears witness to the 
great vogue of evolutionism in China ... ! asked my brother 
to suggest a literary name for me. After only a moment's 
reflection, he said, "How about the word shih [fitness] in 
the phrase 'Survival of the Fittest'?" I agreed and, first 
using it as a nom de plume, finally adopted it in 1910 as 
my name." Hu Shih, "Untitled essay", in Living 
Philosophies: A Serles of Intimate Credos (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1931), 248. Hereafter this work will be 
referred to as "Credo." 
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taxes, who had only passed the lowest level of the exams 
due to civil war (the Taiping Rebellion) and dislocation. 
The Hu ancestral home was in southeastern Anhui (AnhweiJ, 
•• 
an important center of Han studies (Hanxue) (Han-hsueh] and 
kaozheng Ck'ao-cheng] evidential philology in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Despite the potential 
for coming under the influence of Han learning that 
existed, Hu Quan's formal education, such as it was, was in 
the tradition of Sung learning.3 
In the 1890s Shanghai was in the thick of China's 
current social, economic, and political troubles. The 
Chinese City -- the part of Shanghai left to the Chinese by 
the French concession and the International Settlement, 
constant reminders of the city's "treaty port" status 
was still a walled and gated maze of narrow alleys. 
Despite being squeezed between the politics of internal 
struggles for local gentry power and foreign treaty-portism 
(or perhaps, because of it), Shanghai was an important 
center for intellectual activity, and has remained so up to 
the present time. After the Opium Wars of the 1840s, 
Shanghai became an important center of world trade, 
3 Ibid., 241: "My father was a classical scholar and a 
stern follower of the Neo-Confucianist Rational Philosophy 
of Chu Hsi (1130-1200 A.O.). He was strongly opposed to 
Buddhism and Taoism." For a discussion of Han and Song 
strains of Nee-Confucian scholarship in the late Imperial 
period, see Chapter III above, pp. 51-60. 
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transportation, and printing and publishing. Intense 
intellectual activity, frequently involving ideas from the 
West, was common in Shanghai at that time because the 
economic life of the city brought scholars, merchants, and 
others together where they had opportunities for exchange. 
Hu Shi's father, though prevented by financial 
circumstances from studying for any of the higher civil 
service examinations, and consequently locked out of the 
more prestigious government positions, was a talented and 
enthusiastic Confucian scholar-official, even during the 
most difficult of times, and was considered a exemplary 
model for his sons. He died of beriberi in 1895, after 
serving on the island of Taiwan during the Sino-Japanese 
War. Hu's mother had told him, repeatedly, that his father 
was "the only complete man whom I have ever known."4 She 
became the head of a household of children from her 
husband's second marriage, a son from his first marriage 
and his family, and her young son, Hu Shi. Hu had a deep 
feeling for his mother and the suffering she endured to 
raise and educate him.5 
Hu Shi's education began rather early (at the age of 
four), but typically, at his family's school in Shangchuang 
4 Hu Shih, "Hsien-mu hsing-shu" [Reflections on my 
late mother's lifeJ, quoted in Grieder, Hu Shih, 8. 
5 Greider, 8-10. 
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[Shang-ch'uangJ. The teacher there was his youngest 
paternal uncle. Following the practice of her husband, 
Hu's mother paid extra money to have the teacher actually 
explain the meaning of memorized passages in the Confucian 
classics to him. His father's family were firmly within 
the tradition of Sung Neo-Confucianism and the extra 
attention he paid to these studies gave him a solid 
grounding in the standard interpretations and texts. 
Hu Shi enrolled at the first of the three or four "new 
schools" he was to attend during his childhood in 1904, at 
the age of thirteen. When a brother went to Shanghai to 
see a doctor about his tuberculosis, Hu went with him and 
stayed to get a "modern education." Like the schools that 
Yan Fu had attended in Anhui, the "new schools" of 
Shanghai were focused on China's chances for survival in 
the modern world. At the first, Meiji [Mei-chi] School 
(Meiji xuetang) CMei-chi hsueh-t'angJ, Hu began to study 
mathematics and English. Even his Chinese studies were 
directed to the problem of China's survival, and Japan's 
impending threat, with assignments to write essays on such 
topics as "The Sources of Japan's Strength." The thriving 
Shanghai publishing culture of newspapers and political 
tracts exposed Hu for the first time to political events 
with international rather than simply village importance. 
Hu and his classmates began to read anti-Manchu literature 
and to think about rebellion.6 
Despite Yan Fu's emphatic admonition against it, Hu 
Shi, like many others attending the "new schools" which 
combined "Chinese learning" (Zhongxue) CChung-hsuehl and 
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"Western learning" (Xixue) CHsi-hsUehJ, first read Yan Fu's 
Tianyan Lun [T'ien-yen Lunl as a schoolboy. While Hu was a 
student at the second of the schools he attended while in 
Shanghai, the Zhangzhong xuetang [Cheng-chung hsueh-t'angl, 
his apparently reform-minded Chinese language teacher gave 
his students writing assignments based on new ideas coming 
from the West. After having the class read Yan Fu's 
translation of Huxley's Evolution and Ethics (Tianyan Lun), 
essays were assigned asking the students to "try to explain 
"[Living] things contend, Nature [Heaven] chooses" (Wu 
jing, Tian ze) ([Wu-ching, T'ien-tsel and "Survival of the 
fittest" (Shizhe sheng cun) [Shih ch'e sheng ts'unl."7 As 
Hu remembers the experience in his autobiography, 
... this was my first reading of Tianyan Lun, and 
I was very happy ... This kind of topic naturally 
wasn't something for teens to elucidate, 
but ... [wel read Tianyan Lun, and undertook essays 
on "Things contend, nature chooses" -- this was 
representative of the fashion of the period.8 
6 Ibid., 20-24. 
7 Hu Shih, Sishi zishu [Ssu-shih t'zu-shul 
[Autobiography at Forty] (Shanghai: Yatung Tushuguan, 
1933), 55-56. The translation is mine. Hereafter this 
work will be referred to as Autobiography. 
6 Ibid., 56. The translation is mine. 
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In 1906 Hu changed schools again, attending the newly 
opened China National Institute, in Shanghai. Founded 
early in 1906 by radicalized students recently returned 
from Japan, its first director, Ma Qunwu [Ma Ch'un-wu) 
(1881-1940), had been active in a number of student groups 
that had supported the republican efforts of Sun Yatsen 
against the Manchu Chinese government only a few years 
before. There was an atmosphere of stimulating intellectual 
contact, republican politics, and revolutionary fervor 
among many of the students and faculty, and a churning 
mixture of old and new China at the school,9 of men in 
queues writing of Darwin.10 
In 1906, during his first year at the National 
Institute, Hu Shi was among a group of students who began 
9 Grieder, 24-25. 
10 In the period of the Reform Movement of 1898 (Wushu 
bianfa) many intellectuals, especially those who were 
studying overseas, cut-off their queues. Like the refusal 
to bind one's feet for women, cutting the queue was, for 
men, symbolically defiant toward the Manchu government and 
foreign domination. It became a sign of the "modern man" 
to wear one's hair in "the Western style". When Hu Shi 
left Shanghai for the United states in 1910, he still wore 
a queue. See Grieder, 37. There is an apocryphal story 
from Hu Shi's autobiography about why the other, mostly 
revolutionary, students at the China National Institute 
left him alone and didn't pressure him into cutting his 
queue despite his different political views. They 
apparently felt that he had such revolutionary potential 
that he should not be "distracted." See Min-chih Chou, Hu 
Shih and Intellectual Choice in Modern China (Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 17-18. 
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to publish a small, activist newspaper. In the dominant 
"social-Darwinist" rhetoric of student circles in China at 
the time it was called The Struggle (Jinye xunbao) [Chin-
yeh hsun-pao1 and published until 1908. A participant in 
the baihua Cpai-huaJ, or the vernacular language movement, 
the paper was, in Hu's words, " ... primarily interested in 
instilling new ideas into the uneducated masses .... " By 
1907 Hu had become its editor.11 
In the articles that Hu Shi wrote for The Struggle he 
was admittedly "iconoclastic and atheistic", vehemently 
attacking "the superstitions of the people."12 He was 
only fifteen when he began to write for the paper, and 
sixteen when he became its editor, but his overriding and 
life-long concern with what he saw as a necessary remaking 
of Chinese thinking patterns was already strongly evident. 
As a young child he had been impressed with the anti-Taoist 
and anti-Buddhist attitude of his father and uncles.13 
After his father died in 1895, Hu grew up in a house of 
women who were observant Buddhists. Hu's early contact 
11 Hu Shih, "Credo," 249. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 241: "I remember seeing on the door of my 
uncle's house (which was my first school) a sun-bleached 
sign bearing the words, "No alms for Buddhist Honks or 
Taoist Priests," which I learned afterward, was part of the 
Rationalist tradition left by my father." 
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with Buddhism was with the popular, non-intellectual 
strains popular among the women of his home village. He 
retained his father's disdain for Buddhism and other forms 
of thought he thought "superstitious", or non-rational. 
This was reinforced early in his academic training during 
an "intellectual crisis" over the relationship of the 
spirit to the material body while reading passages of Zhu 
Xi's [Chu Hsi] The Elementary Lessons and Sima Guang's 
[Ssu-ma Kuang] General History when he was eleven. The 
result was an atheistic, rationalistic bent of mind which 
was to remain with him throughout his life.14 
As Hin-chih Chou has pointed out, it was part of being 
"modern" in China at the turn of the twentieth century to 
be anti-Buddhist, part of a "rising tide of iconoclasm in 
the nation." Before Hu went to Shanghai himself to go to 
school in 1904, his brothers, who worked in the city, 
certainly may have brought him information about the new 
modes of thought.15 Regardless of how or when Hu Shi's 
decidedly rationalist and "anti-superstitious" attitude 
manifested itself during his childhood, it was to be a 
pivotal aspect of all of his mature thought, bringing 
together the disparate strains of Confucian, Darwinist, 
14 Ibid., 243-245. 
15 Chou, 12-13. 
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liberal, and pragmatic philosophies into a cohesive 
whole.16 
By the 1890s the English language had become the 
preferred foreign language to study in China.17 Yen Fu's 
widely-read translations of Western thinkers were primarily 
of eighteenth and nineteenth century Englishmen. A large 
number of important reformers learned English and many went 
to England or the United States to study in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even the great 
number of Chinese students opting for the less expensive, 
geographically closer, and culturally less dissimilar 
choice of going to Japan to study Western science and 
technology in this period indicates the increasing 
importance of the English language. Many of these 
students, including many important reform figures of the 
16 Ibid., 14. Min-chih Chou describes Hu's thought in 
his late teens as "··.gradually moving away from the 
rationalist and skeptical attitude toward a more empirical, 
naturalist stance .... " The rationalist strain in Hu's 
thought, though joined by an empiricist/naturalist aspect, 
is never entirely absent. His adoption of John Dewey's 
instrumental pragmatism was a commitment to humanity's 
intervention in its own affairs. Science, in Dewey's view, 
and in Hu Shi's, was not a method to escape humanity and 
its parameters, but rather to maximize human ability and 
potential, through wide-spread, dare we say universal, 
participation in the techniques of "good thinking." This 
voluntaristic faith in human thought is, above .all, 
rationalistic, and forms the foundation for Hu's empiricism 
and naturalism. 
17 Ibid., 22. 
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early twentieth century, went to Japan with the hope of 
eventually studying in the United States or England.18 Hu 
Shi's command of the English language was certainly a major 
factor in his eventual academic success in the United 
States. 
Hu Shi's opportunity to study abroad came in 1910 
after successfully taking the exams for the Boxer indemnity 
scholarships to study in the United States.19 The Boxer 
Indemnity Fund was established in 1908 by the United States 
Congress to reduce the U.S. share of the Boxer Indemnity 
imposed on China in 1901 as a result of the Boxer 
Rebellion. Its funds paid stipends to support Chinese 
18 Ibid. Min-chih Chou's list of reformers of this 
period who had studied English includes Chen Duxiu [Ch'en 
Tu-hsiuJ, Ding Wenjiang [Ting Wen-chiang, V.K. Ting], Wu 
Zhihui [Wu Chih-huiJ, Jiang Menglin [Chiang Heng-linJ, Wang 
Guowei [Wang Kuo-weiJ, and of course, Yan Fu. 
19 Ibid., 26-27. Hu's decision to take the Boxer 
exams came after an incident in Shanghai after he left the 
China National Institute, when he was arrested during a 
night of drinking and gambling. He awoke the next morning, 
in jail, wet and muddy, and missing a shoe. At the time he 
was teaching English at small middle school,and resigned 
his position to go to Beijing to study for and take the 
exams. This act seems impulsive, especially when viewed 
with the overwhelmingly cautious tone most of his life took 
on. But perhaps it indicates that, like many other Chinese 
students, he had already been thinking of going abroad, of 
going to the United States, to study. The humiliation of 
landing in jail seems to have "awakened" him from his brief 
intellectual stupor. 
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students studying in the United States.20 The first group 
of forty-seven students arrived in 1909. Hu Shi was among 
the second group sent, placing fifty-third out of seventy 
students who passed the examination.21 Theoretically, they 
were the best students with an all-around preparation in 
Western sciences, languages, history, and mathematics that 
China could recruit. 
Hu chose a major at Cornell University from the 
sciences for the same reasons that many other Chinese 
studying abroad had done so: the Qing government had 
insisted, from the beginning, that ninety percent of 
Indemnity Scholarship students had to specialize in a 
scientific or technological field (although this was not 
strictly enforced);22 and training in the sciences or 
technology seemed to hold the promise of actually 
contributing to "saving China," unlike the "humanistic" 
tradition of China that appeared to have failed.23 Hu 
20 Jerome B. Grieder, Chinese Intellectuals and the 
State in Modern China: A Narrative History (New York: The 
Free Press, 1981), 210-212. 
21 Chou, 35-36. 
22 Grieder, Chinese Intellectuals and the State, 212. 
23 Hu Shi's comment on his choice of majors at Cornell 
was, "Hy choice was based on the belief then current in 
China that a Chinese student must learn some useful art, 
and literature and philosophy were not considered of any 
practical use." See Hu Shi, "Credo," 251-252. The 
writer Lu Xun [Lu Hsun] began his studies in Japan as a 
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entered Cornell University as a student of Plant Science in 
the New York State College of Agriculture, studying 
biology, botany, plant physiology, and pomology (the 
science and practice of fruit growing). While maintaining 
an idealized view of his responsibility to be trained in 
the sciences, Hu studied Latin on his own time, composed 
both Chinese and English poetry, and kept his interest in 
literature and thought alive by reading a very broad range 
of material -- from pre-Qin [Ch'in] classics and poetry, 
Plato, and history, to Darwin, Goethe, Dickens, and Francis 
Bacon.24 
Hu Shi did not act decisively on his true proclivity 
for humanities and literature rather than the natural 
sciences until 1912, mid-way through his second year at 
Cornell. A class in the history of philosophy piqued his 
interest, and after several more classes in various aspects 
medical student and ultimately changed to literature; Jiang 
Menglin [Chiang Meng-lin] began his career at the 
University of California, Berkeley, as an Agriculture major 
and left with a degree in the social sciences. The 
linguist Zhao Yuanren [Chao Yuen-renJ (1892-1982) received 
a Ph.D. in physics at Cornell, switching fields after 
accompanying Bertrand Russell on his 1920 tour of China as 
a multi-dialect interpreter. Despite the widespread belief 
that the literature and social thought of China were not as 
important as science for China's modernization, many 
students who began their studies in Japan or the West 
intent on a career in the sciences ended up in the 
humanities, social sciences, and literature. See Chou, 31-
35. 
24 Chou, 35. 
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of philosophy, humanities, and social sciences, he changed 
his major to philosophy.25 Having struggled with 
mathematics and botany, Hu was thoroughly "in his element" 
in philosophy and was a brilliant student while at Cornell. 
He excelled in communicating his ideas to others and 
succeeded in "taking the campus by storm." Hu was elected 
to Phi Beta Kappa in 1913, and awarded a fellowship to the 
Sage School at Cornell in 1914, after completing his B.A., 
to begin his graduate studies in philosophy. His facility 
with the English language, which can be traced back to his 
middle-school days in Shanghai, as well as his brilliance, 
were rewarded on numerous occasions with prestigious 
University writing awards. His English professor at 
Cornell, Martin Sampson, summed up the effect of young Hu 
Shi on his teachers and fellow students alike when he said, 
"It is entirely possible that a thousand years from now 
Cornell may still be known as the place where Hu Shi went 
to college."26 
Hu Shi's interest in the philosophies of China and the 
West began before his years at Cornell. While he was a 
student in Shanghai he began reading the works of many 
Western thinkers, at first in Chinese translations, and 
25 Ibid., 33. 
26 Ibid., 35-36. 
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then in mostly English originals. But following exposure 
to Yan Fu's translation of Huxley, it was the work of Liang 
Qichao that began Hu's serious interest in Chinese 
philosophy and in the thought of the West.27 
Liang's political essays were published in 1903 in 
Xinmin congbao [Hsin-min ts'ung-paol (The New Peoples' 
Weekly) and concentrated on the ideas of eighteenth century 
European social-political thought, such as "liberty," 
"equality," and "popular sovereignty." His criticism of 
China's weakened and vulnerable state of affairs at the 
turn of the century was ruthless, believing that"·· .there 
is almost no characteristic of present-day Chinese 
government which should not be utterly destroyed, the old 
27 Hu Shi's;own belief was that Yan Fu's translations 
had less of an effect on Chinese youth at the turn of the 
twentieth century than the work of other intellectuals 
grappling with the socially transforming power of modern 
science and scientific thinking, in particular that of 
Liang Qichao. In a discussion of "extracurricular" books 
that Hu read in 1906 while a student at Zhengji Academy, he 
described Yan Fu's books as " ... very much in the ancient, 
elegant style, so his influence on young people was not as 
great as that of Liang Qichao." See Hu Shi, Autobiography, 
57. The translation is mine. See also Hu Shi, "Credo," 
247. Hu, himself, is an example of the depth of influence 
that existed on portions of the young and rising 
intelligentsia of the period. Min-chih Chou considers Yan 
Fu and Liang Qichao to have been the Chinese thinkers with 
the most lasting influence on Hu Shi. Yan Fu's influence 
on Liang only served to reinforce the separate influence of 
Yan on the thought of Hu Shi. 
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eradicated and the new proclaimed."28 
Liang Qichao had also been strongly influenced by Yan 
Fu's Tianyan Lun29 and was a secondary source of Yan's 
influence on Hu Shi. For Liang, Tianyan Lun had provided 
just that explanation of "survival" and "fitness" that he 
had been looking for in his effort to generate support, 
through his journalism, for China saving itself through 
changing it ways. Liang's essays were eloquently 
iconoclastic, forcing Hu to face the harsh reality of the 
cultural, as well as the social and political circumstances 
that appeared to contribute to China's current, and 
seemingly final, failures. Later in his life, Hu readily 
acknowledged his debt to Liang for bringing the rest of the 
world outside China to him: 
Mr. Liang was a great admirer of modern Western 
civilization and ... frankly admitted that the 
Chinese as a race had suffered from the 
deplorable lack of many fine traits possessed by 
the European people ... It was these essays which 
first violently shocked me out of the comfortable 
dream that our ancient civilization was self 
sufficient and had nothing to learn from the 
militant and materialistic West except in the 
weapons of war and vehicles of commerce. They 
opened to me, as to hundreds of others, an 
entirely new vision of the world.30 
28 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Hsin min i" CA discourse on the 
new people], quoted in Grieder, Hu Shih, 28. 
29 See Chapter II above, pp. 31-32, note 27. 
30 Hu Shih, "Credo", 247. 
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Hu Shi was ready for more than just facts in his 
education. Ideas had been his primary interest since his 
days in Shanghai. Hu's main interest in philosophy, 
throughout his life, was in thinking, particularly in 
method. It is here that Hu re-enters the realm of the 
sciences. He was most interested in the philosophy of 
thinking -- he wrote his doctoral dissertation at Columbia 
on "The History of Logical Method in China." But like Yan 
Fu, Hu was convinced that "scientific method" was the best 
way of thinking. Even though Hu chose to work in the 
humanities, and in literature, he placed the highest values 
on the mental patterns established by training in the 
sciences: 
We hope that they [the youth) come to an early 
realization and concentrate on the knowledge and 
methods of the natural sciences. This is the 
road of hope, whereas the other road, that among 
old books and papers, leads nowhere. Even the 
best talents and intelligence of the last three 
hundred years, spent and wasted among books, did 
not produce and good results; we must, therefore, 
adopt another approach. Only after you Cthe 
youth] have achieved good results in the 
laboratory can you speak of and use your energies 
to tidy up our national heritage.31 
Hu Shi's decision in 1915 to pursue a doctorate in 
philosophy at Columbia University was probably the result 
of a number of important factors. He had, indeed, 
31 Hu Shih, "Chih-hsueh ti fang-fa yu ts'ai-liao" 
[Method and Materials of Study], Hsin-yueh 1.9 (November 
1928), quoted in Kwok, 95. 
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discovered John Dewey's experimentalist pragmatic 
philosophy in the summer of 1915. He would become a 
disciple of Dewey's at Columbia, having found in his work 
just the sort of intellectual method that had the potential 
to bring about the cultural transformation he felt China 
required to create new, responsive, democratic social and 
political institutions. Philosophy at the Sage School of 
Cornell University at the time was focused on "objective 
realism," which didn't suit him. He needed an academic 
environment more conducive to his interests in philosophy. 
In addition, while Hu was at Cornell he had become quite 
popular as a speaker on Chinese affairs and a participant 
in student forums. He apparently felt the need to "hide" 
in New York's cosmopolitanism.32 
There is another explanation for Hu's shift to 
Columbia, not touched upon by his primary American 
biographer, Jerome Grieder, but addressed in great detail 
by the later biography of Min-chih Chou. It is worth 
discussing for its important implications for Hu's overall 
approach to intellectual and cultural change over his 
career. While Hu Shi was a student at Cornell he developed 
a close friendship with Edith Clifford Williams, a fellow 
classmate and the daughter of a Cornell Geology professor. 
32 Grieder, Hu Shih, 42. 
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He had come to the United States already betrothed to a 
"semi-literate" young woman with bound feet named Jiang 
Dongxiu [Chiang Tung-hsiuJ. The marriage had been arranged 
by his mother in 1904, just before he left for school in 
Shanghai and he was not to meet her until 1917, when he 
returned to China from America.33 
Hu's relationship with Edith while they were students 
at Cornell was one of shared intellects as well as love. 
33 Chou, 58-63. Like many aspects of traditional 
Chinese culture, Hu's attitude toward the style of 
arranged marriage expected of him as a member of the 
scholar-gentry had already become problematic before he 
arrived in the United States and was confronted with an 
array of new alternatives in his social relations. In "On 
Marriage" ("Hunyin bian"), an essay written in Shanghai 
between 1906 and 1908, he was quite emphatic in criticizing 
the reliance of parents on "go-betweens" and marriage 
brokers and the lack of input from the children themselves 
concerning the selection of marriage partners. Yan Fu's 
translation of Montesquieu's De l'esprit des lois (The 
Spirit of the Law] even figures in the argument, as Hu 
agrees with Montesqieu's belief that the experience of 
guiding parents is necessary -- though Hu feels,not 
sufficient -- in arranging a marriage. He actually went so 
far as to say that because of the great unhappiness caused 
by the way that the Chinese had arranged their marriages 
for so many hundreds of years, " ... you cannot blame the 
youths for advocating family revolution." He was primarily 
concerned, as would become his habit with most issues, with 
the sociopolitical consequences of marriage. By this time 
he was already in the habit of expressing himself on social 
issues in the rhetoric of the "Darwinian" struggle to 
survive as a nation, or race: "If couples are not in love, 
if families are not in harmony, how can they have good 
children? For thousands of years, our race has been 
sinking day by day, our morality has been deteriorating day 
by day, our physique has been getting weaker day by day. 
All these have been because our parents have been too 
unautocratic ... they should take their children's marriages 
as an important national affair." See Chou, 58-63. 
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What Hu once called his "cold personality"34 began to fade. 
They wrote poetry to each other and took long walks in the 
woods near the University campus. During Hu's last year at 
Cornell, Edith moved to New York to study painting. Min-
chih Chou has suggested that Hu may have transferred to 
Columbia, in part, to be near her.35 
Once a man prone to periods of despondency, Hu's mood 
had changed to one of aspirations and optimism.36 Though 
certainly absorbing this "optimistic view point" from the 
general tone of liberalism and progressivism that was 
present at Cornell in the 1910s, Hu owes a measure of his 
new-found feelings to his association with Edith Williams. 
This "optimism" was to play a fundamental role in his 
development as a thinker. Jerome Grieder has observed that 
even Hu's eventual commitment to Dewey's gradualist social 
and political philosophy would have been impossible without 
the prior establishment of an"·· .optimism which gave him 
patience ... and a strong faith in the ultimate triumph of 
logic and reason."37 Hu wrote of it in a diary entry in 
1914: "In letters to my friends at home I invariably urge 
34 Ibid., 63. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Grieder, Hu Shih, 44. 
37 Ibid. I 44-45. 
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upon them the 'optimistic viewpoint' ... ! believe of the 
various things that I have acquired since coming abroad, 
only this great concept is worthy to be counted."38 
Hu's new attitude about the liberation of women from 
the traditional constraints imposed on their choices, 
absorbed from his close contact with the feminism and 
independence of Edith Williams, helped to round out both 
his character and the scope of his belief in the necessity 
of intellectual change as the key to saving the nation. 
His sense of which Chinese would participate in the great 
social and intellectual changes he felt necessary to saving 
China as a nation became fuller and inclusive of women: 
I have always had deep convictions about the 
importance of women's education, but I used to 
think that its purpose was to create for society 
sagacious wives and good mothers who would in 
turn provide a good education for their families. 
Now I realize that the highest goal of women's 
education is to create women able to live free 
and independent. When a nation possesses free 
and independent women, it can improve the 
morality and uplift the character of its 
citizens. This is because women have a special 
transforming power. When we take good advantage 
of it, we will be able to invigorate the weak and 
inspire the timid, to transform people to form 
better habits. It is important that patriotic 
people know how to ... take advantage of [the 
resources of the free and independent womenJ.39 
As Min-chih Chou has inferred, Hu's new sense of 
38 Hu Shih, Diary, quoted in ibid., 44. 
39 Hu Shih, Diary, quoted in Chou, 65. 
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women's role in building a new society has strong parallels 
with Yan Fu's belief that the release of the energy 
potential of the individual was the key to the progress of 
the societal group.40 As discussed above, Yan Fu came into 
contact with this idea through his reading of Herbert 
Spencer.41 By the time that Hu Shi had written the above 
passage in his diary, he had certainly read Yan Fu's 
Tianvan Lun, which Yan wrote with Spencer in the "back of 
his mind."42 He would certainly have been familiar with 
the tenor of Yan's other works, as they were all popular 
among Chinese intellectuals at the time, even though there 
is no direct evidence that Hu specifically read Spencer or 
Yan Fu's translation of A Study of Sociology (Qunxue yi 
lun) [Ch'un-·hsueh i-lun]. Nevertheless, the tone of his 
attitude about the education of women at this time clearly 
indicates his belief in a Spencerian type of "vitalist" 
energy-channelling that Yan Fu was well known for 
promoting. 
Hu Shi arrived at Columbia University to pursue a 
doctorate in philosophy under the guidance of John Dewey in 
autumn, 1915. He had written in his diary the year before 
40 Chou, 65. 
41 See Chapter II, above, pp. 28-29 and note 21. 
42 See Chapter II, above, pp. 33-35. 
83 
that he was looking for a "practical philosophy." Jerome 
Grieder has described Hu's initial interest in Dewey's 
pragmatism as a reaction to the objective idealism that 
dominated the Sage School at Cornell.43 It may also have 
been a "boomerang effect" from an attempt to explore 
Christianity during his undergraduate days at Cornell, as 
well as a reaction to the "impractical" constraints of the 
Chinese tradition of family obligations he was feeling at 
the time due to his arranged betrothal.44 
For Hu Shi, Dewey's instrumentalist pragmatism was a 
powerful antidote to the "illness of thought and culture" 
that he believed China suffered from. The universalism of 
Dewey's scientific method, which allowed its application in 
China or the West, combined with its particularistic 
approach, directed at specific social and political 
problems in a particular time and place, seemed made to 
order for Hu's intellectual agenda. It would allow him to 
43 Grieder, Hu Shih, 47. 
44 Hu made a brief exploration of Christianity during 
1911 and 1912. While embracing its ideals at first, 
contact with the rituals of both Catholic and Protestant 
groups convinced him that Christianity was just as 
"idolatrous" and "irrational" as Buddhism and Taoism. 
Ultimately Hu came to criticize Christianity for more than 
what he called "superstition." But it took him several 
years to develop a critical eye towards this, as well as 
other, aspects of Western civilization. For a full 
treatment of Hu's interaction with Christianity, see Chou, 
39-57. 
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borrow from the West while remaining firmly grounded in the 
special needs and requirements of the Chinese situation. 
It would allow him to reconstitute a new Chinese "essence" 
(ti) on the basis of "useful" (YQ.illl) Western techniques. 
In this sense, then, Hu Shi's adoption of Dewey's very 
American, pragmatist philosophy, with its roots in 
Darwinian evolutionary theory, liberalism, and 
progressivism, retains the ti-yong dynamic of the "self-
strengtheners" of the late nineteenth century, including 
Yan Fu. 
There were other, important, aspects of Dewey's 
philosophy, however, with "revolutionary" value for Hu Shi. 
Many of these have strong parallels to elements of Yan Fu's 
interpretations of science as the source of power in the 
West. The strongest of these is "method." Hu had been 
looking for a "way" to solve China's problems since his 
middle-school days in Shanghai. Like Yan Fu, and perhaps 
partly due to Yan's early and clear admittance of the fact, 
Hu saw the key to China's survival in finding a "method" to 
instigate and drive intellectual, and thus, cultural and 
political change. In 1914, while still at Cornell, and 
before he had read any of Dewey's work, method was already 
the focus of Hu Shi's concerns: 
What our country urgently needs today is not 
novel theories or abstruse philosophical 
doctrines, but the methods [shuJ by means of 
which knowledge may be sought, affairs discussed, 
things examined and the country governed. 
Speaking from my own experience, there are three 
methods which are miraculous prescriptions to 
restore life Cch'i-ssu shen-tanJ: 
1. the principle of inductive reasoning 
2. a sense of historical perspective 
3. the concept of progress45 
Hu's reasons for adopting a method are much the same 
as those expressed in the passage quoted earlier from the 
Daxue CTa-hs~ehJ: "··.to ... put their countries in 
order ... to improve themselves as individuals ... to extend 
their knowledge ... CwhichJ lies in the investigation of 
things."46 But the kinds of methods he considered were a 
direct reflection of his exposure to ideas from the West. 
They are, in fact, all of those concepts that began to 
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develop in China in the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
that ultimately paved the way for the ideas of Western 
science: inductive reasoning (empirical observation leading 
to generalized principles), an accumulative, or historical 
sense of time, and the forward directionality of 
progress.47 
Later in his life, in his autobiography, Hu admitted 
to the primacy of method in his thought, and to his sources 
45 Hu Shih, Diary, 167, quoted in Grieder, Hu Shih, 
48-49. The emphasis is mine. 
46 See Chapter II, above, p. 36, for the whole 
quotation. 
47 See Chapter III, above, pp. 48-57. 
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for it: "When later I followed in the footsteps of Huxley 
and Dewey it was because since youth I had placed such 
great emphasis on intellectual method."48 Indeed Thomas 
Huxley, read by Hu Shi in Yan Fu's translation of Evolution 
and Ethics (Tianyan Lun), provided the foundation for Hu's 
sense of the importance of method upon which his 
appreciation of Dewey's approach to scientlf ic method was 
constructed. In identifying the popularity of Tianyan Lun 
among the intelligentsia and youth of his generation, Hu 
also implied that there was more to Huxley's work than met 
the eye, something subtle, and missed by most: 
Within a few years of its publication the 
popularity of On Evolution was widespread 
throughout the whole country, and even became 
reading material for middle-school students. Of 
those who have read the book, few can understand 
the significance of Huxley for the history of 
science and for intellectual history. All they 
understood was the application of phrases like 
"the strong win and the weak lose" (yu-sheng 
lieh-pai) in international politics.49 
Hu felt most of Huxley's Chinese readers, in their 
rush to adopt his phraseology for the aphorisms of a new 
social rhetoric, had failed to notice that the power in 
Huxley's work rested in his methodology: "Huxley ... teaches 
a method of intellectual honesty. [He] has ... said, "The 
most sacred act of a man's life is to say and to feel 'I 
48 Quoted in Grieder, Hu Shih, 48. 
49 Hu Shih, Autobiography, 56. The translation is mine. 
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believe such and such to be true.'" All the greatest 
rewards, and all the heaviest penalties of existence, cling 
upon that act."50 So the central issue here is truth, 
grounded in "a method of intellectual honesty." Yan Fu's 
interest in Spencer was also partially focused on what he 
felt was his contribution to developing a methodology for 
knowledge and truth that was "free from biases" -- an 
adherence to the "Mean."51 
The key to understanding Hu Shi's eventual total 
commitment to Deweyan pragmatism as "the" correct 
scientific method in approaching problem solving of all 
kinds, and its background in Hu's attitude toward Huxley, 
lays in Hu's definition of science itself: 
The basic spirit of science is the search for 
truth. Man in this world is oppressed by his 
environment, conditioned by customs and habits, 
and constricted by superstition. Only truth can 
free him, give him strength, and give him wisdom 
and intelligence; only truth can help him 
eradicate the strictures imposed by 
environment ... Scientific civilization teaches us 
how to train our senses and intelligence to 
search gradually and progressively for 
truth ... This is the only way to truth.52 
For Hu Shi, science ~method, the method for 
50 Hu Shih, "Credo," 254-255. 
51 See Chapter II above, pp. 37-38. 
52 Hu Shih, "Wo-men tui-yu Hsi-yang chin-tai wen-ming 
ti t'ai-tu" [Our Attitude Toward the Modern Civilization of 
the West] (1916), quoted in Kwok, 96. 
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ascertaining truth, the basis of knowledge. This emphasis 
on the "how-to" aspect of science is connected to Hu's 
desire to find a "practical philosophy," that is, a 
philosophy for solving social, political, intellectual, and 
technological problems. As Grieder has pointed out, many 
of Hu's motivations for seeking a "practical philosophy" 
have their roots in certain tendencies of late Imperial 
Chinese Confucianism53, such as the movement for "practical 
studies" (shixue) Cshih-hs~ehl and practical statecraft and 
explorations of Chu Hsi's admonition to "investigate 
things."54 As such, they were already present in Hu's 
intellectual makeup before he became acquainted with Dewey. 
By then he was, as well, already committed to the primacy 
of ideas in transforming social and political constructs. 
The ideas of science, particularly scientific method, were 
Immediately practical. Like Yan Fu, Hu Shi believed that 
the practice of thinking "scientifically" would lead the 
Chinese to a modern, democratic society, which he felt was 
the key to channeling the energies China needed to survive. 
Hu Shi's thought, by the time he entered Columbia to 
begin his doctorate in 1914, had already begun the 
adaptation of the ti-yong paradigm that would allow Dewey's 
53 Grieder, Hu Shih, 50. 
54 See p. 81, note 46, above. 
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pragmatism a comfortable mooring. Instead of insisting on 
retaining a Chinese essence (ti), while utilizing (~) 
practical knowledge from the West, Hu Shi had begun to 
speak primarily in terms of Y..QllS., of practice. He was, 
while still an undergraduate at Cornell, fundamentally 
concerned with the lack of intellectual preparation among 
the Chinese for the coming tide of republican revolution in 
China: 
Our country falls far, far short of attaining a 
republican character -- not one man in a hundred 
can read, you cannot speak with one in a thousand 
on topics of general knowledge, nor are you sure 
to meet one man in a million with whom to discuss 
foreign affairs .... When the masses are stupid to 
this degree, in truth I know not with whom to 
talk about republicanism! If, indeed, we have 
achieved a republic, it is the republic of a 
handful of people, not a democratic republic.55 
Yet at the same time, he was optimistic about the 
consequences of "practice", without mentioning principles 
at all. In an essay about attaining democracy, written for 
the American magazine The Outlook in 1915, at about the 
same time as the above passage, Hu seems to subsume 
principle in practice, (something that Chen Duxiu, as we 
will see, carries to its extreme): 
Young China believes in democracy; it believes 
that the only way to have democracy is to have 
democracy. Government is an art, and as such it 
needs practice. I would never been able to speak 
English had I never spoken it. The Anglo-Saxon 
55 Hu Shi, Diary,, quoted in Grieder, Hu Shih, 66-67. 
people would never have had democracy had they 
never practiced democracy.56 
Yan Fu had believed that the Chinese people, as a 
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whole, were not ready for republicanism or democracy. His 
reason for translating Western works in such a terse, 
Classical style was so that they would appeal to the 
highest levels of scholar-officials, who were in a position 
to make substantial changes in government policy, and who 
could, as they had traditionally done, serve as exemplars 
of the new thought to the masses. Yan still felt there was 
a need to ground the useful (Y.Qll5l) new thought in the old 
"Chinese-ness," in Chinese "essence" (ti). He would have 
accomplished this through the mediation of the scholar-
officials, who were, after all, the exemplars of "Chinese-
ness." 
The above passage illustrates an important way in 
which Hu Shi's thought, in its pre-Deweyan affinities with 
Dewey's thought, deviates from that of Yan Fu. Hu Shi's 
approach begins the move from the self-strengtheners' 
perception, shared to a great degree by Yan Fu, that t.1 and 
Y.Qll5l can be separated, with t.1 dominant (because, of 
course, it is Chinese ti), to seeing ti in terms of Y.Qll5l, 
56 Hu Shih, "China and Democracy," The outlook 3 
(September 1, 1915): 27-28, quoted in Grleder, Hu Shih, 66, 
note 77. 
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that ls, to seeing "essence" in terms of "function." Tl 
becomes fully subsumed in Y.Q.!1S. in the thought of Chen 
Duxiu after 1921. Hu Shi preserved the role of ti through 
the gradualism and "genetic sense" of Dewey's philosophy, 
rooted in Darwinian evolution: there would always be 
something Chinese carried into any problem to be solved in 
China simply because these problems were set into a Chinese 
situation and Chinese people were going to have to solve 
them. Hu was able to focus on practice (Y.Q.!1S.), because the 
nature of practice in social, political, or scientific 
arenas, using Dewey's method, grew out of the circumstances 
at hand, whatever they might be. Theoretically being 
Chinese was already worked into the equation for solving 
problems without allowing it to dominate. 
What Hu Shi was most attracted to in Dewey's 
philosophy was its focus on method, and therefore on 
practice: "Dewey has given us a philosophy of thinking 
which treats thinking as an art, as a technique .... " He 
believed that Dewey had succeeded in describing a universal 
technique, 
... true not only of the discoveries in the 
experimental sciences, but also of the best 
researches in the historical sciences, such as 
textual criticism, philological reconstruction, 
and higher criticism. In all these fields the 
results have been achieved by the same technique, 
which in its essence consists of a boldness in 
suggesting hypotheses coupled with a most 
solicitous regard for control and verification. 
This laboratory technique of thinking deserves 
the name of Creative Intelligence because it is 
truly creative in the exercise of imagination and 
ingenuity in seeking evidence and devising 
experiment and in the satisfactory results that 
flow from the successful fruition of thinking.57 
Because in Hu Shi's thought, ti is expressed in terms of 
YQ..illi, a certain amount of the "essence" (ti) of Western 
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scientific method is always present because it is always 
expressed in terms of YQ..illi, that is in terms of method and 
practice. And the search for truth, objectively and 
without biases (which, as we have see, has strong roots in 
Confucianism), which is what science was for Hu, determined 
method and practice. 
Hu Shi clearly believed that Dewey's philosophy 
provided a "technique" for thinking, an "intellectual 
technology."58 Much of Hu's career would involve 
journalistic, literary, and pedagogical approaches for 
maximizing the intellectual potential, and therefore the 
social and political potential of the Chinese people. Hu's 
57 Hu Shih, "Credo", 255. 
58 The most outstanding example of an "intellectual 
technology" in pre-modern Chinese culture was the 
examination system. It can also be argued that systems of 
logic and mathematics are intellectual technologies, and 
have existed in many parts of the world. Hu's adoption of 
Western scientific method as a "thinking technique" or 
"intellectual technology," therefore, doesn't represent a 
complete break with the past, but shares continuities of 
role and purpose, though not of details with China's 
previous "intellectual technologies." See Chapter II, 
above, pp. 40-41 and note 39. 
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belief in the power of "intellectual technologies," even 
his involvement in the movement for the use of vernacular 
Chinese, become instances of the practice of Dewey's 
pragmatic instrumentalism. 
D.W.Y. Kwok believes that the language reforms 
promoted by Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, among others, were 
" ... not primarily technological -- to enable the Chinese 
language to absorb modern scientific terminology. It was 
based on social considerations --to achieve a unity of the 
spoken and the written languages for mass application."59 
However "social considerations" in no way necessarily 
preclude a behavior from being considered "technological" 
or "technical." The operant words here are "achieve" and 
"application." Technologies are systematic methods for 
achieving practical purposes. Hu's own belief in the 
necessity of effective "thinking techniques," or 
"intellectual technologies," is linked to their use in 
achieving "social" ends -- the molding of the "old" Chinese 
people into a "new" Chinese people.60 
59 Kwok, 8. The emphasis is mine. 
60 The period of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries saw a world wide movement toward 
molding society by the use of wide-spread behavior 
modifying "mechanical" or "technological" processes. 
Taylorism is a well-known example of the application of 
these types of ideas in the West and in the Soviet Union. 
For a brief description of the American origins of 
Taylorism, see Howard. P. Segal, Technological Utopianism 
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The idea behind Hu's and Chen's promotion of language 
reform was to bring written linguistic expression more into 
line with how people really communicated with each other. 
Language reform was a "systematic method" for preparing the 
way for new ideas and concepts to be introduced, and for 
the people to be able to express themselves and participate 
in a larger world more effectively. The "levelling 
effect"61 of the reforms mentioned by Kwok parallels Hu 
Shi's belief in the universal character of scientific 
method. A vernacular language movement, together with the 
widespread application of scientific thinking, would, in 
Hu's point of view, maximize the number of individuals 
solving particular problems, in order to maximize the 
survival of the group in Yan Fu's sense of the collective 
Great Self Chinese society. Hu was ultimately 
interested in achieving a new state of "collective mind" in 
order to achieve a new society and a new polity. 
in American Culture (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985), 106-108. For an excellent discussion 
of the debate in the Soviet Union (another developing 
nation at the turn of the twentieth century) over the 
adoption of Taylorism in industry in the early 1920s, see 
Kendall E. Bailes, "Alexei Gastev and the Soviet 
Controversy over Taylorism, 1918-1924," Soviet Studies 
29.3 (July 1977): 373-394. I want to thank Dr. Lois 
Becker, Department of History, Portland state University, 
for bringing Taylorism and its Soviet variant to my 
attention. 
61 Kwok, 8. 
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John Dewey's philosophy, adapted by Hu Shi, owed a 
great deal to his understanding of Darwin, partly absorbed 
through the influence of psychologist and fellow 
philosopher William James (1842-1910). Distressed at the 
apparent incongruity of the idea of "free will" with the 
deterministic science of the mid-nineteenth century, James 
had come to view the human freedom to choose among 
alternatives as an adaptive product of the pressure of 
natural selection on the species.62 Dewey took James' 
ideas about evolution and the workings of the human mind 
one step further, seeing in Darwin's impact on philosophy a 
great organicist revolution in thought, returning man to 
his place among the plants and animals. As far as Dewey 
was concerned, the methods of the natural sciences could 
now be applied to all that is human, including morality and 
values: 
... prior to Darwin the impact of the new 
scientific method upon the life, mind, and 
politics had been arrested, because between these 
ideal or moral interests and the inorganic world 
intervened the kingdom of plants and animals. 
The gates of the garden of life were barred to 
the new ideas; and only through this garden was 
there access to mind and politics. The influence 
of Darwin upon philosophy resides in his having 
conquered the phenomena of life for the principle 
of transition, and thereby freed the new logic 
62 James T. Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: Social. 
Democracy and Progressivism in European and American 
Thought, 1870-1920 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 38-39. 
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for application to mind and morals and life.63 
John Dewey was part of an "invisible college" of 
scholars in the late 1910s and 1920s that James 
Kloppenberg, borrowing Dewey's own term, calls a via media, 
or "middle road."64 Hu Shi had much in common with Dewey 
in this regard. Hu generally takes a "gradualist" and 
synthetic approach. Human morality and the need to seek 
objective knowledge were not contradictory for Dewey or Hu, 
but worked together to achieve a "mean," in the Confucian 
sense of the word. Hu had very early on shown a tendency 
to view human nature as "neutral," neither following 
Xunzi's [Hsun-tzuJ (300-235 B.C.) idea that it is 
inherently evil or Mencius'[Mengzi,Meng-tzuJ (372-289 
B.C.E.) idea that it is inherently evil. His "middle road" 
followed Wang Yangming's (Wang Yang-ming] (1472-1529) 
63 John Dewey, "The Influence of Darwin on 
Philosophy," in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and 
other Essays in Contemporary Thought (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press,1965, [19101), 8. 
64 Specifically, Dewey's notion, inspired by the work 
of William James, was of " ... a via media between the 
natural sciences and the ideal interests of morals and 
religion." See Kloppenberg, 26 . Dewey and his fellows in 
quest of a "middle way" -- such thinkers as Walter 
Lippmann, William James, and Max Weber -- nursed a notion 
of knowledge founded on experience instead of Cartesian ~ 
priori deductive logic, a profound historicism, a 
commitment to democracy in all spheres of human life, and a 
gradualist program of reform focused on the achievement of 
proximate change rather than on an ultimate and 
revolutionary end. See ibid., 3-6. 
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belief that human nature is capable of both good and 
evil.65 He was not a revolutionary, despite many of the 
sources of his philosophy being the same as those of many 
who were revolutionaries. He believed, in general, that 
revolutionary activities hindered the intellectual reforms 
that he had in mind for the nation. By opposing both 
"utopian" or "anarchistic individualism" and a revival of 
the Confucian tradition of "self-cultivation,"66 Hu was 
standing on his own "via media." It sets him quite apart 
from his fellow traveler until 1921, Chen Duxiu, whose 
revolutionary, and finally Marxist approach shares the 
early well-springs of Hu's thought. 
There are clearly identifiable origins for this idea 
of a "middle way" in the Chinese Confucian tradition 
itself. The ideal of the "sage" who adheres to the "mean" 
-- the upright, what is "proper" under the circumstances --
is a main theme of The Doctrine of the Mean, one book of 
the Confucian canon that was important to Yan Fu. Its 
importance to Yan only serves to reinforce its importance 
in Confucianism itself. The importance to Hu Shi of a 
method of inquiry that is free from biases, and gives 
"truth" is a modern reverberation of the Confucian concept 
65 Grieder, Hu Shih, 31. 
66 Ibid., 33-34; 98. 
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of the "mean." What is fundamentally different, of course, 
is the source of the measurement in each case: the testing 
of laws generalized from experience versus the selective 
interpretation of the appropriate Confucian text. 
By the time that Hu Shi received his doctorate from 
Columbia and returned to China in 1917 to a professorship 
in the P~ilosophy Department of Beijing University, all of 
his fundamental ideas about how science works and what to 
use it for were already in place. They would be refined to 
some degree, but were largely maintained for the rest of 
his life. When Hu became a central figure in the New 
Culture Movement that overlapped with the May Fourth 
Movement after the spring of 1919, and culminating, for our 
purposes, in the 1923 "Debates on Science versus 
Metaphysics," he was speaking and writing from his mature 
position concerning the role of science in society. 
The Debates on Science and Metaphysics grew out of the 
discourse of the May Fourth Era after May 4, 1919, and 
therefore, in this study, form a single history with them. 
The fate of Hu Shi's ideas in the New Culture and May 
Fourth periods and his role in the Debates of 1923 will be 
treated, along with those of Chen Duxiu after 1917, in 
Chapter VI. 
CHAPTER V 
CHEN DUXIU BEFORE 1917 
Chen Duxiu [Ch'en Tu-hsiu] (1880-1942) has been 
primarily regarded as a political figure, journalist, and 
promoter of the baihua Cpai-hua] or vernacular literary 
movement in China in the 1910s and 1920s. A leader of the 
pro-democracy New Culture and May Fourth movements in the 
first two decades of this century, he also co-founded the 
Chinese Communist Party in 1921 with Li Dazhao [Li Ta-
chaoJ (1888-1927). As D.W.Y. Kwok has noted, Chen is often 
singled out for his change of political stance from 
republicanism to Harxism.1 Kwok further points to Chen's 
1 This chapter will examine the development of Chen 
Duxiu's thought concerning science and cultural change only 
up until 1917. The year 1917 marks a significant 
intersection of Chen's and Hu Shi's [Hu Shih] professional 
and intellectual lives. In that year, Hu returned to China 
from the United States, they both began to teach at Beijing 
University, and Hu joined Chen in writing for and editing 
the journal New Youth. It is also the year that Cai 
Yuanpei [Ts'ai Yuan-p'eiJ (1868-1940) began his tenure as 
the president of Beijing University, ushering in, by his 
faculty appointments, an era of unprecedented intellectual 
fervor and vigor that established the school's reputation 
as the center of China's student and intellectual culture 
up to the present time. For a discussion of the 
significance of Cai Yuanpei's reforms at Beijing University 
see Chow Tse-tsung, The Hay Fourth Movement: Intellectual 
Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, HA: Harvard 
University Press, 1960), 47-57. Chen's and Hu's 
intellectual stances begin to pull away from each other in 
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"basic philosophical understanding of science and its 
implication," as an important link between his early 
democratic republicanism and his later Marxism.2 What is 
left unsaid is that Chen's notions about Western science, 
particularly evolutionary theory and its connections to 
social theory and its ideological expression, like those of 
Hu Shi, have strong parallels, and identifiable ties, to 
the earlier work of Yan Fu [Yen Fu]. 
Chen Duxiu's importance for early twentieth century 
Chinese intellectual history is largely due to his pivotal 
role as a publicist. "A man of singular and original 
personality,"3 rather than an originator of ideas, Chen 
"was a dazzling stylist prepared to talk about a broad 
range of ideas in an extremely appealing and attractive 
the period between 1919 and 1921, when Chen co-founded the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with Li Dazhao. By the 
"Debates on Science and Metaphysics" in 1923, they are 
standing in somewhat different positions, despite the fact 
that they are in the same "pro-science" camp during the 
debates. In order to differentiate their positions clearly 
it is important to establish their lines of thought prior 
to the New Culture and May Fourth Movements (1915 - 1921) 
(the focus of Chapter VI), so that the divergence of their 
thought after May Fourth stands out in bold relief. 
2 Kwok, 59. 
3 Benjamin I. Schwartz, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu: Pre-Communist 
Phase," Papers on China 2: 168. Mimeographed for private 
distribution by the Committee on International and 
Regional Studies, Harvard University, May 1948. 
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manner."4 Lin Yu-sheng has described Chen's charismatic 
wz:iting as a combination of "intellectual 
straightforwardness with moral passion and dogged 
persistence" that cut through the "cultural anomie" and 
confusion of the times.5 Chen's role in this regard may be 
likened to that of a transformer in an electrical system 
boosting the current, "cranking it up," so to speak. Not 
simply, and not quite, a synthecist, his "intellectual 
guerilla warfare" often paid no attention to the logical 
consequences of the sometimes contradictory stances that he 
took.6 But it was Chen Duxiu, "orchestrating the writings 
of his friends,"7 who perhaps more than any other single 
person, helped to spread the New Culture that was 
developing in China in the 1910s and 1920s, and its belief 
in the efficacy of "scientific" and "democratic" thinking. 
Chen Duxiu was born in 1880 in Huaining, Anhui 
Province.a Like Yan Fu and Hu Shi, Chen's family were part 
4 Lee Feigon, Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese 
Communist Party (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1983), 100. 
5 Lin Yu-sheng, Crisis of Chinese Consciousness, 63. 
6 Ibid., especially note 14. 
7 Feigon, 98. 
8 The plain facts of Chen Duxiu's biography are not 
clearly and definitively established. There has only been 
one published book-length biography of him in English, Lee 
Feigon's Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist 
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of the lower gentry. Although definitive information about 
Chen's family is difficult to obtain, it appears that 
before the time of his paternal grandfather the family had 
Party. Richard C. Kagan mentions three unpublished 
biographies, none of which I had access to in writing this 
essay: Julie Lien-ying Howe, "The Development of Ch'en Tu-
hsiu's thought, 1915-1938," M.A. thesis, Department of 
History, Columbia University, 1949; Chih Yu-ju, "The 
political thought of Ch'en Tu-hsiu," doctoral dissertation, 
Department of Government, University of Indiana, 1965; and 
Thomas C.T. Kuo, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942) and the Chinese 
Communist Movement," Ph.D. thesis, Department of History, 
University of Pittsburgh, 1969. See Richard c. Kagan, 
"Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Unfinished Autobiography," China 
Quarterly 50 (April-June, 1972): 295. There are also long 
biographical sketches in Benjamin Schwartz, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu 
and the Acceptance of the Modern West," Journal of the 
History of Ideas 12.1 (January, 1951), and Chow, 42. All 
of them use a variety of different sources and give a 
variety of conflicting information. The problem of "facts" 
is further complicated by the following factors that 
mandate careful use of primary sources and the secondary 
works based upon them: 1. biographies of Chen written by 
the Nationalists or Communists at the time of his arrest by 
Yuan Shikai's Nationalist forces may be suspect because 
both parties have a political point to prove; 2. Chen's 
fragment (two chapters) of an autobiography, "Shih-an Tz'u-
chuan," written while he was in prison in 1932, and 
published in Cosmic Wind (Youzhou feng, Yu-chou fengl 
(Shanghai), Nos.51-53 (September-October, 1937), should be 
used carefully because it contains some exaggerations, not 
unusual in autobiographies, intended to arouse interest and 
sympathy from his Chinese readers after his case went to 
trial; 3. accounts written in post-1949 China may be 
suspect because Chen was purged from the CCP in 1929. He 
became a persona non grata in China as the communist 
revolution progressed, and has not been fully 
"rehabilitated" yet; 4. the remaining source of 
biographical information, interviews with his surviving 
relatives, taken after the Cultural Revolution, may be 
suspect because of their desire to protect their own 
positions in society or in the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), or because of their desire to "rehabilitate" Chen on 
their own. 
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primarily been farmers. Both his grandfather and his 
father, though not originally from the class of scholar-
officials, had become teachers and minor officials. His 
father, Chen Yanzhong [Ch'en Yen-chung], was a tutor to a 
wealthy Suzhou (Su-chou, Soochow) family.9 Like Yan Fu and 
Hu Shi, Chen was quite young (two years old) when his 
father died.10 
The examination system was still in place when Chen 
was a child, and his formal education was focused on the 
Confucian classics. His first teacher was his grandfather, 
an excessively moralistic and harsh taskmaster, who died 
9 Feigon, 24 ; Schwartz, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the 
Acceptance of the Modern West," 61. There are 
discrepancies in the literature about the real social 
status of Chen's scholar-gentry family. Schwartz, whose 
article was a pioneering work on Chen in English, claims 
that Chen's family were "well to do," based on 
biographical work that was done at the time of Chen's 
arrest by Yuan Shikai's Nationalist army in 1932 (see note 
8 above for a discussion of the problems with sources). 
Feigon claims that Chen's father was a minor official, 
working for a wealthy family. That would not necessarily 
make Chen's family wealthy, though Chow Tse-tsung flatly 
states, "In his home town, Chen's family was regarded as 
rich." See Chow, 42, note a. 
10 In his unfinished autobiography (Shih-an Tz'u-
chuan), Chen states his age at the time of his father's 
death as two months old. Feigon, utilizing other sources, 
places his age at two years old, and considers this an 
example of Chen's exaggeration in order to push the idea 
that he was a fatherless orphan and came from a less-than-
pr iveledged scholar-official background. Neither of these 
assertions on Chen part seem to hold up under examination 
of other sources. See Feigon, 24-26; and Kagan, 301-302. 
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when Chen was ten years old.11 But early on Chen showed an 
interest in the unorthodox, foreshadowing his 
"iconoclastic" nature. As Lee Feigon has pointed out, Chen 
never indicated in any of his autobiographical writings 
whether his education had been in the Song or Han school of 
Neo-Confucianism. But he showed close affinities to Han 
learning (Hanxue), especially to the critical posture of 
its practitioners and their development of evidential 
philological research methods (kaozheng) Ckao-chenqJ as a 
basis for criticism.12 
After Chen's grandfather died, he reported going 
through a number of unsuitable tutors, until his older 
brother, Chen Mengji [Ch'en Meng-chi], who had already 
received his xiucai [hsiu-ts'ai] degree (the lowest, local 
level of the examinations) became his teacher. The older 
brother was charged with preparing young Chen Duxiu for his 
xiucai exams. But Chen preferred studying the obscure 
characters in the Zhaoming wenxuan (Chao-ming wen-hsuanJ, a 
11 Chen's autobiography describes his grandfather as 
having a "perverted" hatred of "dirt and noise." "Old 
white beard" was addicted to opium and was prone to beat 
Chen and his siblings for undefined infractions of his 
private codes of conduct and scholarship. See Richard 
Kagan's translation, 302-303. 
12 Feigon, 28-29. Chen Duxiu's native province of 
Anhui had been a center of kaozhenq development in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For a discussion of 
kaozheng and Anhui's importance, see above, Chapter III, 
pp. 50-57. 
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collection of parallel verse from the sixth century, to 
reviewing the various accepted styles of the rigid "eight-
legged" essay he was expected to perform on the exams. 
Chen became "intractable," and his "indulgent" brother 
stopped insisting on study of the "eight-legged" form.13 
In 1896, at the rather young age of seventeen, Chen 
took his xiucai examinations. As he describes the 
experience, 
With my level of eight-legged essay such as it 
was, I was certain to be lowest on the list of 
examinees ... At the time of the third and last 
examination for hsiu-ts'ai ... the topic was the 
selection of incomplete phrases from 
Hencius ... For me, this kind of crazy topic 
deserved an illogical essay. I filled up my 
essay with the obscure terms for the birds, 
animals, and bamboo drawn from the Wen-hsuan, and 
padded it further with the absurd characters of 
the K'ang-hsi dictionary. I didn't care about 
coherence; whether the cow's head did not fit on 
the horse's mouth, or whether there was no 
connection between the beginning and the end of 
the essay.14 
Chen, with this act of youthful defiance, was already on 
his way to becoming an iconoclast. But then, after writing 
an exam that he didn't really take seriously, he not only 
passed, he placed first: "No one would ever have thought 
that my muddled essay would deceive the muddled Provincial 
Director of Education, but he marked me first place in the 
13 Chen Tu-hsiu, Shih-an Tz'u-chuan, translated in 
Kagan, 307-308. 
14 Ibid., 308. 
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examination. With this, I despised the examination system 
even more."15 Chen's disdain for "China's examination 
hell"16 was the beginning of a life-long critique of an 
antiquated Chinese culture he would describe some years 
later as the root cause of "··.the old and rotten air that 
fills society everywhere ... ,"17 threatening "national 
survival." 
The following year Chen and his older brother and an 
entourage of teachers and their brothers, and fellow 
candidates, travelled to Nanjing for the provincial exams 
.. 
for the second level, the zhuren Cchu-jen] degree, which 
I 
was the entre for lower-level government posts. His heart 
was apparently not in it -- he intimates that his attempts 
to pass the exams were mostly to please his mother.18 In 
15 Ibid., 309. 
16 This expression is from the title of Ichisada 
Miyazaki's study of the civil service examinations, China's 
Examination Hell: The Civil Service Examinations of 
Imperial China, trans. Conrad Shirokauer (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1981 [19761). Chen's 
description of his experiences is particularly vivid. See 
Chen Tu-hsiu, Shih-an Tz'u-chuan, translated in Kagan, 309-
314. 
17 Chen Duxiu, "Chinggao qingnian" (Ching-kao ch'ing-
nienJ CA Call to Youth], Xin Qing Nian (Hsin Ch'ing-nien] 
[New Youth] 1.1: 1. The translation is in Ssu-yu Teng and 
John K. Fairbank, eds., China's Response to the West: a 
documentary survey, 1839-1923 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1961), 241. 
18 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Shih-an Tz'u-chuan, translated in 
Kagan, 309-310. 
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the midst of waiting to take the first part of the zhuren 
exam, a strange naked candidate began walking up and down 
the alley that ran past everyone's rooms, reading loudly 
and posturing wildly. This disturbance caused Chen's 
stressed and wandering mind 
... to question the whole phenomenon of selecting 
men of talent by the examination system. It was 
just like an animal exhibition of monkeys and 
bears performing every few years; and then I 
pondered whether this system was not as defective 
as every other system in the nation.19 
After a harrowing experience in Nanjing for nine days in 
dirty, narrow, smelly examination stalls, with poorly 
cooked food (he didn't know how to cook for himself), he 
failed to finish writing the exam and didn't try again.20 
Chen's early experiences with the examination system 
helped to establish his well-known stance against the 
habits and values of the Chinese tradition. At this early 
stage in his thinking he had nothing with which to replace 
that tradition, and no effective alternative thesis to back 
up an argument to do so. By 1919 and the May Fourth 
movement he will have promoted "Mr. Science and Mr. 
Democracy" as field-marshals in his progressive war against 
the "lethargy and superstition" of the cultural status quo 
in China. The textual evidence for Chen's vehement 
19 Ibid., 314. 
20 Ibid., 313-314. 
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promotion of "scientific thinking" as the basis of his 
attack doesn't appear until 1915, in the first issue of his 
journal New Youth (Xin Qingnian). From that point on, 
Chen's entire political point of view, even as it shifts 
from Republicanism to Marxism, is rationalized through his 
understanding of science as a set of laws that unified 
man's knowledge of an organically whole material world. 
However, it is important to take a look at Chen's 
development as a young anti-Manchu revolutionary because 
his understanding of science and the rhetoric he will use 
to express it after 1915 will come out of the context of 
his political activism up to that year, when he returned to 
China from Japan for the second time. 
About the time that Chen took the zhuren exam in 1897, 
he began to read the reform journals and newspapers that 
had sprung up in coastal cities and treaty-ports such as 
Shanghai and Changsha in the years leading up to the 1898 
Reform Movement. A wave of reformism was sweeping though 
Chen's cohort of young examination candidates, and he was 
thoroughly caught up in it. In particular the work of Kang 
Youwei CK'ang Yu-weiJ, and the articles of Liang Qichao 
(Liang Ch'i-ch'aol in the journal Shiwu bao [Shih-wu paol 
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(Current Affairs, or Chinese ProgressJ21 "really made some 
sense" to him, especially after he failed the provincial 
exam in Nanjing.22 These writings helped Chen to make the 
leap from the critical Chinese studies he had pursued 
outside his official tutoring to a new iconoclasm which had 
thrown its support to "Western learning" (xixue) in the 
interest of "national salvation."23 This is also the point 
at which Yan Fu's influence on Chen's thought begins. 
Although there appears, so far, to be no record of Chen 
specifically saying that he had read the work of Yan Fu, it 
has been intimated in a number of secondary works; Yan's 
influence on Liang Qichao, in particular, and Kang Youwei 
21 Kang and Liang's program of reform was the basis of 
the "100 Days of Reform" in 1898 that was quashed by the 
Dowager Empress Cixi CTz'u-hsiJ, causing them both to flee 
the country. Liang wrote the major articles for and edited 
Shiwu bao, which began publication in 1896, in Shanghai. 
The overall tone of the journal was a call to change (bian) 
Cpien] and to break down the old barriers between classes 
in order to strengthen the group (9...illl) CchunJ. Rather than 
focusing on the technological innovations advocated by most 
of the "self-strengtheners" as the key to bringing China 
independently into the modern world, Liang placed his 
emphasis on political reform, achieved through the spread 
of literacy and the total revamping of China's educational 
institutions. See Hao Chang, "Intellectual Change and the 
Reform Movement, 1890-1898," 295-296. 
22 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Shih-an Tz'u-chuan, in Kagan, 314. 
23 Feigon, 32. 
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as well, is well known.24 Though Yan's influence on Chen 
may not have been as direct as it was on Hu Shi, relying to 
a degree on Liang Qichao as the "car:rier," as we will see, 
it is no less pronounced. 
After spending several years in Manchuria with an 
uncle, apparently being tutored, Chen Duxiu returned to his 
home area in about 1899, to attend his mother's funeral. 
From there, the following year he went to Hangzhou, near 
Shanghai, where he got his first exposure to "Western 
learning."25 He entered Qiu Shi Shuyuan ("Search for the 
Truth" Academy) and studied naval architecture (as Yan Fu 
had) and French. The academy took its name from a popular 
slogan of the radical kaozheng academies the southern 
Yangtze valley had been known for during the eighteenth 
century.26 The Qiu Shi Academy's program was a combination 
of non-traditional interpretations of the classics and the 
24 For examples of secondary works that suggest, 
without further exploration, the influence that Yan Fu's 
writings had on Chen, see Chow, May Fourth, 64, note t.; 
and Schwartz, Wealth and Power, 217. For a discussion of 
Yan's influence on Liang and Kang see Chapter II, above, 
pp. 31-32 and note 27. 
25 This part of Chen's chronology is very unclear. A 
number of the sources have conflicting information. I am 
accepting Feigon's chronology of the years 1897-1900. See 
Feigon, 33 and 35, especially notes 41 and 42. 
26 See Chapter III, above, pp. 50-57, for a discussion 
of these academies and their relationship to the kaozheng 
scholarship movement. 
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introduction of Western ideas. The first school in the 
region to teach both traditional Chinese and Western 
studies, it became a center of the new student culture 
movement that was beginning to develop. A growing sense of 
alienation from the "old" Chinese culture and a self-
awareness of themselves as "new," and as "youth," gave 
them a sense of mission.27 
By 1901 anti-Manchu feeling at the school had 
escalated to the point where an anti-government phrase 
slipped into an essay that had been circulating at the 
school resulted in the dismissal of several students and 
faculty. Apparently Chen spoke up in defense of those 
expelled and was forced to flee the school. Going first to 
Nanjing, where he may have stayed in Zhang Shizhao's 
"underground revolutionary dormitory," by the end of 1902 
he had gone to Japan with other "escapees" from Qiu Shi 
Academy. Chen and a group of his fellow student ex-
patriots established the first openly revolutionary student 
organization among Chinese students in Japan, the Zhongguo 
qinqnian hui [Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien hui] (Chinese Youth 
Society).28 By 1901-1902, Chen had established himself as 
an anti-Manchu revolutionary. 
27 Feigon, 35-36; Schwartz, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the 
Acceptance of the Modern West," 61. 
28 Feigon, 36-37; Chow, 42. 
112 
The Chinese Youth Society was the first of dozens of 
organizations, newspapers, and journals that Chen would 
found or support over the next eighteen years or so that 
would have the word "youth" (gingnian) in their names and 
titles. Chen pinned all his aspirations for China's future 
existence on "youth," defined, as Richard Kagan has 
suggested, " ... [not] by age or class but by a state of 
mind which was fresh, active and not yet destroyed by 
Chinese tradition."29 Yan Fu's progress, instead of 
residing in a re-educated older generation of scholar-
officials, was, for Chen Duxiu, to be found in the "younger 
generation," with the energy and fresh outlook to save 
China. Like Yan Fu and Hu Shi, Chen feared that China 
wasn't ready to save itself and he bemoaned the "corrupted" 
state to which China's youth had been reduced by the 
demands of a "rotten culture": 
I am horrified when I see the people who have 
undergone our traditional education ... They are 
sallow of face, slender of waist with hands 
lacking the strength to wring a chicken's 
neck ... They are as weak and soft as invalids. 
How can people so feeble in mind and body bear 
the weight of heavy burdens?30 
But Chen retained faith in youth, because of the dream that 
29 Kagan, 300. 
30 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Chin-jih chih chiao-yu fangchen" 
[Our Present Educational Policy], Hsin Ch'ing-nien [New 
Youth] 1.2 (1915): 6, quoted in Schwartz, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu: 
Pre-Communist Phase," 192. 
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some of them might have been untainted by the culture of 
China. Youth, which China had a lot of, would become 
Chen's symbol for the creative dynamism of the West that 
all of the reformers felt China had to acquire in order to 
survive. 
The newness and the dynamism of "youth" would become 
the focus of his most famous journal of the May Fourth era, 
New Youth (Xin qingnian) [Hsin Ch'ing-nienJ and the focus 
of his later professional career as Dean of the College of 
Letters and professor at Beijing University, and 
Commissioner of Education in Guangdong. Richard Kagan has 
further suggested that the centrality of "youth" in Chen's 
thought extended to his acceptance of Marxism, and that "he 
never fully completed the substitution of the proletariat 
for youth as the vanguard of the revolution."31 
A student culture was developing in Japan in the early 
1900s, and there was a strong reformist feeling in the 
air. Western science and technology and Western ideas such 
as democracy and liberalism were popular and taught in the 
universities. Japanese students were quickly adopting 
Western styles of dress and behavior, in opposition to 
their own traditional Japanese culture of Shinto, 
Confucian, and Buddhist values. Japan's success in 
31 Ibid. 
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becoming a "modern" nation, graphically illustrated by 
winning the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, encouraged the 
Chinese students to take their cue from the Japanese 
students, and they became bolder and more vocal against the 
Chinese government. 
Chen Duxiu gravitated to the radical wing of this 
Chinese student vanguard incubating in Japan. In 1903 
members of the Chinese Youth Society, in a dramatic gesture 
of nationalism and condescension toward the Manchu 
government, organized themselves into an army to fight the 
Russians threatening the border at Manchuria and offered 
themselves to the government. Shortly thereafter, Chen 
committed the revolutionary act that succeeded in getting 
him thrown out of Japan. A group of Chinese students were 
intensely critical of the government official whose job was 
to oversee Chinese students from Hubel while they were in 
Japan. They had accused him of trying to control the 
activities of all the overseas Chinese students in Japan, 
as well as of sexual impropriety. A group of students, 
including Chen, broke into his of £ice, held him down, and 
Chen cut off his queue, which was hung in the Chinese 
student union as a trophy. In the diplomatic tangle that 
resulted, Chen and his fellows were deported, and returned 
to China.32 
32 Ibid., 38-39. 
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In the next few years Chen's revolutionary fervor 
continued to grow. Returning to Anhui, he formed a 
revolutionary library (which later became the Anhui 
provincial library) and began to form groups dedicated to 
political and social reform. In 1903 he helped to form 
what has been called the first revolutionary youth group in 
Anhui, the Anhui Patriotic Society (Anhui aiguo hui), based 
in Chen's native Anjing. Stressing "moral uprightness" and 
physical education in order to prepare to fight the 
Russians on the northern border, the group defined itself 
primarily in nationalist terms, " ... seeking to unite the 
masses into an organization that will develop patriotic 
thought and stir up a martial spirit, so the people will 
grab their weapons to protect their country and restore our 
basic national sovereignty."33 
After Chen had given a particularly nationalist speech 
demanding that the Manchu government of China not sign 
treaties with Russia, putting the northern borders in 
jeopardy, a group of students from Anhui Academy who had 
heard the speech began to make demands on their school 
administration to allow them to prepare to "go to the 
Russian front." After a week of disorder and arguments 
33 "Anhwei ai-kuo-hui nichang" [Proposed constitution 
of the Anhwei Patriotic Society], Subao, June 7, 1903, 
quoted in Feigon, 41. 
between students and authorities, several students were 
expelled and an order for Chen's arrest was issued, for 
instigating the disturbances.34 
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Chen fled to Shanghai and went lo work for the China 
National Gazette (Guomin riri bao) (Kuo-min jih-jih-paol, a 
paper directing reform sentiments in a moralistic tone 
toward students who "were sure that their education had 
provided them with an understanding of society their elders 
did not possess."35 Their emphasis was on "historical 
progress" and "nationalism." For a short time Chen 
belonged to an assassination squad that ultimately turned 
into Cai Yuanpei's "Restoration Society" (Guangfu hui) 
(Kuang-fu huiJ, a major revolutionary group in the Lower 
Yangzi Valley.36 
Chen Duxiu spent from 1904-1907 participating in a 
variety of newspaper projects and revolutionary action 
groups. After the actions 0£ one of these groups, the 
"Yue Warrior Society," were implicated in the 
assassination of the governor of Anhui in 1907, Chen and 
34 Feigon, 45-48. 
35 Ibid., 48-49. 
36 Ibid., 56. 
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many of his cohorts fled to Japan again.37 
After the failure of the Nationalist Revolution of 
1911 to bring substantive political or social changes, 
resulting in the nationalization of the warlord government 
of Yuan Shikai, Chen began to attack the cultural structure 
that underpinned those who had risen to power in the failed 
revolution. Returning to China, Chen began to put together 
the various pieces of the puzzle of how to save China from 
itself. Believing, still, that culture and thought had to 
precede politics and social structure, he founded the 
journal that would catalyze the whole New Culture movement, 
New Youth in 1915. It is in New Youth where his notions of 
science and its relation to social change, wrapped in the 
Spencerian/Darwinian rhetoric of Yan Fu, found their 
fullest and clearest expression. 
The first page of the first issue of New Youth, 
frequently excised from subsequent Chinese and Japanese 
reprint editions, contained Chen's editorial policy for the 
journal, written in classical Chinese. Chen's later 
totalistic rejection of Chinese "essences" (ti) is not yet 
37 Ibid., 56-82. Chen was apparently not in France at 
this time, as many scholars have said. It appears that 
Chen has never been to France. For a thorough 
investigation of the issue of whether or not Chen had ever 
been to France, see Feigon, 82-84, and n.73 and n.74. 
evident at this early date (1915)38: 
The strength of our country is weakening, the 
morals [of our people) are degenerating, and the 
learning [of our scholars) is distressing. Our 
youth must take up the task [of rejuvenating 
China). The purpose in publishing this magazine 
is to provide a forum for discussing the ways of 
hsiu-shen (self cultivation) and chih-kuo (the 
methods of governing the state).39 
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This early "manifesto" indicates that Chen's alms at 
that time were not completely divorced from traditional 
Confucian concerns, even while criticizing that tradition. 
Self-cultivation and a concern with the correct running of 
the state as ideals of the Confucian scholar were themes in 
the writings ascribed to Confucius himself, and have been 
central and recurring aspects of the ongoing Confucian 
discourse. Their importance in the Daxue [Ta-hsuehl (The 
Great Learning) has already been mentioned. The language 
in the passage above closely resemble the language used in 
38 Chen had, in fact, gotten interested in the 
"national essence" movement among Chinese students while he 
was a student in Japan. He remained interested in it for a 
time when he first returned to China in 1915. Feigon 
suggests that part of the lure of this type of conservative 
movement for him was its "research" aspect, in which he 
could exercise his interest in kaozheng evidential 
philology. See Felgon, 83-86. 
39 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "She-kao", Hsin Ch'ing-nien [New 
Youth] 1.1 (September 15, 1915), unnumbered opening page, 
quoted in Lin, Crisis of Chinese Consciousness, 65 and note 
17. 
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the Daxue, as well.40 At times they have seemed 
antithetical to each other, or have been treated as such by 
Confucian scholars.41 In Chen Duxiu, as in many of the 
reform and revolutionary thinkers of this period, the two 
are seen as linked, "self-cultivation" now perceived as an 
education in "Western ideas," science, technology, 
economics, or politics, and the proper route to correctly 
governing the state. 
This particular combination of "self cultivation" and 
"statecraft" had been the core of Japanese Nee-Confucian 
attempts at an adoption of aspects of Western economic, 
mathematical, and scientific ideas and practices during 
their contact in the Tokugawa period (1600-1867). In an 
extension of jitsugaku (Ch. shixue lshih-hsuehl, "practical 
40 Compare with the quotation in Chapter II, above, 
p. 36. 
41 Chinese shixue and Japanese jitsuqaku orientations 
toward "practical studies" within the Confucian discourse 
were highly critical of what they perceived as the useless, 
overly metaphysical, quietist and escapist approach of the 
kind of Sung Nee-Confucianism that was focused on "self-
cultivation" usually identified as lixue (Study of 
Principle). See Chapter III, above, pp. 52-53. The ideal 
of a "cultivated" Confucian sage, teaching The Way by 
example was often perceived to be at odds with the ideal of 
the "acting" scholar-official, at work in the society that 
he was in the process of molding. For an example from 
Tokugawa Japan where the two are seen to be working 
together, the urban "merchant academy" of Osaka, see Tetsuo 
Najita, Visions of Virtue in Tokugawa Japan: The Kaitokudo, 
Merchant Academy of Osaka (Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1987). 
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studies"), Japan, after opening to sustained contact with 
the West during the Meiji Period (1868-1912), continued to 
absorb Western technologies, science, educational systems, 
and economic and political strategies from the imperialists 
crouching by their door. By the early twentieth century 
Japan itself had become a formidable imperialist threat to 
China and the rest of East and Southeast Asia. 
Fearing the military threat from Japan, but 
recognizing the opportunity to learn about Western 
technologies and strategies from a culture and in a written 
language less different from their own than those of 
Europe, students started going to Japan in increasing 
numbers at the turn of the century.42 Chen's experiences 
as a young student in Japan, would likely have exposed him 
to that particular combination of Confucian culture and 
Western ideas that Japan had been developing since the late 
Tokugawa period. It would have served to reinforce his 
exposure to Chinese strains of shixue (including "self-
strengthening") and various trends of practical statecraft 
that were current in many schools during his early 
education. 
As Chen conceived it, the aim of New Youth was, on the 
42 There is a detailed, but concise discussion of 
Chinese students in Japan in this period in Grieder, 
Intellectuals and the State in Modern China, 141-148. 
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surface at least, not political. He wanted to promote a 
cultural change in morality, and to reinvigorate China, 
through a change in the basic pattern of thinking. The 
pivot of Yan Fu's concerns had been the belief that thought 
drove action. To change the Chinese into a modern people 
who could survive and thrive in the modern world 
necessitated adopting new ways of thinking and new ideas 
that is, the ideas and ways of thinking of the West. 
Solidly based on a faith in the rationality of humanity 
that had deep roots in Neo-Confucianism, Yan expected that 
these new ideas would, in turn, create the necessary new 
institutions and social structures to ensure China's 
survival. Hu Shi, taking a cue from Yan Fu, also believed 
that cultural and intellectual change had to precede a 
change in social and political structures. 
Prior to 1919, Chen too, believed that new thought 
must precede new politics in saving the nation: "If our 
countrymen have not reached a fundamental awakening in 
their ideas, there are no grounds for blaming the political 
administrators [for not having achieved much]."43 It is 
true that by staying close to non-political issues Chen 
could keep New Youth out of the scrutiny of government 
43 Chen Duxiu's reply to Wang Yunggong, Xin Qingnian 
1.1 (September 15, 1915), correspondence section, 2, quoted 
in Lin, Crises of Chinese Consciousness, 64. 
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officials suspicious of the increasingly anti-government 
stance of the press. But the fact that Yan Fu before him, 
Hu Shi in America, and many others were calling for a 
change in thinking in order to form a basis for new social 
and political structures lends weight to Lin Yu-sheng's 
contention that Chen's motivations for the direction of the 
journal were part of a definite strategy and not simply 
self-preservatory.44 After the fall of Yuan Shikai's 
regime in 1916, the immediate threat to those engaged in 
critical journalism lessened somewhat, but Chen continued, 
until his shift towards Marxism began after 1919, to 
believe in the primacy of intellectual and cultural 
change: "Even if, for the time being, the old is discarded 
and the new is sought, without a change of fundamental 
ideas the old pattern of behavior will naturally and 
definitely re-emerge."45 
Chen's "Call to Youth", the first article of the first 
issue of New Youth, serves as a manifesto of the New 
Culture Movement, lead by "New Youth". New Youth was an 
idea and a reality that materialized in the hatching of 
44 Lin, Crisis of Chinese Consciousness, 64. 
45 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Hsien-fa yu K'ung-chiao" 
[Constitution and Confucianism], Hsin Ch'ing-nlen [New 
Youth] 2.3 (November 1, 1916), in Tu-hsiu wen-ts'un 
[Collected Essays of Ch'en Tu-hsiuJ (Shanghai: Ya-tung t'u-
shu-kuan, 1922), 1:103, quoted in Lin, Crisis of Chinese 
Consciousness, 64. The emphasis is mine. 
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dozens of journals, newspapers, and organizations with the 
word "youth" in their title, and the aims of the "New 
Youth" mentality. The main themes of "Call to Youth" place 
Chen at the nexus of all of the major strains of thought 
current among reformers and progressives in China at the 
time, from liberalism to Marxism. The "Six Principles" he 
urges his readers to adopt are ones that Hu Shi, who was 
still at Columbia University in 1915 when the piece was 
published, would certainly be able to support: 
1. Be independent, not servile (Zizhude er fei 
nulide). 
2. Be progressive, not conservative (Jinbude er 
fei baoshoude) 
3. Be forward-moving, not retiring (Jingongde er 
fei tuiyinde) 
4. Be cosmopolitan, not isolationist (Shijeide er 
fei suoguode) 
5. Be utilitarian, not vacuous (Shilide er fei 
xuwende) 
6. Be scientific, not imaginative (Kexuede er fei 
xlangxiangde) .46 
The earliest example there is of Chen Duxiu's 
conceptualization of "science" and how it worked comes in 
"A Call to Youth" The sixth of Chen's "New Principles" for 
youth was to "Be scientific, not imaginative." (Kexuede er 
46 Chen Duxiu, "Chinggao qingnian" [A Call to Youth], 
Xin Qingnian [New Youth] 1.1 (September 15, 1915): 2-5. 
The translation is mine. 
fei xiangxiangde): 
What is science? It is our general conception of 
matter which, being the sum of objective 
phenomena as analyzed by subjective reason, 
contains no contradiction within itself. What is 
imagination? It first oversteps the realm of 
objective phenomena, and then discards reason 
itself; there is something constructed out of 
thin air, consisting of hypotheses without proof, 
and all the existing wisdom of mankind cannot be 
made to find reason in it or explain its laws and 
principles.47 
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For Chen, " ... the contribution of the growth of science to 
the supremacy of modern Europe over other races is not less 
than that of the theory of the rights of man."48 Here we 
have the first inkling of the slogan for which Chen would 
become famous during the May Fourth movement, "Welcome Mr. 
Science and Mr. Democracy." 
Chen's sense of progress and historical change was 
conceptualized in biological terms, but those of a vitalist 
biology. It is short leap from "self-cultivation" to 
"voluntarism" if the goal is movement in a particular 
direction. Chen's voice of progress, like Hu Shi's, is 
that of Yan Fu reading Huxley reading Darwin -- with 
Spencer looking over Yan's shoulder: 
It is impossible to avoid the struggle for 
survival ... The progress of the world is like a 
fleet horse, galloping and galloping onward. 
47 Chen, "Chinggao qingnian" CA Call to Youthl, 5-6, 
translated in Teng and Fairbank, 244. 
48 Ibid., 6, translated in Teng and Fairbank, 245. 
Whatever cannot skillfully change itself and 
progress along with the world will find itself 
eliminated by natural selection because of 
failure to adapt to the environment. Then what 
can be said to defend conservatism!49 
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It would seem that Chen perceived natural selection as 
a universal, governing "law" of the universe, applicable to 
the universe, the biological world, and the social world as 
well. This is the basic tenet of various forms of "social 
Darwinism," but what is more important for our study is 
not the label, but the source of Chen's thought. The 
elements of Spencer's vitalistic social theory that appear 
in Chen's thought preclude the simple label of "social 
Darwinist." The mechanism for the "survival of the 
fittest" in Chen's way of thinking, is a Spencerian release 
of the energies of the individual for the good of the 
larger society. The survival of the group -- the 9.lill.. -- is 
still the primary goal. This clearly links his thought, 
like that of Hu Shi, with Yan Fu's work. 
At the same time that Chen Duxiu was reassuring his 
readership (and the government authorities) that the 
intentions of New Youth were not political, the journal's 
"manifesto" reverberated with an "iconoclastic 
nationalism," couched in the language of anti-
traditionalist sentiments. In "A Call to Youth" 
49 Ibid., 2, translated in Teng and Fairbank, 243-242. 
The emphasis is mine. 
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C"Chinggao qingnian"J Chen drew a clear line between 
survival of the Chinese culture and survival of the Chinese 
"nation/race": 
All our ethics, law, scholarship, rites and 
customs are survivals of feudalism. When 
compared with the achievement of the white race, 
there is a difference of a thousand years in 
thought, although we live in the same period. 
Revering only the history of the twenty-four 
dynasties and making no plans for progress and 
improvement, our people will be turned out of 
this twentieth-century world, and be lodged in 
the dark ditches fit only for slaves, cattle, and 
horses. What more need be said? I really do not 
know what sort of institutions and culture are 
adequate for our survival in the present world if 
in such circumstances conservatism is still 
advocated. I would much rather see the past 
culture of our nation disappear than see our 
race die out now because of its unfitness for 
living in the modern world.SO 
Chen's stance, though in opposition to traditional 
Chinese culture, was still focused on the survival of the 
Chinese race/nation.51 In this sense he is nationalistic, 
50 Ibid., 2, translated in Teng and Fairbank, 242. 
The emphasis is mine. This quote is also translated in 
Lin, Crisis in Chinese Consciousness, 66. 
51 The characters that have been translated as "race" 
are min zu . It must be remembered that the Chinese 
character zu is a generic word that means both "nation" and 
"race." Even when the character is used in min zu, there 
may be a connotation of either "race" or "nation." The 
Chinese nation was (and perhaps still is) largely 
identified with the Han "race," the dominant ethnic group 
in China for the past several millennia. The passage 
translated here suggests that Chen believes that a nation 
is two-fold: that it contains a biological element: the 
population (the race), and its culture, or civilization 
(wenming). The implication is that if the culture were to 
disappear, there would still be something left -- the 
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as were nearly all intellectuals to one degree or another 
during this period. The real and continued military threat 
from Japan, as well as the humiliation of European and 
American treaty ports cast the desire for survival into a 
mode that was inevitably nationalistic. On the other hand, 
in the same essay, Chen advocated a strong cosmopolitanism. 
Point four of the six-point program for changing Chinese 
patterns of thought Chen proposed in "A Call to Youth" is 
the admonition to "Be cosmopolitan, not isolationist" 
(Shijiede er fei suoguode).52 
Chen's use of the word shijiede [shih-chieh-tiJ for 
"cosmopolitan" should be noted here, for it provides an 
early clue to the shift in ti-yang dynamics that mark 
Chen's departure from Hu Shi during the 1923 debates on 
"Science and a View of Life." Shijiede literally means "of 
the world," and is markedly different from the 
"cosmopolitan" stance of Hu Shi. Hu was well known for his 
cosmopolitanism. He had belonged to the Cosmopolitan Club 
while an undergraduate at Cornell, where he was active as a 
writer and speaker on behalf of world peace.53 Hu's word 
biological population. And it would be left, as always, to 
struggle. 
52 Chen, "A call to Youth," 2. 
53 For an account in English of Hu Shi's 
cosmopolitanism see Grieder, Hu Shih, 52-61. 
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for "cosmopolitanism" was datongzhuyi (ta-tung chu-iJ,54 
which literally translates as "Great Unityism." Because Hu 
Shi's term has clear links to the idea of Datong, or the 
Great Unity, important to Confucianism, it suggests 
movement out from a Chinese center. This is the 
traditional way that China had looked at the world -- with 
itself as the center, looking out from civilization at a 
barbarian periphery. The implication here is that Hu 
Shi's cosmopolitanism is still rooted in the idea of a 
Chinese basis, or essence (ti) of some kind. 
Chen's term, shijiede , suggests a very different kind 
of cosmopolitanism. To be "of the world" is to join the 
world, to be embedded in it. The directionality of this 
term is not the same as datongzhuyi; here one must move 
toward a "larger something." There is no implication of 
Chinese-centeredness in shijiede, as there clearly ls in 
datongzhuyi. In Lee Felgon's recent book on Chen Duxiu as 
the founder of the Chinese Communist Party, he takes the 
position that Chen was more nationalist than cosmopolitan. 
The point ls a difficult one to answer definitively. Prior 
to 1917, when he began to be in close contact with Hu Shi 
through their positions on the faculty of Beijing 
54 In a passage of his Diary, Hu Shi uses the phrase 
datonqzhui for "cosmopolitan." This passage ls translated 
in Grieder, Chinese Intellectuals and the State, 68. 
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University (Beida) and their work for New Youth, at the 
time that "A Call to Youth" was written, nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism were undifferentiated in Chen's thought. 
Though it may seem to be a contradiction in terms, in 
Chen's early thought cosmopolitanism is put in the service 
of nationalism. In order to save the nation/race, it must 
adopt a cosmopolitan (shijiede) approach to its problems. 
Like Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu was often pessimistic in these 
years before the May Fourth movement began. In Chen's 
case, it was a price paid for seeing "the big picture." In 
a letter to his friend Bi Yunzheng [Pi Yun-ch'engJ, 
published in the November 1, 1916 issue of New Youth, he 
expressed his utter dismay that China was not ready for the 
struggle at hand, and that she would not survive: 
My pessimism is not caused by having no quick 
success in our undertaking. It has developed 
from an awareness of the hopelessness of our 
catching up with European and American 
civilizations. They are progressing a thousand 
li a day, while we are left far behind. The 
majority of our people are lethargic and do not 
know that not only our morality, politics, and 
technology but even common commodities for daily 
use are unfit for struggle and are going to be 
eliminated in the process of natural selection. 
Although there are a few awakened people in the 
country, who can save us from the fate of 
perishing?55 
His despair dissipated, ironically, by taking a similar 
55 Chen Duxiu, Xin Qingnian [New Youth] 2.3 (November 
1, 1916): 3 (correspondence section), quoted in Lin, Crises 
of Chinese Consciousness, 59. The emphasis is mine. 
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tact to Hu Shi's particularistic pragmatism -- by focusing 
on a smaller piece of the problem. That piece formed an 
integral part of Chen's understanding of the republicanism 
of his favorite Western nation -- France. It was the 
individual. 
The foremost writer in the 1890s reform era on the 
role of the individual had certainly been Yan Fu. In his 
hands, Spencer's belief in the fundamental integrity of the 
individual as the building-block of society was wedded to 
Huxley's Darwinian portrayal of the survival of the fittest 
in a "general exaltation of the Faustian-Promethean 
dynamism of the West .... "56 This dynamism was the result 
of the interaction of individuals, and, if harnessed, would 
ostensibly save China. But by 1900, several generations of 
reformers had believed that the Chinese Confucian way of 
the Three Bonds and the Five Relationships57 had 
established social norms that had stifled the individual 
and left China weak and unable to face the technological 
56 Lin, Crisis in Chinese Consciousness, 65. 
57 San gang, Wu lun [San-kang, Wu-lunJ: The "three 
bonds" are the ties of minister to king, son to father, and 
wife to husband. The extension of these are the "Five 
Ethical Relationships," which are minister to king, son to 
father, wife to husband, older brother to younger brother, 
and equal to equal. It was virtually impossible to relate 
to anyone else outside of these categories, which had 
clearly defined behavioral expectations. Society was, 
then, a constantly shifting hierarchy of relations, where 
someone is always "above" or "below" you. 
131 
and political challenges of the modern world. 
When Chen Duxiu began to write of the individual after 
1915, it was, at first based on a concern with the 
"nation." Lin Yu-sheng has suggested that his attack on 
Chinese tradition took form in the interaction of his 
notion of individualism and his nationalism: "The nation 
consists of many persons. When the stature of these 
persons is elevated, then the stature of the nation is 
elevated. When the rights of these persons are 
consolidated, then the rights of the nation are 
consolidated."58 He believed national survival was 
possible through cultivation of the individual, much as he 
had stated in the opening editorial of the first issue of 
New Youth, the year before.59 
Chen began to build a cosmology for his anti-
traditionalism. He used a Spencerian rhetoric that began 
58 Chen Duxiu, "I-chiu i-liu nien" [The Year 1916), 
Tu-hsiu wen-ts'un (The Collected Writings of Chen DuxiuJ, 
1:44-45, quoted in Lin, Crisis of Chinese Consciousness, 
67. Benjamin Schwartz has taken the view that Chen's 
"ardent individualism" cancels out his apparent 
nationalism. See Schwartz, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the 
Acceptance of the Modern West," 66. It seems to this 
author, however, that there is a high incidence of 
"individualism" and the concerns of a "nation" appearing 
together in Chen's writings in the period 1915 and 1916. 
Rather than indicating an ambivalence on Chen's part, their 
shared context points to a facultative relationship, the 
existence of either one serving the needs of the other. 
59 See pp. 111-112, above. 
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first in a Huxley-like admittance of a struggle (Chen says 
"resistance") against nature, and cast the story of the 
individual and the nation in terms of a biological struggle 
to build strength for survival. He blamed the "feebleness" 
of China in standing up to its aggressors on an 
unwillingness to fight, on too great an emphasis on 
harmony, on the non-adaptive character of Confucian 
formalism: 
The most regrettable fact is the feebleness of 
the moral leaders of our society ... Whenever they 
confronted obstacles, they let themselves become 
frustrated. Some would commit suicide, others 
would flee to a life of contemplation, still 
others would drown themselves in wine. Such men 
-- so passive, feeble, and decrepit -- are our 
great moral heroes ... Taoism favors [the attitude 
of] withdrawal, Confucianism venerates rites and 
[trains people] to yield (~), and Buddhism 
advocates Ca theory] of vacuity ... The spirit of 
our people is not filled with a single aggressive 
and energetic thought; hence the power of 
resistance cannot take root in our people.60 
Chen's belief that the "culture of China" could be 
replaced with the "culture of the West" in China was made 
possible by Chen's conceptualization of both cultures as 
monolithic. In November of 1916 he wrote: 
If we want to build a new state and organize a 
new society according to the Western model in 
order to survive in this world, the basic task is 
to import the foundation of the Western society, 
60 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Ti-k'ang li" [The Power of 
Resistance], Tu-hsiu wen-ts'un [The Collected Writings of 
Chen Duxiul, 1: 31-33, quoted in Lin, Crisis of Chinese 
Consciousness, 68. 
that is the new belief in equality and human 
rights. We must be thoroughly aware of the 
incompatibility between Confucianism and the new 
belief, the new society, the new state. We must 
courageously decide to throw away that which is 
incompatible with the new belief, the new 
society, the state!61 
By the following spring (March, 1917) he had soundly 
rejected all possibility of a synthetic approach to the 
problematic of China's adoption of "the culture of the 
West": 
If someone thinks the old Confucianism is right, 
he must regard the newly imported culture of 
Europe wrong. There is absolutely no place where 
the new [European culture] and the old [Confucian 
culture] can coexist and be blended together. We 
can only choose one of these two.62 
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By 1917 Chen Duxiu's transfer of transvaluative power 
from "evolution" to "revolution" was well on its way. His 
totalistic conceptualizations of both the culture of China 
(particularly Confucianism) and that of the West was 
essential to this change of perspectives, so that one could 
be replaced with the other, in the way that atoms (atom 
means "unsplittable") replace one another in a materialist 
61 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Hsien-fa yu Kung-chiao" 
{Constitution and Confucianism], Tu-hsiu wen-ts'un [The 
Collected Writings of Chen Duxiul, 1: 111-12, quoted in 
Lin, Crisis of Chinese Consciousness, 76. 
62 Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Ta p'ei chien ch'ing-nien" [Reply 
to the young man bearing a sword), originally published in 
Xin Qinqnian [New Youth) (March 1, 1917), reprinted in Tu-
hsiu wen-ts'un [The Collected Writings of Chen Duxiul, 3: 
48, quoted in Lin, Crisis in Chinese Consciousness, 76. 
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world. Yan Fu himself had been vehemently against 
revolutionary change -- hoping that a developmental process 
of gradual change according to "the evolutionary laws of 
historical progress" would prevail in China. 
However, in many ways, Yan Fu's evolutionary laws were 
the beginning of revolution for Chen, and many others. It 
appears to have been Yan Fu who began to point to 
Confucianism as the source of China's weakness,63 and to 
talk of the mechanism of this cultural debacle in "social-
Darwinist" terms. By placing the blame for China's 
weakness on the dominant Confucianism's "disabling" focus 
on harmony and stability, which had protected China from 
the natural struggles which would have prepared her for a 
European-style modernity, Yan had committed a revolutionary 
act.64 He had not only thought about Confucianism's 
culpability, but as Liang Qichao has said, he had "dared to 
speak" of the idea that Confucianism "[could] not be 
protected and need not be protected."65 It would be 
replaced with Western scientific and democratic thought. 
Yan had set the stage for Chen's argument that in order to 
63 Schwartz, Yen Fu and the West, 179. 
64 James Reeve Pusey, China and Charles Darwin 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 225. 
65 Liang Qichao, Yin-ping-shih wen chi [Collected 
writings from the ice-drinker's studio) (Taipei, 1960) I, 
1: 109, quoted in Pusey, 225. 
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survive China had to completely rid herself of the old 
order and learn to struggle successfully, which was the 
opening for Chen's eventual revolutionism. 
The role of science in this rebuilding of Chinese 
culture for Chen Duxiu in the formative period of his 
thought, between 1915 and 1917 was, as Benjamin Schwartz 
has put it, " ... as a weapon -- a corrosive to be used in 
dissolving tradition."66 It is clear that he saw it as the 
tool with which to conquer nature, necessary because, like 
Yan Fu, the successful struggle against the environment is 
what Chen believed had made the West strong and powerful. 
So Chen's conceptualization of the role of science is 
completely tied to his view that science is what human 
potential at its greatest -- exemplified by the West -- has 
achieved. Science, and the democracy it ostensibly brings, 
is what humans do when they are successfully struggling 
against their environment, and by extension into Chen's 
later Marxism, in the human political world as well. 
In the next chapter, the relations between Chen 
Duxiu's and Hu Shi's conceptualizations of science and its 
role in the transformation of society are examined during 
their period of direct contact, from 1917 -- during the May 
Fourth period, and the subsequent "Debates on Science and 
66 Schwartz, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the Acceptance of the 
Modern West," 67. 
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Metaphysics" in 1923. All of the points of view about 
Western science that had been stewing in China since the 
turn of the twentieth century, including opposition to it, 
came to a head in these debates. When the line was drawn 
between those who saw science as a "sufficient way" to 
relate to the day to day world, and those who did not, Chen 
and Hu were clearly on the side of science. But their 
views diverged as they explored the logical consequences of 
the subtle differences in their beliefs about science and 
culture, many of them a legacy from Yan Fu, in the heat of 
the debates. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE IDEA OF SCIENCE IN THE MAY FOURTH ERA 
AND THE 1923 DEBATES ON SCIENCE VS METAPHYSICS 
The May Fourth era (wusi shidai) Cwu-ssu shih-tai], as 
a period in Chinese intellectual history, extends from the 
nationalism, new journalism, and "new thought tide" of 
"science," "democracy," and "individualism" that began in 
Beijing, Shanghai, and other Chinese cities in 1915, to the 
intellectual aftermath of these trends in the twin polemics 
of Eastern versus Western civilization, in 1922, and 
science versus metaphysics, in 1923. In the center of this 
chronology is the May Fourth Incident itself, in Beijing, 
May 4, 1919.1 The whole period constitutes an important 
stage in the larger Chinese Revolution of the twentieth 
century -- the stage of cultural and intellectual 
transformation that Yan Fu in the nineteenth, and 
ultimately Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu and others in the 
twentieth century had said was the necessary first step 
1 Although the May Fourth Incident is important to the 
overall history of the period, it has very little to do 
with the concerns of this essay. Most of the important 
trends among intellectuals of the period concerning the 
role of science in China's survival originate in the years 
before 1919 and have a life of their own, beyond the events 
of 1919, although they are certainly helped along by them. 
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before a substantial change in political and social 
circumstances could be effected. Though Yan Fu was 
intensely opposed to the intellectual revolution of the May 
Fourth period (by then he had become a pro-Confucian 
monarchist), much of May Fourth thought owes its origins to 
the trends in thought that he began and the great influence 
his work had on other intellectuals in the period. 
This chapter will be concerned with the further 
development of Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu's notions of the 
meaning of science in the May Fourth period, from about 
1917 through the "Debates on Science versus Metaphysics" in 
1923. The importance of the year 1917 to the May Fourth 
era for one noted historian of the period is due to a 
"gathering momentum" in that year of the tide of new 
thought and new literature that began in 1915, "due to the 
rallying of the new intellectual leaders around New Youth 
(Hsin Ch'ing-nien) magazine and National University of 
Peking."2 Beginning in 1917, at Beijing University 
(National University of Beijing), Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu 
were part of a uniquely diverse collection of scholars, put 
together by then president of the University, Cai Yuanpei 
CTs'ai Yuan-p'ei] (1868-1940). And they were also an 
important part of the editorial core of the reform journal 
2 Chow, 6. 
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New Youth. 
New Youth, founded in 1915 and originally edited in 
Shanghai by Chen Duxiu alone, was moved to Beijing in 1917 
and edited from early 1918 to mid-1920 by a coalition 
editorial board of reform-oriented Beijing University 
faculty, which included Hu Shi.3 It served as an important 
link between the self-conscious, though loosely allied, 
group of the more progressive liberal and 
socialist/anarchist elements among the faculty and their 
students. Because it was widely read among non-academic 
intellectuals, it also helped to tie the Beijing academic 
community to progressives in other social, political, and 
labor movements. 
Of the important focal points for the May Fourth 
movement and the "new culture" it espoused, the one with 
the most sweeping ramifications for intellectuals of the 
day was, perhaps, the "new" Beijing University. The 
institution had gone through a number of changes since its 
inception in 1898, but none with such cataclysmic or long 
lasting repercussions as those that were begun in 1917 by 
Cai Yuanpei. 4 
3 The six editors were Chen, Hu, Qian Xuantung, Li 
Dazhao, Liu Fu, and Shen Yinmo. See ibid., 44-45, note d. 
4 The origins of Beijing University are in the 1898 
Reform Movement (Wushu bianfa) [Wu-shu pien-fa) and the 
"100 Days of Reform." Most of the Imperial reform edicts, 
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In its earliest years, Beijing University was 
popularly known as "the Brothel Brigade," "the Gambling 
Oen," or "the Fountainhead of Ribaldry and Bawdiness" for 
the reputation its students and faculty had for gambling 
and sexual excess.5 The first serious attempt to reform it 
came four months after the 1911 Nationalist Revolution. In 
February 1912 Yan Fu, then well known as a translator of 
Western books and advocate of Western learning, was 
appointed the president of the University by Yuan Shikai 
(Yuan Shih-k'ai) (1859-1916), who had recently wrested the 
presidency of the Republic from Sun Yatsen (1866-1916). 
based on the proposals of its major proponents, Kang Youwei 
and Liang Qichao, were annulled by the Dowager Empress, 
Cixi. The funding for what was then called Imperial 
University (Jingshi Daxue) CChing-shi Ta-hsuehJ, however, 
was not cut off. She appointed a well-known conservative 
scholar, Sun Jia'nai [Sun Chia-nail, to be its first 
superintendent. W.A.P. Hartin, appointed by Sun to oversee 
the Western faculty, developed programs in French, English, 
Russian, Japanese, and other foreign languages, and a few 
courses in applied mathematics and astronomy, while 
basically not upsetting the basic curriculum of traditional 
Confucian studies. The students, who had all passed at 
least the second level (zhuren) Cchu-jenl of the civil 
service examination, were less than enthusiastic about non-
Confucian studies that would not contribute to their 
ability to pass the imperial examinations for the highest 
degree. The students were in the habit of being 
" ... officials-in-waiting: gambling, whoring, and in 
general, expecting society to reward them for the mere fact 
of being students of the Imperial University." See Vera 
Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the 
Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1986), 39-41. 
5 Chow, 49-50. 
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Though Yan would grow politically more conservative as time 
went on, becoming one of Yuan's chief supporters in his 
attempts at an Imperial restoration (1915 and 1917), his 
ideas on educational reform, in terms of both curriculum 
and institutional structure, were the beginning of the 
complete transformation of Beijing University that would 
be accomplished in 1917 and 1918 by Cai Yuanpei.6 
When Cai Yuanpei was appointed president of Beijing 
6 Yan Fu revamped the foreign languages program, 
insisting that students go to classes (!),and practice 
speaking the languages they learned, particularly English. 
He asked the Ministry of Education to change the name of 
the school to Beijing Daxue [Peiking Ta-hsuehJ, that is 
Beijing University, reflecting a new identity as a Western-
styled institution of higher learning, rather than an elite 
bastion for "officials-in-waiting." He also argued 
forcefully for a raise in faculty salaries, insisting, in 
language that is still echoed today, that in order to 
maintain and raise the quality of the teaching staff, that 
salaries had to reflect the high value that should be 
placed on a good education. Conservative elements in the 
Ministries of Education and Finance began to work for Yan's 
dismissal (spreading "rumors" of the opium addiction he had 
apparently never denied), while he was in the midst of 
hiring a new group of faculty, a process that would 
continue after his resignation in November 1912. Many of 
the new faculty, beginning with those who were hired under 
Yan's tenure, had some education in foreign schools, and 
had been exposed to Western ideas and acquired Western 
skills in European, American, and especially Japanese 
schools. Many of the ideological differences between 
Beijing University faculty that were involved in the May 
Fourth movement can be partially ascribed to the very 
different intellectual histories and contemporary currents 
each was exposed to in the country in which they studied. 
See Schwarcz, 43-45. 
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University? by Yuan Shikai's successor Li Yuanhong [Li 
Yuan-hung} on December 26, 1916, he had a clear vision of 
the kind of institution it needed to be to serve as the 
premier training ground for the "new citizen" of a new 
China. An active anarchist and nationalist prior to his 
appointment, he was able to collect a faculty of radically 
divergent opinions which encouraged an environment of 
discussion and inquiry. By the time he had served as 
Minister of Education under Sun Yat-sen in 1912, he had 
already talked of an ideal system of education for China 
that was "above politics." Above all he advocated freedom 
of thought, but grounded on a strong morality and belief in 
the promise of human rationality.8 
Cai gathered together a faculty of conservatives, 
liberals, socialists, monarchists, republicans, 
nationalists, and anarchists that was unparalleled in the 
world at the time for its diversity. Both Hu Shi and Chen 
Duxiu, with whom we are primarily concerned in this essay, 
owe their professional "base of operations" during the May 
Fourth period to their faculty appointments at Beijing 
University in this period. Cai Yuanpei had known of Chen 
7 Beijing University (Beijing Daxue) is frequently 
abbreviated "Beida." Sometimes this abbreviation may be 
used in this essay. 
8 Chow, 51-52. 
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Duxiu since 1906, when they were both anti-Manchu 
revolutionaries in Shanghai. He brought Chen with him as 
the Dean of the School of Letters when he took off ice as 
president in late 1916.9 Chen was, at that time, deeply 
involved in editing and writing for the journal New Youth 
and was a public figure with quite a following among 
intelligentsia outside the universities. Because Chen was 
also known as an advocate (and practitioner) of 
revolutionary violence, his appointment was a bold move on 
Cai's part.10 
Hu Shi accepted a position teaching Chinese and 
Western philosophy at Beida in the autumn of 1917.11 He 
was already well known to intellectuals in China through 
articles that had been published in New Youth while he was 
still in the United States. By the time he began his tenure 
at Beida, he and Chen had begun their promotion of a 
"literary revolution" in the pages of New Youth. Beginning 
in 1917, the writers for New Youth stepped up their attack 
9 Ibid., 52. 
10 For more background on Chen's early political life 
see Chapter V, pp. 110-117, above. 
11 Chow, 53. Hu would later serve as the chairman of 
the department of English Literature, dean of the School of 
Letters (1930-37), and Chancellor of Beijing University 
(1945-49). Additionally, he served as the Chinese 
ambassador to the United States from 1938-1942, during the 
second Sino-Japanese War. See Chow, 26-27, note c. 
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on traditional Chinese culture, particularly 
Confucianism.12 
The Beida faculty who were on the editorial board of 
New Youth all fundamentally believed in the need to achieve 
substantial intellectual and cultural change before real 
social and political change. But political concerns often 
made this nearly impossible to adhere to for those, like 
Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, whose political lives were 
activist to begin with. As Hu Shi remembered the situation 
in a speech delivered at Beijing University in 1932: 
When in 1917 we worked together for New Youth, we 
had a common ideal that we should for twenty 
years not talk politics. We promised to keep 
away from politics for twenty years and to be 
devoted only to educational, intellectual, and 
cultural activities, to build a political 
foundation by way of nonpolitical factors. But 
this promise was not easy to keep, because even 
though we resolved to refrain from talking 
politics, the practical political situation 
compelled us to become involved in it.13 
By 1918, a student-lead wing of the New Culture 
movement was beginning to have a public identity. A group 
of students interested in history and literature and active 
12 Ibid. I 53, 57-58. 
13 Hu Shi, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu yu wen-hsueh kc-ming" [Chen 
Duxiu and the Literary Revolution], in Ch'en Tu-hsiu p'inq-
lun [Discussions on Chen DuxiuJ, ed. Chen Tung-hsiao, 51-
57, quoted in Chow, 57. This essay was originally a 
speech delivered at Beijing University, October 30, 1932, 
while Chen was in prison and being tried by the Nationalist 
government in Nanjing. 
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in the movement founded the monthly journal New Tide (The 
Renaissance) (Xinchao) CHsin-ch'aoJ. There was a strong 
link between the New Youth writers and their younger 
compatriots at New Tide. Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao were 
able to secure funding for them from Beijing University and 
Hu Shi served as their advisor. Most of those associated 
with the journal would eventually become student leaders of 
the May Fourth Incident.14 
As the "intellectual and cultural revolution" of the 
"new thought tide" began to grow and spread throughout 1917 
and 1918, opposition to their aims began to grow as well, 
though it was never particularly effective. No doubt 
because it was staffed by faculty from Beida, New Youth was 
under attack by conservatives for attempting to destroy 
"Confucianism, the code of rituals, the "national 
quintessence," chastity of women, traditional 
ethics ... traditional religion,and ancient literature, as 
well as old-fashioned politics." Fully accepting the 
responsibility for the attacks, on behalf of the journal, 
Chen Duxiu sloganized the two fundamental principles that 
"new thought" intellectuals would use in their "war of 
words" (wenzhan) Cwen-chanJ to bring China into the modern 
world, "Mr. Democracy" (Demokelaxi xianshenq) and "Mr. 
14 Ibid., 55. 
Science" (Saiyinsi xiansheng):lS 
All of these charges are conceded. But we plead 
not guilty. W~. have committed the alleged crimes 
only because we supported the two gentlemen, Hr. 
Democracy and Hr. Science. In order to advocate 
Mr. Democracy, we are obliged to oppose 
Confucianism, the codes of rituals, chastity of 
women, traditional ethics, and old-fashioned 
politics; in order to advocate Hr. Science, we 
have to oppose traditional arts and traditional 
religion ... we are compelled to oppose the cult of 
"national quintessence" and ancient 
literature ... has this magazine committed any 
crimes other than advocating Hr. Democracy and 
Hr. Science? If not, please do not solely 
reprove this magazine; the only way for you to be 
heroic and to solve the problem fundamentally is 
to oppose the two gentlemen, Mr. Democracy and 
Mr. Science.16 
There is a strong assumption, on Chen's part, that 
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everyone who wanted to "save China" would want to support 
"(Mr.) Science" and "(Hr.) Democracy," ipso facto. 
"Science" and "democracy" were understood to be the basis 
of "modernity." Hu Shi, in his preface to the collected 
works of the "Debates on Science versus Metaphysics" a few 
years later, in 1923, would reiterate this assumption that 
the reform-minded were those who, for better or worse, 
15 These words are not the words for "science" and 
"democracy," but rather Chinese words used to 
transliterate English words. It is an indication of Chen's 
(and others') turn towards the English speaking world at 
this time that the Western language that was used for this 
rhetoric was English, and not French or German. 
16 Chen Duxiu, "Benzhi suian zhi da bienshu" [A reply 
to the charges against our journal], Xin Qingnian (New 
Youth] 6.1 (January 1919): 1-2, translated in Chow, 59. 
nearly worshipped science: 
During the last thirty years there is a name 
which has acquired an incomparable position of 
respect in China; no one, whether informed or 
ignorant, conservative or progressive, dares 
openly slight or jeer at it. The name is 
Science. The worth of this almost nationwide 
worship is another question. But we can at least 
say that ever since the beginning of reformist 
tendencies [1890s] in China, there is not a 
single person who calls himself a modern man and 
yet dares openly to belittle Science."17 
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Here we have an intimation of one of the fundamental 
differences between Hu Shi's and Chen Duxiu's notions of 
the character and social role of modern science. Chen's 
science comes as a unit, materialized and personified as 
"Mr. Science." Science, then, is a total "thing," to be 
either accepted or not. Hu Shi's concern, however, is with 
the suppression of critique as a result of acceptance of a 
"total" science. As a philosophical pragmatist, Hu was 
precluded from a purely totalistic notion of science. 
Unlike Chen, Hu Shi's concept of knowledge was historical -
- "genetic" in pragmatist terms -- accumulative. Because 
it was a process, adapting to changing circumstances, 
critique was a built-in necessity. 
Chen's notion of science after 1917 was increasingly 
focused on its "determinative" aspects. In this 
17 Hu Shi, "Kexue yu renshengguan xu" (Preface to 
Science and Philosophy of Life), in Kexue yu Rengshengguan 
(Science and Philosophy of Life), I (Shanghai: Yatung 
Publishing Co., 1923), 2-3, translated in Kwok, 11-12. 
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description of science as "law," the sense of constant 
change that is evident in Hu's thought is absent in Chen's 
beliefs: 
I believe that in the future the true belief and 
course of action for humanity will be guided by 
the proper course of science. At such time all 
religions will be among the expendable items. 
The reasons for this ... can be stated in outline. 
In the universe there are two kinds of law --
natural law and man-made law. Natural law, to 
which science belongs, is all-pervasive, eternal, 
and inevitable. Man-made law, to which belong 
religion, ethics, and rules, is partial, 
temporary, and rational ... The future evolution 
and progress of mankind must be based on the 
budding science of today; we must seek gradually 
to improve man-made laws so that they conform 
with the results of natural laws. Only when this 
is done can life and the universe_be in perfect 
union. This is our greatest and most final 
purpose!18 
Chen conceived of a holistic-deterministic universe, 
much like that of the Chinese tradition, where "what is 
above" (in the heavens) is reflected in "what is below" (on 
earth, in human society). But in Chen's monism, there can 
only be a single unit for everything in the universe --
matter. For Chen, science is ~priori, humans apparently 
just "discover" it. The mechanism whereby humans apprehend 
these relationships in the universe that he is calling 
"science" are not made clear in Chen Duxiu's writings. In 
18 Chen Duxiu, "Zai lun Kungjiao wenti" [Again on the 
problem of Confucianism], Xin Qingnian [New Youth] 2.5 
(1917): 1 (first article), quoted in Kwok, 76-77. The 
emphasis is mine. 
149 
the above passage, Chen has set science (Natural law) 
against "the rational" (Man-made law), as though there were 
only room in all of "good thinking" for one of them. Their 
relationship to each other, if any, isn't spelled out. In 
fact, science seems to be substituted for rationalism in 
the fight against "superstition": " ... I am in favor of 
replacing religion with science and of cultivating slowly 
our realistic faith, which is definitely attainable by 
science .... "19 
It is clear that materialism was part of what 
attracted Chen to Marxism. And, as "science" was the key 
to reality and materialism was the foundation of science 
for Chen, and he wished, fundamentally to rework society, 
his "science of society" would be completely materialist as 
well. By 1921, Chen was setting "science" against 
"metaphysics" in a way that presaged the Debates, still two 
years away: 
From now on our duty towards learning and thought 
must be the analysis of human affairs and matter 
in order to establish unequivocal facts [about 
the two areas, social science and science]. This 
then is my idea of science; it can also be called 
a philosophy. If, however, we were to detach 
ourselves from the analysis of human affairs and 
matter and indulge in the empty speculations of 
metaphysics, wishing to find a quick but illusory 
method to solve problems of the universe and 
life, we would be entertaining fanciful dreams 
that characterized the past. We must wake up! 
19 Ibid., quoted in Kwok, 77. The emphasis is mine. 
Let me ask you: outside of human affairs and 
matter, is there still any universe or life?20 
1921 was the year that Chen and Li Dazhao committed 
themselves fully to Marxism and founded the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). In this move to Marxism, Chen's 
total and social definitions of science came together --
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and in the process he ceased to call for democracy. Chen 
carried this new "social science," without the old aim of 
democracy, into the "Debates on Science versus Metaphysics" 
two years later. 
The "Debates on Science versus Metaphysics" were able 
to occur in 1923 because effective opposition to the wave 
of pro-science sentiment had developed by that time. 
Opposition to the attack on Confucianism and the rest of 
the foundations of Chinese civilization that was being 
mounted by the new intelligentsia of the "new thought tide" 
was weak in the early years, and had posed little threat. 
Many of this opposition were old gentry who had no 
experience with modern, Western ideas, and couldn't 
maintain credibility with the new young scholars, 
increasingly educated in the West or Japan. But after 
1919, the intellectual programs of the New Culture 
movement were criticized by scholars who had studied and 
20 Chen Duxiu, "Da Jlebing" (Answering Jlebing), June 
1, 1921, Tu-hsiu wen-ts'un (Collected Essays of Ch'en Tu-
hsiu), 3: 373, quoted in Kwok, 81. The emphasis is mine. 
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compared the civilizations of China and "the West," and 
found the West wanting. The material, economic, and social 
devastation of World War I in Europe started many 
intellectuals, European and Chinese alike, thinking 
critically about the values of Western civilization. 
After World War I, the Occidentalism that many Chinese 
had espoused since the turn of the twentieth century in 
their pursuit of the key to modernization and national 
survival was challenged by a new wave of Orientalism from 
Europe.21 Philosophers such as Henri Bergson (1859-1941) 
and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), disturbed by the events 
of the war, began to see "Oriental pacifism," especially 
in China, where Karl Wittfogel had once seen "Oriental 
despotism." And, they began to question the presumed value 
21 Orientalism is a concept brought out in the open by 
Edward Said, in Orientalism (New York: Random House, 1978; 
reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1979). Basing a working 
definition on Said's, "Orientalism is a style of thought 
based on an ontological and epistemological distinction 
made between "the Orient" and (most of the Time) "the 
Occident"." (See p. 2) It should be added that these are 
simple differences, but ones that are assumed to cut to the 
"essence" of what each set of traditions is supposed to 
stand for. Strains of Orientalism have cropped up in 
twentieth century America is various movements to exhault 
pre-modern Chinese, Japanese, or Indian culture as 
superior, without examining any of the superficial 
presumptions on which such ideas are based. By extension, 
"Occidentalism" is "Orientalism" in reverse. Many of the 
"New Culture" movement supporters of the May Fourth era in 
China were "Occidentalists," promoting Western ideas 
without any real understanding of the historical 
circumstances that produced them. 
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of the West's materialistic and scientific civilization.22 
Liang Qichao (Liang Ch'i-ch'aoJ, who had been one of 
the strongest "Occidentalists" in China before World War I, 
late in 1918 lead a group of "semi-official" Chinese 
observers from the Paris Peace Conference on a trip through 
Europe, during which they visited Bergson and other 
philosophers, intellectuals, and politicians. The group 
included two men who would be important players on opposite 
sides of the 1923 "Debates on Science versus Metaphysics," 
•• Carsun Chang [Zhang Junmai, Chang Chun-mai] and V.K. Ting 
(Ding Wenjiang, Ting Wen-chiang]. For the Europeans they 
met on this trip, the war had been the result of "the 
bankruptcy of Western civilization," and they looked to 
the relative stability of Chinese civilization for a 
corrective.23 
Liang's contact with the disenchanted Europeans had 
undercut his "dream of the omnipotence of science": 
Those who praised the omnipotence of science had 
hoped previously that, as soon as science 
succeeded, the golden age would appear forthwith. 
Now science is successful indeed; material 
progress in the West in the last one hundred 
years has greatly surpassed the achievements of 
the three thousand years prior to this period. 
Yet we human beings have not secured happiness; 
22 Chow, 327. 
23 Ibid., 328. 
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on the contrary, science gives us catastrophes.24 
He took direct aim at New Youth (and Chen Duxiu in 
particular) by accusing "Mr. Science" of being a shadowy 
seducer, luring the unwary into "the slough of despond." 
Liang called the fact that Europeans had come to this 
conclusion about their own civilization "a major turning 
point in current world thought."25 He even went so far as 
to lay the blame for the war at the feet of Darwin, who, 
because of the widespread regard in China of Yan Fu's 
translation of Huxley's treatment of Darwinian evolution, 
had become nearly synonymous with "science" in Liang's and 
many others' minds.26 
24 Liang Qichao, "Ou yu xinying lu jielu" [Impression 
of a European Journey], Shishi xinbao [The China Times] 
(Shanghai, March 1919), quoted in Chow, 328. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Joseph R. Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind 
of Modern China (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1967), 203. In "Laozi zhexue" (The philosophy of 
Laozi) (1919?), while trying to explain Europe's interest 
in the Taoist philosophy of Laozi [Lao-tzu] in its current 
wave of Orientalism, Liang had his say about Darwin and 
World War I (even while confusing Yan Fu's translations of 
Spencer with Spencer's Principles of Sociology and Huxley's 
Evolution and Ethics): "Since Darwin's discovery of the 
principle of the evolution of species, a great revolution 
has occurred in intellectual circles of the whole world. 
His service to learning must be acknowledged. But 
afterwards his theory of struggle for existence and 
survival of the fittest was applied to the study of human 
society and became the core of thought, with many evil 
consequences. This great European war nearly wiped out 
human civilization; although its causes were many, it must 
be said that the Darwinian theory had a very great 
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Liang Qichao had "thrown down the gauntlet" in what 
was to be a sprawling debate over the next four years 
(1919-1923) on the relative merits of the "new" Chinese 
culture versus the "old." By extending the two fundamental 
points Liang had to make in his influential 1919 
articles,27 the impetus for the two stages of polemics that 
follow emerges. The first point was a belief in the 
"failure of Western civilization." It took several years 
before anyone could mount effective support for Liang's 
contention. But in 1920 and 1921, Liang Shuming [Liang 
Ssu-mingJ, lecturer at Beijing University, gave a series of 
lectures on "Eastern and Western Civilizations and Their 
Philosophies." In these talks the Chinese "way of life," 
Confucianism and Chinese metaphysics in particular, was 
systematically defended in the process of explaining 
Western, Chinese, and Indian civilizations as stages in the 
development of society as a problem solving mechanism. His 
influence. Even in China in recent years, where 
throughout the whole country men struggle for 
power ... although they understand nothing of scholarship, 
yet the things they say to screen themselves from 
condemnation are regularly drawn from Yen Fu's translation 
of "The Principles of Evolution" ... No wonder that Mencius 
said, "These evils, growing in the mind, do injury to 
government, and, displayed in the government, are hurtful 
to the conduct of affairs." Perhaps the European's current 
fondness for the study of Lao-tzu is in reaction to this 
theory." See Levenson, 203. 
27 Chow, 328-329. 
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systematic critiques of previous views on the issue of 
Chinese versus Western "ways of life" set the tone and 
intensified the issues for the polemics to come.28 
It is the second of Liang Qichao's points, his 
criticism of the "dream of the omnipotence of science," 
that is of importance to this present study; it catalyzed 
enough controversy that the 1923 "war of words" (lunzhan) 
on science versus metaphysics owes its origins to Liang's 
discussions. As Chow Tse-tsung has noted, many who read 
Liang's articles converted his wary attempt to forge a 
balanced interpretation of the achievements of scientific 
culture into a belief in the "bankruptcy of science" 
itself .29 
The "Debates on Science versus Metaphysics" deepened 
and focused the issues of the "Eastern versus Western 
Civilization" arguments, on both sides. The polemic of the 
debates began with a lecture given to a group of science 
students at Tsing Hua University, February 14, 1923, by 
28 Ibid. I 329-332. 
29 Ibid., 328-329. At the end of Ou yu xinying lu 
jielu [Impressions of a European Journey], Liang mollifies 
his ringing pronouncements against the "rightful" dominance 
of Western civilization with this more balanced comment: 
"The reader must not be mistaken [by this article) so as to 
belittle science; I absolutely do not recognize the 
bankruptcy of science, but then also I do not recognize the 
omnipotence of science." Quoted in Kwok, 138. 
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Carsun Chang (1886-1969), a professor at the university.30 
He was a graduate of waseda University in Tokyo, in 
political science, and his post-graduate work in Germany 
and England added to the credibility of his opinions about 
Western civilization. He had travelled with Liang Qichao 
on the 1918 tour of Europe where he was developing his 
anti-Western ideas, and he was clearly sympathetic to the 
cause.31 
Chang's lecture, titled "The Philosophy of Life" was a 
severe criticism of the view that science was a unitary 
approach to all facets of life, including morality and 
ethics -- the area that was part of "a philosophy of life" 
(rensheng guan) [jen-sheng kuan]. His post-graduate work 
in Germany had evidently exposed him to debates on the 
supposed split between "natural sciences" 
30 There is only one article in English on the 
Debates, Lin Yu-sheng, "The Origins and Implications of 
Modern Chinese Scientism in Early Republican China: A Case 
Study -- The Debate on Science vs. Metaphysics in 1923," 
Proceedings of the Conference on the Early History of the 
Republic of China, 1912-1927 (1983) 2: 1181-1200. A full-
length study in English of the polemic on "Science versus 
Metaphysics" has never been done. Secondary discussions 
with a fair number of details may be found in Kwok, 135-
160; Chow, 333-337; Grieder, Hu Shih, 145-160, passim; and 
Benjamin I. Schwartz, "Themes in Intellectual History: May 
Fourth and After," in The Cambridge History of China: 
Volume 12, Republican China 1912-1949, Part I, eds., Denis 
Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 439-444. 
31 Grleder, Hu Shih, 145. 
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(Naturwissenschaft) and "spiritual sciences" 
(Geisteswissenschaft),32 as his own view placed "an 
unbridgeable gap between them."33 For Chang a philosophy 
of life was "subjective, intuitive, synthetic, freely 
willed, and unique to the individual."34 And all the 
issues could be reduced to one: 
No matter how developed science is, it can never 
solve the problems of the philosophy of life, 
which depends entirely on man himself and nothing 
more ... From Mencius and Confucius down to the Li 
school of Sung, Yuan, and Ming, the thinkers all 
gave priority to the cultivation of the inner 
life and hence brought about a spiritual 
civilization. Europe ... for three hundred years 
concentrated on the control of nature by human 
power with the result that it produced a 
materialistic civllization."35 
The geologist V.K. Ting (1887-1936) led the attack 
against Chang. Chang had set up "science" and 
"metaphysics" as dichotomous, with completely separate 
spheres of application, and Ting's attack was first 
directed to this issue. For Ting, the universe was 
32 Schwartz, "May Fourth and After," 419-420. 
33 Lin, "Science versus Metaphysics," 1181. 
34 Chang Chun-mai, "Rensheng guan" CA view of life], 
in Kexue yu rensheng guan [Science and a view of life], 
with prefaces by Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu (Shanghai: Yadong 
tushuguan, 1923; reprint, Taipei, R.O.C.: Wenxue Zhubanshe, 
1977), 9 (page references are to the reprint). Kexue yu 
rengsheng quan will hereafter be abbreviated as KYRG. 
Translated in Lin, "Science versus Metaphysics," 1181-1182. 
35 Ibid., 9-10, translated in Kwok, 141-142. 
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unified, and therefore science was also unified. To say 
that one part of phenonmena are not ultimately 
apprehendable using the methods of science is then absurd. 
His theory of knowledge was brought in to support his 
argument: 
[The] contents of psychological phenomena are all 
material for scientific study. The nature of 
matter that we know is but [that derived from] 
psychological sensory stimulation; perception 
leads to conception, and conception leads to 
inference. What science undertakes to study is 
nothing but these conceptions and inferences; 
whence comes the difference between the so-called 
spiritual sciences and material sciences? How 
can one also say the purely psychological 
phenomena cannot be governed by the scientific 
method?36 
For Ting, as for others such as Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu 
who would rally to support and augment his point of view as 
the exchange continued, there was one "law of causation" in 
the universe, applicable to all phenomena. For Ting, 
"science" was the "philosophy of life," a universally 
applicable approach: "The aim of science is to eliminate 
from the philosophy of life preconceived and subjective 
ideas, the greatest enemy of the philosophy of life, [and) 
to search for the kind of truth that can be recognized by 
all."37 And, as it had proven to be for Hu Shi, the 
36 V.K. Ting, "Xuanxue yu kexue" (Metaphysics and 
Science}, KYRG, I:l (second article), translated in Kwok, 
144. 
37 Ibid., 20, quoted in Kwok, 144-145. 
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universalizing aspect of science was linked to its strength 
and its "utility" as method, another echo of Yan Fu's faith 
in Huxley's and Spencer's "avoidance of bias": 
The method of science is to distinguish the 
falsity and truth of things, to classify all 
available data, and then to bring order to these 
data, and to use the simplest and clearest 
language to express them ... science is all-
sufficient not so much in its subject matter as 
in its method and procedure."38 
Ting's notion of scientific method is more inclined to 
assign primacy to induction, over deduction or hypothesis. 
The science of Ting's training, geology, was, at that time, 
observational-classifying in character, and perhaps 
conditioned his predilection for the inductive approach to 
phenomena through empirical sense-perception.39 As Lin Yu-
sheng has noted, hypothesis and deduction were not absent, 
but highly de-emphasized in Ting's point of view:40 "It is 
38 Ibid., quoted in Kwok, 145. V.K. Ting was quite 
involved intellectually with Hu Shi at the time that this 
piece was written, and might had been influenced by him in 
terms of the importance of method. The article from which 
these passages are taken first appeared in a small weekly 
liberal journal that Hu and Ting had founded in Beijing in 
1922 called Null zhoubao [Nu-li zhou-paoJ (Endeavor), after 
several years of discontent at the "political" direction 
New Youth had taken under the influence of Chen Duxiu. 
Ironically, Endeavor, turned out to be Hu's debut vehicle 
for political commentary. See Grieder, Hu Shih, 184-188, 
150. 
39 Lin, "Science vs. Metaphysics," 1185; Schwartz, 
"May Fourth and After," 440. 
40 Lin, "Science vs. Metaphysics," 1185. 
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not that science attaches no importance to individuality 
and intuition. But individuality and intuition recognized 
by science are those which are derived from hints of 
experience -- those that emerge from living experience (as 
Hu Shi has said)."41 
The parenthetical aside in Ting's comment above, 
tipping his hat to Hu Shi, brings up an important aspect of 
the way in which Hu, and Chen Duxiu as well, enter the 
1923 debate. Hu and Chen were not a part of the week to 
week "war of words" in the journals that lasted for nine 
months or more of that year.42 However, their articles in 
New Youth and their influence among other intellectuals in 
the May Fourth period were fundamentally responsible for 
establishing the notions of "Chinese thought" versus 
"Western thought" and "science" versus "metaphysics" as a 
dichotomies, as well as defining those aspects of science 
valued by progressive intellectuals in the debates. 
Hu had, since his days at Cornell, perceived 
"scientific thinking" as the remedy for religion and other 
41 Ting Wenjiang, "Xuanxue yu kexue" (Metaphysics and 
Science), KYRG, 30, quoted in Lin, "Science vs. 
Metaphysics," 1185. 
42 Grieder, Hu Shih, 151. Hu Shi was recovering from 
a physical breakdown during much of 1923, and was not in 
Beijing during the controversies. But, as many of the 
articles in the polemic appeared in journals that he 
edited, it is obvious that he kept close tabs on the affair. 
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"superstitions." Chen had berated the "impracticality" and 
"vacuousness" of the Confucian tradition unrelentingly and 
promoted a view of science as a pre-existing "law" for 
humans to align themselves with in the press since 1915. 
The 1923 Debates revolved around this very point: "science" 
versus "metaphysics." Hu and Chen wrote prefaces to the 
entire polemic when the various articles were published in 
the collection Kexue yu Rensheng Guan (Science and the 
Philosophy of Life) in 1923. It only indicates the 
importance others attached to their points of view on the 
issue of science and meaning in this period that they were 
asked to write the prefaces when they had not been active 
participants in the polemic of that year. 
In Hu's preface to the debates, clarifying his own 
position regarding the primacy of "science" over 
"metaphysics," his faith in the human apprehension of the 
phenomenal world -- a supreme faith in the "rule of 
evidence" -- was his bottom line: 
In the China of today where religious worship has 
been comparatively free, if we deeply believe in 
the scientific evidence available now, we can 
only deny the existence of God and the 
immortality of the soul. If this is the case, 
then we might as well proclaim ourselves 
atheists. This type of faith cannot be called 
dogmatic because it is based on evidence.43 
43 Hu Shi, "Kexue yu rensheng guan xu" (Preface to 
Science and the Philosophy of Life), 14-15 of second 
preface, translated in Kwok, 105. 
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In this important sense Hu was a rationalist and a 
materialist and approached his assessment of the issues in 
the debate on these bases. But his pragmatism led him to 
pluralism, as well. In an infinite universe, with a 
plurality of contexts, there is no single and final answer 
to the questions humans seek to answer, even when applying 
the scientific method to their solution: "The constant 
search for truth does not imply a complete success because 
truth is infinite and the universe is infinite. That we 
must keep searching is merely to fulfill our obligation, 
hoping that we can add an iota to the total whole."44 It 
is in this respect that his conception of science differs 
from the "totalism" of Chen Duxiu. 
By the beginning of the "Debates on Science versus 
Metaphysics" Chen Duxiu had new rhetoric and a new focus in 
his response to the issues, indicative of his conversion to 
Marxism. Whereas previously he had treated the "scientific 
way of thinking" as a "corrosive" to eat away the infection 
of traditional Chinese society, in the period of the 
debates he switched to regarding science as the set of the 
"economic laws" of Marxism. He, had two years earlier, 
already joined the "laws" of human affairs to the "laws" of 
44 Hu Shi, "Kexuede rensheng guan" [The Scientific 
Philosophy of Life], Hu Shi wenxuan [Selected Essays of Hu 
Shi] (Hong Kong, 1958), 77, quoted in Kwok, 106. 
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matter in a single, unitary "science."45 In Marxism he 
finally had his "science of human affairs." Marx himself 
had believed his economic philosophy to be a "science of 
society." Chen's notion of science as a description of the 
"laws of nature" became even more deterministic in his 
application of these "laws" to human society. 
In his section of the preface to the 1923 collection 
of the articles of the debates, Chen attacked the positions 
of nearly all the participants, on the basis of his 
reinforced materialism. The "metaphysicians" were guilty 
of "dream talks," the pro-science faction was guilty of not 
advocating a unitary schema of linear causation. In the 
rhetoric of Marxism, Chen attacked Liang Qichao's belief 
that "feeling and sentiment" don't lend themselves to 
scientific examination by reducing human emotions and 
values to the consequences of socioeconomic "laws and 
forces."46 Chen believed "· .. that only objective, material 
causes can account for social evolution, can explain 
history, and can determine the philosophy of life."47 
Hu Shi's notion of a "view of life," implied in many 
45 See above, pp. 139-141. 
46 Kwok, 152-154, especially note 36. 
47 Chen Duxiu, "Kexue yu Rensheng Guan Xu" [Preface to 
Science and the Philosophy of Life], KYRG, quoted in Kwok, 
154. 
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of his earlier writings, came together during the period of 
the debates. Later in his life, he formulated a "Credo" 
that he felt he had been stated in a "more general way" in 
his preface to the debates. Hu called his "Credo" the 
"Religion of Social Immortality": 
... the religion of Social Immortality ... is 
essentially based on the idea that the individual 
self, which is the product of the accumulated 
effect of the social self, leaves an indelible 
mark of everything it is and everything it does 
upon that larger self which may be termed 
Society, or Humanity, or the Great Being ... This 
Great Self lives forever as the everlasting 
monumental testimony of the triumphs and failures 
of the numberless individual selves."48 
It was a reverberation of Yan Fu's Spencer, whose notion of 
the energies of the individual being developed in the 
interest of the progress of the larger group had shaped 
much of the May Fourth era discussion of individualism. 
And it was intellectual progress in Darwinian terms -- an 
accumulation of "numberless individual selves." 
Hu proposed "a framework for a new philosophy of the 
universe and life." Some Christian missionaries 
"mischievously" called the ten points of Hu's credo "Hu 
Shi's New Decalogue."49 But they represent what Hu 
considered essential to a "view of life" at the time of the 
1923 debates. Hu's credo spelled out the scientific basis 
48 Hu Shi, "Credo," 259. 
49 Ibid., 260. 
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for a proper "view of life" (rensheng guan). It was " ... a 
hypothesis founded on the generally accepted scientific 
knowledge of the last two or three hundred years ... I 
propose to call it, not 'a scientific credo', but merely 
'the Naturalistic Conception of Life and the Universe.'"50 
Hu's credo was built upon his understanding of the "laws of 
causality" and the unity of phenomena in the adherence of 
all of their behavior to these same laws of causality. 
With echoes of Herbert Spencer, as presented by Yan Fu's 
translation of A Study of Sociology, physical "law," 
biological "law," and the hypothetical "laws" that govern 
the evolution and maintenance of societies are all of a 
piece -- and can be "scientifically studied" by humans. 
The capstone of Hu's credo is the tenth item, the 
raison d'etre for study and science, in fact for bothering 
with any of this at all: 
On the basis of biological, sociological, and 
historical knowledge, we should recognize that 
the individual self is subject to death and 
decay, but the sum total of individual 
achievement, for better or for worse, lives on in 
the immortality of the Larger Self; that to live 
for the sake of the species and posterity is 
religion of the highest kind; and that those 
religions which seek a future life either in 
Heaven or in the Pure Land, are selfish 
religions.51 
50 Ibid., 261-262. 
51 Hu Shi summarized this aspect of his view of life 
in English in "Credo," 261. 
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For Hu, change was the very basis of life. This change was 
not the first step to chaos, as Confucianism tended toward, 
but the first step on the way to survival, as Darwin and 
Huxley believed. Human capacities are the result of 
adaption to change, and intelligence is a sign of the 
"natural" freedom of humans within the perimeters of the 
"laws of causality": 
Even the absolute universality of the law of 
causality does not necessarily limit [Man's] 
freedom, because the law of causality not only 
enables him to explain the past and predict the 
future, but also encourages him to use his 
intelligence to create new causes and attain new 
results. Even the apparent cruelty in the 
struggle for existence does not necessarily make 
him a hardened brute; on the contrary, it may 
intensify his sympathy for his fellow men, make 
him believe more firmly in the necessity of 
cooperation, and convince him of the importance 
of conscious human endeavor as the only means of 
reducing the brutality and wastefulness of the 
natural struggles. In short, this naturalistic 
conception of the universe and life is not 
necessarily devoid of beauty, of poetry, of moral 
responsibility, and of the fullest opportunity 
for the exercise of the creative intelligence of 
man.52 
By the "Debates on Science versus Metaphysics" in 1923 
the legacy of Yan Fu's initial presentations of "how" 
modern science works and its role in China's modernization 
and survival as a nation had split into two distinct 
streams, represented by the thought of Hu Shi and Chen 
52 Ibid., 263. The emphasis is mine. 
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Duxiu. They still shared certain important presumptions 
about the fundamental importance of the group in human 
affairs and a focus on scientific methodology as the way to 
rebuild the Chinese people into a competitive, progressive, 
independent, modern nation. But Chen, partly perhaps 
because of his intensely activist personality, in a 
revolutionary fervor had taken the energetics of Yan Fu's 
Spencerian vision and left the gradualism implied by Darwin 
behind. He was more focused on causality, and therefore 
had more of a single directionality to his thinking than Hu 
Shi by this time. Progress for Chen seemed to leave behind 
the past, unlike Hu's more historical, cumulative vision. 
Hu's vision allowed a more active role for man in 
determining his own circumstances than Chen's did. Hu's 
reality is interactive with humanity -- we can create "new 
causes and attain new results." The voluntaristic strain 
of Yan Fu's thought receives a stronger application in Hu's 
thought than in Chen's deterministic approach. Chen's 
sense of "law" precludes there being very many alternative 
routes to solving a problem, and only one possible route 
for history. 
The "debates" themselves did not end on a definitive 
note, solving once and for all the issue of the "correct 
view of life" for Chinese to adopt. It could be said that 
the success of the communists in the 1949 revolution is an 
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indication that the pro-science faction won the debate. 
Communism is an approach that believes that it is applying 
the "economic science of society" to all human affairs, 
but it is inaccurate to say that "Western science" won the 
debate. However, the tendency of the pro-science faction 
to adhere to the Y.Q..!1g_ side of the ti/yong paradigm had its 
cultural precedents in Chinese intellectual traditions as 
much as the "metaphysicians" tendency toward ti and 
"Chinese essences" did. By relying on ideas from Western 
thinkers for their arguments in the debate -- and in the 
polemic on Eastern versus Western Civilizations that 
preceded it -- while casting their arguments in traditional 
Chinese philosophical terms, both sides in the debate 
managed to "face both ways." 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS: THE MEANING OF SCIENCE, 1898-1923 
The concern of Chinese intellectuals with the "idea" 
of modern science in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century was, fundamentally, concern about "national 
survival" and "modernity." Given the military, economic, 
and political dominance of the West in East Asia and the 
need for Chinese national survival, thinkers such as Yan 
Fu, Hu Shi, and Chen Duxiu saw salvation in the very 
modern-ness of the modern West and the modern Japan it had 
successfully inspired. In fact, the value and meaning that 
accrued to science in general, and Darwinian evolutionary 
theory as the "science of choice" among Chinese 
intellectuals of this period, was due to their belief (or 
disbelief) in the power of these ideas to describe, 
explain, or solve the problematic of "modernity" in the 
Chinese context. 
It is important for Western trained historians, still 
emerging from the "monolithic, static, 
Confucian/superstitious China" meets "versatile, dynamic, 
democratic/scientific West" trend of historiography on 
nineteenth and early twentieth century China, to 
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"deprogram" our ethnocentrism in overemphasizing the 
importance of the West in shaping Chinese events in this 
period.l On the other hand, we must not shy away from a 
critical examination of the impact of challenging ideas 
from the West on Chinese intellectuals of this period. One 
of the most problematic aspects of the "old" historiography 
has been the attempt to apply a "tradition versus 
modernity" paradigm to early twentieth century China.2 
Benjamin Schwartz rejects such a category as inadequate to 
explain the behavior of Chinese intellectuals of the 
"transitional generation" (ca. 1890-1920), primarily 
because it doesn't focus on "what happened in China."3 
This present study of the meaning of modern science in 
the thought of three key figures in this generation, by 
focusing on "what happened," that is, on what Yan Fu, Hu 
1 The "Introduction" and first essay, "China's 
Response to the West" in Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History 
in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese 
Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 1-55, 
offers an excellent summary of the main strains of "Western 
impact" historiography on nineteenth and twentieth century 
China, and some of the more recent correctives. 
2 For a general discussion of the problems with 
tradition modernity models in recent Chinese history see 
Cohen, 57-96 (Chapter two, "Beyond 'Tradition and 
Modernity"). 
3 Benjamin I. Schwartz, "The Limits of "Tradition 
versus Modernity" as Categories of Explanation: The Case of 
the Chinese Intellectuals," Daedalus 101.2 (Spring 1972): 
79-81. 
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Shi, and Chen Duxiu wrote, and not on applying the label of 
"traditional" or "modern" to their work, shows a complex 
development of thought within a Chinese context, but 
informed by the Western sources each man had turned to. 
Having said this, there are three inter-related overall 
conclusions that can be drawn from the writings of these 
three important figures: 
1. Contrary to the "old" historiography on the period, 
sustained contact with the ideas of the West in the period 
leading up to the May Fourth era did not instigate a 
generalized "break with the past" among intellectuals. 
Rather, the thinkers in this study faced "both ways" at 
once -- outward, toward the West, and inward, toward the 
Chinese tradition. 
2. The "idea" of modern science is positively regarded 
as a tool for solving the problematic of modernity in China 
it is the method for achieving the "transvaluation of 
culture" many felt to be the necessary first step in 
changing China's political, economic and social structures. 
Examination of the dynamic between the concepts of ti and 
YQDS in Yan, Hu, and Chen's writings about science shows 
this trend. 
3. Yan Fu's influence on thinkers in the May Fourth 
period succeeded in establishing a trend of thought about 
the meaning of modern science in general, and Darwinian 
evolutionary theory in particular. This trend can be 
clearly seen in the thought of Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu; even 
the radical divergence in their views after 1921 are 
reverberations of elements in the thought of Yan Fu about 
which he was ambivalent or whose logical consequences he 
had insufficiently explored. 
Establishing that there was no cataclysmic "break" 
with the Chinese tradition is a necessary first step in 
understanding the meaning of modern science for the figures 
in this study. Despite the clearly "anti-traditional" and 
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often frankly iconoclastic character of the thought of all 
three men, their language, categorizations, approach, inner 
logic, and choice of avenue of expression were often 
reflections of a submerged and unacknowledged intellectual 
context whose parameters were still largely Confucian. In 
fact, the great extent to which each man was aware of and 
participated in the "Confucian discourse" of late Imperial 
China and its extension into the Republican period, through 
conscious scholarship and critique, and through unconscious 
habits of thought, made the transmission of the meaning of 
modern science possible in this transitional stage between 
"old" and "new" China. 
Yan Fu's approach with its adherence to Confucian 
categories of description and assumed acceptance of 
Confucian cosmology, even while promoting "progress," 
"democracy," "individuality," and "science," set the stage 
for much of the discussion, for and against modern science, 
that was to follow. Many of these Confucian, or "native" 
aspects of Yan's thought are deeply intertwined with the 
second and third conclusions arrived at in this essay as 
well, and will be discussed further in the contexts of 
science as a tool of cultural transvaluation, ti/vong 
dynamics, and Yan's influence on the thought of Hu Shi and 
Chen Duxiu. But a few elements may be selected out for 
special mention. 
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Yan initiated the practice of transferring the role of 
Sage as the adept of knowledge and the methods to obtain it 
to the scientist or "scientific" thinker as the adept of 
both the processes of change or evolution in the universe 
and of scientific knowledge in general. Starting from the 
assumption that "knowledge is power," Yan Fu's belief that 
the power of the West lay in its scientific thinking led 
logically to the idea that the new Sage would be the man 
who thought "scientifically."4 In selecting the first 
Western book for his translation project, it was no 
accident that it turned out to be Thomas Huxley's Evolution 
and Ethics. Charles Darwin was one of the "new" Sages and 
Yan felt that his theory of evolution described the 
mechanism of the West's strength. Huxley's systematic and 
"unbiased" approach in presenting Darwin's theory in a 
social context suited Yan's Confucian need for intellectual 
balance and social order.5 Elements of The Doctrine of the 
Mean and the Great Learning, important texts of the 
Confucian canon, echo throughout Yan's thought, linking the 
Sage's (read: scientist's) elimination of disorder in the 
4 See Chapter II, above, pp. 23-25. 
5 Never mind that Huxley's motivation in writing his 
book was to thwart just exactly that social-engineering use 
Europeans like Herbert Spencer had already made of Darwin's 
theory. It was this aspect that held such power for Yan Fu 
and those he influenced. 
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running of the state to the centeredness to be achieved 
through the "integrity of intentions" and "the 
investigation of things." Morality, as it had been for 
Confucians for two thousand years, was still fundamental to 
the enlightened person. 
Yan's ultimate emphasis on the "group" (gun) is 
another reverberation of Confucian considerations. Despite 
Yan's focus on individuality as the prime mover of society 
in the West, and his indebtedness to Herbert Spencer's 
concept of the importance of releasing the "energies" of 
the individual in order to maximize their contribution to 
society, his greater concern is society. This ambivalence 
between emphasis on the individual and the group is one of 
the aspects of Yan's thought that finds expression in the 
divergence of Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, and will be discussed 
later. 
The second and third conclusions are so interlocked 
and dependent on an understanding of the general dimensions 
of the first conclusion that they cannot be fully pulled 
apart and must be presented together. A major part of Yan 
Fu's legacy to the thought of the May Fourth period was the 
idea of science as a tool and method for changing culture. 
The trend, through the "Debates on Science versus 
Metaphysics" in 1923, was an increased separation of a 
notion of science's "usefulness" from any sense of its 
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relationship to underlying principles, an increased 
ahistoricity. This is clearly seen in the way in which ti-
Y.Q..!1.g_ dynamics, conceptually part of the Confucian past, 
change over one generation of intellectuals influenced by 
Yan Fu, represented by Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, when examined 
in terms of their relation to notions of the meaning of 
science. That these new, "modern" issues are expressed in 
terms of "national essences" (ti) and their "usefulness" 
(Y..Q.llil) tie them to an ages old Confucian discourse. 
Yurij Lotman and B.A. Uspensky have pointed out that 
during great changes in a given culture, what seem like 
contradictions in the blending of new and old forms and 
behaviors in a changed aspect of culture are simply part of 
the semiotic mechanism of cultural change: 
It is significant that a change of culture (in 
particular, during epochs of social cataclysms) 
is usually accompanied by a sharp increase in the 
degree of semiotic behavior (which may be 
expressed by changing of names and designations), 
and even the fight against old rituals may itself 
be ritualized. On the other hand, the 
introduction of new forms of behavior and the 
semiotic intensification of old forms can testify 
to a specific change in the type of culture.6 
Language and categories of thought, as part of the system 
6 Yurij Letman and B.A. Uspensky, "On the Semiotic 
Mechanism of Culture", in Critical Theory Since 1965, eds. 
Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle (Tallahassee, FL: Florida 
State University Press, 1986), 410. The emphasis is mine. 
"Semiotics" in this context has the meaning of 
"semantics," that is the study of "signs and what they 
signify" -- systems of communication. 
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of signs? of a culture, are a critical part of this 
semiotic mechanism. 
The ti-yang dynamic in early twentieth century China 
is an example of such an "old form" (Confucian) being 
intensified with the introduction of new forms of behavior 
(Western) .8 In moving from the thought of Yan Fu, to Hu 
Shi and Chen Duxiu, their notions of the meaning of modern 
science are expressed, implicitly and explicitly, in terms 
0£ this ti-yong category, and are thus an indicator of 
"specific change." In turn, by examining how this change 
in the ti-yong dynamic occurred, the way in which "modern 
science," a foreign idea, was taken into the intellectual 
culture of China in the early part of this century becomes 
clearer. 
When cautious "self-strengtheners" of the mid-
nineteenth century such as Tan Sitong [T'an Ssu-t'ungJ and 
Zhang Zhidong [Chang Chih-tungl first began to talk of 
Western science and technologies, they were thinking of 
"techniques" for modernizing China's military and 
7 I bid. 
8 According to Wing-tsit Chan, the concept of ti-yang 
originated with Wang Bi [Wang Pi] (226-249) in a commentary 
on the term~ (non-being) in Laozi. Wu, a "positive" 
state in Taoist thought, was equated in this commentary 
with U, or "essence." It became a prominent metaphysical 
concept in both Neo-Confucianlsm and Buddhism. See Wing-
tsit Chan, ed., A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 791. 
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industrial technologies. The more conservative faction's 
intention to leave the whole cloth of Chinese civilization 
intact while grafting on the "techniques" they believed 
were at the heart of the strength of the modern West was 
amply illustrated in 1898 by Zhang Zhidong's famous 
formula: "Chinese learning for the fundamental principles, 
Western learning for its practical use" (Zhongxue wei ti, 
Xixue wei yong). By resorting to the dichotomy, long in 
Chinese philosophy, of ti (principle, essentials) and YQ1l9. 
(practical, useful), with ti given priority, Zhang clearly 
lent his support to the state status QJ!Q., buttressed by an 
entrenched Confucian orthodoxy. At the same time, he 
succeeded in establishing the notion that ti and Y.Q!!.9.. were 
mutually separable from each other. In his formula, they 
are not interactive, like the yin-yang duality of ancient 
Chinese philosophy, but characterize truly separate 
spheres. 
Yan Fu's motivation for writing journal articles and 
undertaking his mammoth translation/commentary project in 
the late 1890s was his over-riding concern with China's 
survival. If China was going to survive, autonomously, in 
the modern world, it was going to have to become modern. 
Four elements are discernable in Yan's writings that he 
felt were essential to the West's "wealth and power" as a 
modern nation: progress, individuality, democracy, and 
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Western science. All of these ideas had to be imported 
from outside the Chinese tradition. As Yan worked out the 
details, particularly in his translations of Thomas 
Huxley's Evolution and Ethics and Herbert Spencer's A Study 
of Sociology, science, both in general as a way of 
thinking, and the specific case of Darwinian evolution, 
became a "wild-card" of a sort. All of the other elements 
were dependent on science, and science was the result, as 
well. 
Spencer had taught Yan that the power of the 
progressive West lay in harnessing the energy of 
individuals, trained increasingly in science. The result 
was democracy, where the individual could be of the 
greatest value to the group, the gun [ch'un]. The group 
has been recognized as the core of Chinese societal order 
for millennia.9 From reading Huxley and Spencer Yan 
developed the belief that Darwinian struggle, where 
"[Living] things contend" (wu jing) and "Nature [Heaven] 
chooses" (Tian ze) was the arena where Europe (and England 
in particular) had fought and won. Europe was rich and 
powerful (fu giang) because its people had struggled and 
had proven the fittest. What did they have that China did 
not have? They had progress, individuality, democracy, and 
9 The Confucian/Legalist philosopher Xunzi [Hsun-tzul, 
(fl. B.C.E.220) described man as the "grouping animal." 
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science. Above all, they had science. 
Yan Fu also contributed an emphasis on methodology, 
which, in essence, is an emphasis on Y.2.llil· Yan believed 
that Huxley and Spencer, in their presentations, freed 
investigation from bias, or "lop-sided extremes." Yan was, 
essentially, looking for balance and order. He was still, 
as Confucians for generations before him had done, seeking 
to adhere to the "Doctrine of the Mean." The "mean' was 
the resonance with the balance of Heaven/Nature that the 
"superior man", or sage, sought in his dealings with human 
society.10 "Science" would be the new source of balance 
and order, illuminating the path to truth and power. 
Because Yan Fu never mentions the fate of "Chinese-ness," 
that is, a Chinese essence (ti) (in fact it did not become 
an issue in the Chinese press until the 1910s), it is 
probably safe to assume that he believed that it was a 
10 An example of the mean defined in this way is the 
following from Chapter I.4 of The Doctrine of the Mean: 
"While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, 
or joy, the mind may be said to be in a state of 
EQUILIBRIUM. When those feelings have been stirred and 
they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be 
called the state of HARMONY. This EQUILIBRIUM is the great 
root from which grow all the human actings in the world, 
and this HARMONY is the universal path which they all 
should pursue." See The Doctrine of the Mean [Zhong Yung], 
in Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning, and 
The Doctrine of the Mean, translation and exegetical notes 
by James Legge, (New York: Dover, 1971, an unabridged 
republication of the second revised edition of Volume I in 
the "Chinese Classics Series," (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1893)), 384. 
180 
given, and not in jeopardy. 
Between progressive intellectuals and in the new 
independent press at the turn of the twentieth century, a 
discourse on modernity and tradition began to emerge with 
"science" at the core. The rationale for the new interest 
in "science," a concept from the West, was its usefulness. 
"Science" emerged, as it had in the West, as the 
"handmaiden" of modernity, as the method for transforming 
culture. As the generation of intellectuals who came of 
age between the 1890s and 1910s had been the last to be 
educated in the orthodox interpretations of the Confucian 
canon necessary to take the civil service examinations, 
this discourse was, to some extent, carried out in 
Confucian terms. 
Yan Fu's influence on intellectuals of the May Fourth 
era (1917-1923) has been widely acknowledged, though never 
traced. By examining the influence of Yan's notions of the 
role and meaning of science on two very different figures 
from this period whose influence was wide-spread and who 
had close contact with each other, the liberal Hu Shi and 
republican-turned-communist Chen Duxiu, a clear trend of 
thought emerges. Even when the views of Hu and Chen 
concerning the meaning of science become radically 
divergent after Chen's turn to Marxism-Leninism in 1921, 
their branching-off can be viewed as further development of 
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strains of Yan's thought whose consequences had been 
insufficiently explored or about which he had been 
ambivalent. In particular, there is an overall trend, in 
discussions of science as a transformer of culture, as the 
bearer of modernity, to subsume Chinese essence, or any 
cultural essence (ti) in useful techniques (.YQ.nS.). In 
moving through the thought of Yan Fu to Hu Shi and Chen 
Duxiu, ti seems to evaporate, its importance dissipates. 
Hu's approach to modernity and science's place in it 
was still a kind of synthesis -- to forge a new national 
identity (ti) out of the dialectic between the Chinese 
people, with their Confucian past, and modern "scientific" 
problem solving in their particular environment --
geographical and cultural. While rejecting a disabling 
Confucian culture he felt had put China in the vulnerable 
position it occupied with regard to foreign "treaty-
ports," Japanese imperialism, and internal warlordism, he 
was unwilling to be ahistorical. Progress for Hu was a 
process, an accumulation of smaller steps, not "leaps and 
bounds." The pragmatism of John Dewey that he adopted (and 
adapted) was a "genetic" method, knowledge formed by 
building on a series of experiences. The problem of 
"national essence" was solved, for Hu, by "letting nature 
take its course" among a Chinese people educated to think 
using scientific method. 
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Donald Munro offers another interpretation of the 
changing character of ti, especially as it relates to the 
thought of Hu Shi. The concept of ti, or essence, in a 
consciously social setting can be described in terms of a 
group's "consensus on values"ll -- this is the group's ti. 
In the earlier discussion in Chapter IV of ti and YQ.!1SI. as 
they relate to Hu Shi's effort to theorize the rebuilding 
of Chinese culture on a basis of "scientific thinking," it 
was already suggested that the evidence shows that Hu, 
while focusing primarily on .Y..Q.llii, on the usefulness of 
something, preserved the role of ti through the gradualism 
and "genetic sense" of Dewey's philosophical pragmatism.12 
Some essence of being Chinese would always be present in 
solving problems in China because the problems were being 
solved in Chinese conditions, by Chinese. In Hu Shi's 
thought ti is partially submerged in the notion of Y.Qll.S.. 
Philosophical pragmatism's conceptualization of theory and 
practice growing out of the circumstances at hand allowed 
Hu to neatly sidestep the issue of the fate of Chinese ti -
- it would always be evolving, along with changing 
circumstances, and would, therefore, always be there. 
11 Donald J. Munro, Images of Human Nature -- A Sung 
Portrait (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 
219. 
12 See Chapter IV, above, pp. 88-91. 
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Donald Munro's recent work on "human nature" in Sung 
Neo-Confucianism and its continuity with aspects of modern 
Chinese intellectual history casts some light on the 
resonances from the Nee-Confucian tradition in Hu's nolion 
of ti. The part of Hu's "unconscious legacy of the Neo-
Confucian past" Munro brings to our attention is Hu's 
"faith in the possibility of a consensus of values."13 
Because of pragmatism's fundamental identity as a method, 
it "requires a consensus on moral first 
principles ... Philosophical pragmatists do not like to 
articulate first principles. They assume them."14 The 
American progressives from whom Hu learned pragmatism while 
a student of John Dewey's in the late 1910s shared ti, or 
a "cultural essence" of belief in the values of progress 
through science and industrialization, the Protestant work 
ethic, individualism, and human rights.15 
Hu Shi had faith that "modernizing the Chinese mind" 
through education in "scientific thinking," would result 
in a "consensus on values" -- and that democracy would, 
naturally, prevail. Munro posits that the source of this 
faith is part of the legacy of Neo-Confucianism: the claim 
13 Munro, 219. 
14 Ibid. The emphasis is mine. 
15 Ibid., 219-220. 
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that a nation of "one mind" and in agreement on major 
principles of morality can be achieved through education 
and a belief in a universal moral sense.16 Hu's apparent 
naivete in ignoring the differences in historical setting 
of the two areas of the world -- the United States and 
China -- in applying the experience of one with "national 
consensus" to the circumstances of the other may be 
ascribed to this echo of Nee-Confucianism in Hu's pattern 
of thinking. At the same time that an essentially Chinese 
notion is shaping Hu's thought, he is, in a sense partially 
substituting American ti for Chinese ti. His belief that 
pragmatism and "scientific thinking" would both create and 
take root in a "new national consensus" was conditioned 
both by Chinese tradition and a practical desire to see 
these concepts work in China. By assuming that the 
required "consensus on values" either already existed (as 
in the United States) or could be achieved through 
particular educational methods, the issue of ti is 
partially subsumed in the notion of usefulness, or Y.QJ19., in 
Hu's thought. 
The break between "conservatives" and nearly all other 
intellectuals in the May Fourth era concerning science was 
certainly over the issue of whether the tradition of 
16 Ibid., 220. 
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Chinese culture, particularly Confucianism should be cast 
out in favor of a new, modern "scientific" culture, 
borrowed or adapted from the West. The issue between 
liberals and radicals, between Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, 
however, was not Confucianism, but the difference between 
the liberals' gradualist "science-as-process" and the 
radicals' sense of "science-as-law," as "something to be 
in accordance with." 
Jerome Grieder gives a clue to the fork in the road 
for liberals and radicals in the May Fourth period that, 
although directed at their political concerns, is 
applicable as well to their notions about the meaning of 
science. Since the publication of Yan Fu's translations, 
Western science and technology were perceived by a 
significant number of Chinese intellectuals to lie at the 
heart of Western "wealth and power," however defined. 
Although Grieder never mentions any names, Hu Shi and Chen 
Duxiu are representative liberal and radical (he may well 
have had them in mind): 
The radicals, those who sooner or later 
gravitated toward the revolutionary program of 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, found there a 
restatement ... of the traditional idea that human 
behavior is conditioned by environment through 
the medium of social values, political forms and 
the cultural justifications for them ... Though 
they redefined the meaning of "environment," 
stripping it of its Confucian moral connotations 
and substituting a materialist theory of social 
and cultural determinism, by creating culture as 
a derivative of political power they echoed a 
traditional perception ... The liberals ... 
attempted to break away from the totalistic 
tradition by affirming the possibility of 
individual creativity as a source of cultural 
values. To them, the "New Culture" movement 
meant not only emancipation from the particular 
culture of Confucianism, but ... emancipation from 
the belief that man is merely the product of a 
cultural environment which he is powerless to 
control and which is itself the product of forces 
-- either moral or material -- even more remote 
from ordinary observation.17 
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In the context of Dr. Grieder's remarks, though Chen 
Duxiu is usually painted as more political and more 
radical than Hu Shi, and certainly was in term of his 
acceptance of Western political systems (Marxism generally 
being considered more radical than liberalism!). At the 
same time he is just as indebted to Confucian values as Hu. 
In particular, his adherence to the notion of culture as 
"totalistic" -- he regarded both China and the culture of 
the "West" (read:France) as seamless and "total" -- recalls 
the Confucian notion of tianxia [t'ien-hsia], that is, of 
all under Heaven being within the influence of Heaven's 
Way. As mentioned in Chapter VI,18 Hu maintained his 
skepticism and sense of the necessity of critique. 
Knowledge and reality were not seamless for Hu. 
17 Jerome B. Grieder, "The Question of "Politics" in 
the May Fourth Era," in Reflections on the May Fourth 
Movement, ed. Benjamin I. Schwartz (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1972), 99. 
18 See Chapter VI, above, p. 147. 
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Early in Chen's writing career, when he had not yet 
arrived at the total conscious rejection of Chinese 
essences (ti) that marked his work after 1921, the sense of 
morality that Greider referred to above was still 
present.19 But he was already looking "outside" China in a 
different way than Hu had. As early as 1915, Chen already 
exhibited elements of this totalistic rejection of the 
Chinese tradition in his use of the word shijiede 
("worldly") for the English "cosmopolitan," a very outward 
facing expression compared to Hu Shi's datungzhuyi ("Great 
Unity-ism"), which is very inward looking, still seeing 
China as the center of civilization.20 
Chen's "looking outward" extended to his materialistic 
view of science. Science was, for him, a reflection of the 
"laws of Nature," and as such was steady-state and not open 
to criticism. The job of humans, in practicing science, 
then is to reflect the "laws of nature" in the policies and 
procedures of society. Science "contains no contradictions 
within itself,"21 and is as much as "truth." By as early 
as 1917, he had called for the Chinese, and youth in 
particular, to make a choice between European and Chinese 
19 See Chapter v, above, pp. 117-120. 
20 See Chapter V, above, pp. 127-129. 
21 See Chapter v, above, p. 125. 
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culture -- no synthesis was consciously possible for Chen 
Duxlu. 
Chen's materialism combined with strong expectations 
of service to society and a belief that knowledge is for 
the benefit of society from his Confucian background, and 
contributed to his eventual turn to Marxism-Leninism, as a 
"science of society." His science was utterly monistic, 
unlike Hu's skeptical promise of pluralism and critique. 
And all mention of ti is gone. There is only matter. And 
its laws are the laws of the universe. Marxism's economic 
"laws" were the "science of human affairs" that his 
Confucianism had inadvertently taught him to look for. It 
no longer mattered that the philosophy of Marxism had 
developed within the intellectual history of not simply the 
West, but a specific locale -- nineteenth century Germany. 
Because it was "scientific," it was universally applicable 
its truth value was transferable to China. 
Chen's legacy lives on today in the current Chinese 
Communist government notion that modern science can be 
separated from the social/cultural matrix of Western Europe 
that created it. The current crackdown on pro-democracy 
student demonstrations that began in the spring of 1989 is, 
to some extent, a government response to the fact that when 
students are sent to the West to learn the "techniques" 
(YQ..Il.S) of modern science and technology, they often return 
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to China with the "ideas" of the West as well. The current 
Chinese regime shares with one of the founders of the CCP, 
Chen Duxiu, the belief that the physical reality of 
science and technology (YQI!.S.) can be completely separated 
from the underlying principles from which it developed. In 
China today, all is YQ.!}S, ti seems to have dissipated. 
Marxism, as a "science of society" has been universalized 
to cover all instances of Chinese society, as science was 
in the "Debates on Science versus Metaphysics" in 1923. 
Both the liberal view of science as a critical method, 
applicable to all of life, represented by Hu Shi, and the 
Marxist view of science as universal "law," have their 
Chinese antecedents in the thought of Yan Fu. He would no 
doubt have disapproved of both views. But his focus on 
"science as method," its power as an idea to transform the 
political and institutional structures of Chinese society, 
and the ways in which he expressed his views, consciously 
and unconsciously, to a great degree within the cosmology 
and language of Confucianism, were a major contribution to 
thought concerned with the meaning of science during the 
May Fourth period, in particular that of its major 
proponents, Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu. By beginning the debate 
about the role and meaning of science, some threads of his 
thought may still be found in official government ideology 
about science in China today. 
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